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Chapter 1
The Roaring Thirties
When people think of the United States in the 1930s, they rarely imagine a time of
technological and organizational innovation, much less of rapid labor productivity
growth. Instead, this decade is more often associated with lengthy unemployment
lines, dust storms, crop failure, foreclosures and overall financial malaise. Contempo-
raries felt no diﬀerently. In the early 1940s, Lifemagazine labeled the previous decade
the “Gloomy Thirties,” whereas Time opted for the, equally grim, “Threadbare Thir-
ties.”1
In academics, the ‘Great Crash’ of 1929 and the ‘Great Depression’ that ensued have
also left their mark and a great body of literature has been written on the subject. Most
of these studies, both in economics and economic history, deal with the stock-market
crash, the bank-runs and the international monetary crisis.2 Many evaluate the direct
consequences on consumer demand, employment, price levels, international trade and
real output.3 Moreover, in light of the recent financial crisis, various studies reflect on
the lessons learned from the 1930s by reexamining the fiscal and monetary policies
1. M. Meredith, “The ‘Nifty Fifties,’ the ‘Flying Forties,’ the ‘Threadbare Thirties,’ and the ‘Roaring Twen-
ties’ of Twentieth Century America,” American Speech 26 (1951): 228.
2. B. Bernanke, Essays on the Great Depression (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); B. Eichen-
green, Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992); M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1963); L. Chandler, America’s Greatest Depression, 1929–1941 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1970); E. White, “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 4 (1990): 67–83.
3. B. Bernanke, “Non-monetary Eﬀects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depres-
sion,” American Economic Review 73 (1983): 257–76; H. Cole and L. Ohanian, “The Great Depression in
the United States from a Neoclassical Perspective,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 23
(1999): 2–24; T. Hatton and M. Thomas, “Labour Markets in the Interwar Period and Economic Recovery
in the UK and the USA,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26 (2010): 463–85; C. Romer, “The Great Crash
and the Onset of the Great Depression,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (1990): 597–624; P. Temin and
B. Wigmore, “The End of One Big Deflation,” Explorations in Economic History 27 (1990): 483–502.
1
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implemented by the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations.4
Where most of these academic contributions focused on the output not produced,
income not earned and resources not exploited, the economic historian Alexander
Field argues that the 1930s were actually the “most technologically progressive decade
of the century.”5 Field’s hypothesis builds upon earlier work by Michael Bernstein and
Ester Fano and entails two main claims: firstly, “during this period businesses and
government contractors implemented or adopted on a more widespread basis a wide
range of new technologies and practices, resulting in the highest rate of peak-to-peak
[total-]factor productivity growth in the century, and secondly, that the depression
years produced advances that replenished and expanded the larder of unexploited or
only partially exploited techniques, thus providing the basis for much of the labor and
[total-]factor productivity improvement of the 1950s and 1960s.”6
The period 1929–1941, Field shows, witnessed little to no growth in both labor
hours and capital for the US private non-farm economy.7 Nevertheless, the output
of this sector was 33 to 40 percent higher in 1941 as compared with 1929. This gap
between the growth of output and inputs reflected improvements in total-factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) or disembodied technological change, which Fields put somewhere
between 2.3 and 2.8 percent per annum over this twelve-year period. These gains in
TFP represented, according to Field, real improvements in the productive capacity
of the American economy.8 This view contrasts sharply with the predictions of real
business cycle theory, which maintains that deviations in TFP from trend are cause
not consequence of business cycles.9 Recently, however, Field’s claims have been en-
dorsed by a study by Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Reitze Gouma, who show
that technology change in the interwar era was not positively correlated with input us-
4. N. Crafts and P. Fearon, “Lessons from the 1930s Great Depression,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy
23 (2010): 1–56; C. Romer, “Lessons from the Great Depression for Policy Today,” Teach-In on the Great
Depression and World War II: University of Oklahoma 1 (2013): 1–25; A. Shlaes, The Forgotten Man: A New
History of the Great Depression (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2007); P. Temin, Lessons from the Great
Depression (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).
5. A. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” American Economic Review 93
(2003): 1399–1413.
6. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” 1399; M. Bernstein, The Great
Depression. Delayed Recovery and Economic Change in America, 1929–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987); M. Bernstein, “The Response of American Manufacturing Industries to the Great Depres-
sion,” History and Technology 3 (1987): 225–248; E. Fano, “Technical Progress as a Destabilizing Factor and
as an Agent of Recovery in the United States Between the TwoWorldWars,”History and Technology 3 (1987):
249–74.
7. A. Field, A Great Leap Forward: 1930s depression and U.S. economic growth (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2011), 7.
8. A. Field, “The Procyclical Behavior of Total Factor Productivity in the United States, 1890–2004,” Jour-
nal of Economic History 70 (2010): 347.
9. Cole and Ohanian, “The Great Depression in the United States from a Neoclassical Perspective.”
i
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age.10 Hence, these authors demonstrate, “there was little role for technology shocks
in driving the Great Depression.”11 The technological gains thus indeed represent a
very substantial and real increase in potential output, exceeding those attained in the
1920s or even in the ‘Golden Age’, the quarter century between 1948 and 1973.
For specific examples of the largely disembodied technical change during the de-
pression years Field turns to a contemporary study by David Weintraub.12 Weintraub
describes the development of chrome-plating and corrosion-resistant steel alloys as
well as improvements in paints, varnishes and lacquers. He showed that by 1939, “the
development of cellulose lacquers, for instance, has cut down the time required to
finish a motor car (through reducing the drying time) from twenty-six days to a few
hours.”13 Further advances in chemicals resulted in improved yields from ore mining
and new commercial uses of waste-products, preeminently in the petroleum and nat-
ural gas industries.14 As noted by Field, “finding commercial uses for waste was [...]
about as close to manna from heaven as one could get.”15
In addition, the 1930s observed a general increase in the utilization of large-
capacity equipment, greatly boosting both labor- and capital productivity. This was
evident for equipment in general use such as industrial locomotives, power shovels
and electric motors as well as fixed installations like cement kilns, milling equipment
in mining, conveyors in flour mills and electric-power-generating units.16 The use of,
for instance, larger boilers in the electric-power-generating industry led to greater
thermal eﬃciency and an almost uninterrupted rise in the kilowatt-hours of energy
distributed throughout the 1920s and 1930s.17 Closely associated with this continued
trend toward larger units was the growing importance of industrial measuring and
controlling devices. These improvements greatly facilitated automatic process con-
trol, reduced downtime and maintenance costs and lengthened the life of equipment
considerably.18
The depression years also witnessed the introduction of new and improved ma-
terials and parts. In addition to the previously mentioned steel alloys, manufactures
10. R. Inklaar, H. de Jong, and R. Gouma, “Did Technology Shocks Drive the Great Depression? Explaining
Cyclical Productivity Movements in U.S. Manufacturing, 1919–1939,” Journal of Economic History 71 (2011):
827–858.
11. Ibid., 851.
12. D. Weintraub, “Eﬀects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments Upon Capital Forma-
tion,” American Economic Review 29 (1939): 15–32.
13. Ibid., 23.
14. Weintraub, “Eﬀects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments,” 23, 28; Bernstein, “The
Response of American Manufacturing Industries to the Great Depression,” 238–42.
15. Field, A Great Leap Forward, 49.
16. Weintraub, “Eﬀects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments,” 17.
17. Field,AGreat Leap Forward, 48; J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton: National
Bureau Economic Research, 1961), 590.
18. Weintraub, “Eﬀects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments,” 19.
i
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increasingly substituted plastics for wooden or metal parts, developed new materials
for cutting tools (e.g. tungsten carbide) and replaced outdated friction bearings for
roller bearings on a great part of the rotating machinery installed since 1930.19 Fi-
nally, the 1930s saw further improvements in plant layout and management through
the installation of conveyer belts and the implementation of continuous-flow produc-
tion, amongst others. Although the foundation for many of these advances had been
laid in the 1920s, there were still substantial gains to be reaped during the depression
era.20
Field’s finding that the 1930s was indeed technologically a very progressive decade
raises a number of new questions, however. Although Field speculates that the produc-
tivity gap between Europe and the US widened further during the 1930s, he does not
come forward with comparative evidence.21 His account is centered almost entirely
around the American experience, begging the question whether these rapid techno-
logical developments were unique to the US or if similar developments were apparent
in Europe as well. In addition, Field plays down the role of human capital. As illus-
trated by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz, the American labor force experienced
an unprecedented increase in educational attainment during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, a trend that continued unchallenged throughout the depres-
sion era.22 Surprisingly though, Field claims that “the eﬀect of labor quality improve-
ment on growth in output per hour or TFP growth over the entire period 1929–1941
was dwarfed by other factors.”23
This study reexamines the comparative labor-productivity performance of the United
States as well as the United Kingdom – the main industrial-rival of the US. In light of
the dynamic productivity developments reported by Field, I reassess the British tech-
nological and organizational innovations and provide a novel explanation for the rapid
divergence of the Anglo-American labor-productivity levels, observed during the early
twentieth century. Chapters 2 and 3 present new benchmarks of Anglo-American com-
parative labor productivity, establishing the relative productivity gap between the two
leading industrial nations at both the start of the twentieth century (ca. 1910) as well
as the interwar era (1935). Chapter 4 discusses technological change, capital accumu-
lation and eﬃciency decline in Britain and the US between the wars. Lastly, chapter 5
19. Weintraub, “Eﬀects of Current and Prospective Technological Developments,” 21–2.
20. Field, A Great Leap Forward, 49.
21. A. Field, “The Equipment Hypothesis and US Economic Growth,” Explorations in Economic History 44
(2007): 49.
22. C. Goldin and L. Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 2008).
23. Field, A Great Leap Forward, 37–8.
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Chapter 1. The Roaring Thirties 5
reexamines American labor quality for the first half of the twentieth century.
I find that, on the eve of the FirstWorldWar, the Anglo-American aggregate income
and productivity gap was greater than suggested by previous estimates.24 In chapter
2, I show that particularly the American agriculture, mining and manufacturing sec-
tors demonstrated a strong performance in comparison to their British counterparts.
Around 1910, value added per hour worked in US manufacturing, for instance, was a
little over twice as high as it had been in the UK. Regardless of this substantial lead,
the American manufacturing sector forged even further ahead during the 1920s and
1930s, widening the productivity gap to almost 280 percent in 1935; as I demonstrate
in chapter 3. Strikingly, I do not find any evidence for a ‘temporary cyclical narrow-
ing’ prior to the Second World War, as suggested by Stephen Broadberry.25 On the
contrary, when I adjust labor input for hours worked, the productivity gap observes
a continued upward trend throughout the depression years. The steady divergence of
the Anglo-American labor-productivity levels in manufacturing corroborates Field’s
claim of major productivity improvements in the US during the 1930s.
America’s lead over Europe inmanufacturing productivity from the late nineteenth
century onwards has often been contributed to diﬀerences in initial conditions, trap-
ping Europe in a relatively declining, labor-intensive and low-productive technologi-
cal path.26 Likewise, Broadberry argues that the lack of productivity convergence re-
flected the persistence of distinct industrial technologies in Britain and the United
States.27 British producers continued to pursue a crafts-based production system, los-
ing both productivity and technological leadership to the American system of mass-
production that, up to the 1970s, proved to be technologically more progressive.
In chapter 4, I reassess the productivity dynamics in British manufacturing dur-
ing the early twentieth century on the basis of a novel analytical framework by Su-
santo Basu and David Weil that emphasizes the role of learning and localized tech-
nical change and which predicts convergence in light of rapid capital deepening.28
By means of a data envelopment analysis (DEA), I assess the eﬀects of capital ac-
cumulation, technological change, and eﬃciency change on British and American
labor-productivity growth.29 I find evidence for a considerable increase in the capital-
24. S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom During
the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 43 (2006): 257–279.
25. S. Broadberry, The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 291.
26. P. David, Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth. Essays on American and British Experience
in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 66.
27. S. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing Since the
Industrial Revolution: Implications for the Convergence Debate,” Economic Journal 104 (1994): 291–302.
28. S. Basu and D. Weil, “Appropriate Technology and Growth,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1998):
1025–1054.
29. S. Kumar and R. Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening:
Relative Contributions to Growth and Convergence,” American Economic Review 92 (2002): 527–548.
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6 The Roaring Thirties
intensity levels within British manufacturing (proxied by statistics on the horsepower
rating of power equipment), particularly in the ‘new’ industries closely associated
with the Second Industrial Revolution. Manufactures in these key industries – i.e.
transportation equipment, printing, chemicals, petroleum and rubber – actively be-
gan to adopt modern techniques of mass-production and managerial control.30 Even
though by 1930 British capital intensity levels still trailed the United States by almost
two decades, overall dissimilarities between best-practice production techniques used
in American and British manufacturing industries disappeared to a large extent.31
British producers of motor vehicles, for instance, were following the path set out by
the American vehicle industry. The interwar era witnessed large investment programs,
with the gradual introduction of mechanized production techniques, assembly lines
and specialized machinery used to produce individual items on a continuous basis.32
As illustrated by Barry Eichengreen, by the end of the 1930s management in a vast
number of manufacturing industries was being professionalized, spending on research
and development had tripled over the course of the decade and new products and pro-
cesses proliferated.33
As demonstrated by the steady divergence of the Anglo-American labor-
productivity levels during the early twentieth century, this process of capital deep-
ening was not accompanied by an immediate labor-productivity increase in British
manufacturing. Regardsless, in contrast to existing literature, I do not interpret the
lack of catch-up growth during the 1920s and 1930s as a failure on the part of British
entrepreneurs.34 Instead, I suggest a sequence where first opportunities for growth are
created followed by a period of learning-by-doing and actual productivity catch-up.35
The initial phase of catch-up, the adoption of new production techniques through
the accumulation of capital, involves an extensive transformation of the production
process. This causes eﬃciency levels to deteriorate in the short run. Only after the
economy has successfully adjusted to the new state and has ‘learned’ to operate the
new technology at its full potential, can the labor-productivity gap to the frontier be
30. H. Richardson, “The New Industries Between theWars,”Oxford Economic Papers 13 (1961): 360–384; H.
Richardson, “The Basis of Economic Recovery in the Nineteen-Thirties: A Review and a New Interpretation,”
Economic History Review 15 (1962): 344–363.
31. W. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966),
72–3.
32. S. Bowden andD. Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” chap. 14 in The Cambridge Economic
History of Modern Britain, ed. R. Floud and P. Johnson, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004),
386–7.
33. B. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” chap. 12 in Floud and Johnson, The Cam-
bridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 2:341.
34. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing,” 292; D.
Greasley and L. Oxley, “Comparing British and American Economic and Industrial Performance 1860–1993:
A Time Series Perspective,” Explorations in Economic History 35 (1998): 184.
35. M. Timmer and B. Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia: An Intertemporal DEA
Approach,” Journal of Productivity Analysis 23 (2005): 58, 60.
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Chapter 1. The Roaring Thirties 7
narrowed. In line with Field’s argument for the US, I argue that the advances made
during the depression years provided the basis for much of the labor and total-factor
productivity growth of British industry during the Golden Age. I do argue that, in
the case of Britain, the modernization process was curtailed by institutional rigidities,
which explains why technological diﬀusion was not as widespread and the conver-
gence of technological paths following the Second World War did not occur as quickly
as observed in the case of, for instance, West-Germany and France.36 Still, the British
shift toward mass-production techniques during the interwar era provides a strong
case for a remarkable escape from the labor-intensive path, challenging the traditional
technological lock-in hypothesis.
In chapter 5, I turn to the American advances in education attainment and its ef-
fects on the countries’ productivity potential. As shown by Goldin and Katz, the Amer-
icans had a strong tradition of educating their youth at public charge.37 The American
approach to schooling stood in stark contrast to the European system, which was still
reserved for the relatively rich. By 1930, compared to Britain, the US was already three
to four decades ahead in post-elementary education; a lead which remained large well
into the second half of the twentieth century.38 The advances in schooling during the
early twentieth century transformed the American workforce and prepared the Amer-
ican youth for a wide array of potential tasks and occupations, allowing them to ad-
equately respond to the considerable technological change that marked this period.39
Various authors have claimed that America’s approach to schooling was one of the
driving forces behind its technological dynamism and paved the way for rapid eco-
nomic growth.40 Nonetheless, as previously noted, Field ascribes only a minor role to
the advances in education (or the ‘quality’ of labor in general) on labor and total-factor
productivity growth during the years between 1929 and 1941.41
In order to fully assess the impact of the substantial investments in schooling on
the American economy, I turn to an approach developed by Dale Jorgenson and Zvi
36. B. van Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity: Manufacturing Productivity Perfor-
mance of Ten Countries from 1950 to 1990 (Groningen: Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 1993),
86–7; N. Crafts and T. Mills, “TFP Growth in British and German Manufacturing, 1950–1996,” Economic
Journal 115 (2005): 650; N. Crafts, “British Relative Economic Decline Revisited: The Role of Competition,”
Explorations in Economic History 49 (2012): 22–3.
37. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 12.
38. C. Goldin, “The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership: Virtues of the Past,” Journal of
Economic History 61 (2001): 267.
39. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 29.
40. E. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us (New
York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962), 73; Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and
Technology, 12.
41. Field, A Great Leap Forward, 37–8.
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8 The Roaring Thirties
Griliches.42 The key innovations in their work was to adjust the traditional measure of
labor input for improvements in quality. The main principle behind the labor quality
adjustment is the distinction among several diﬀerent types of labor inputs (e.g. educa-
tional attainment, experience, etc.) characterized by one or more quantifiable factors
that aﬀect the productivity potential of the average worker. By assigning weights to
these categories, one can measure the change in the productivity ‘potential’ of the
workforce. When this new measure of labor input is used in a growth accounting
framework – instead of a raw input measure such as the number of employees or hours
worked – output growth as a result of better educated and trained workers are ascribed
to the growth of inputs, rather than productivity or technology growth.43
In contrast to previous studies, my estimates include a detailed sectoral break-
down. This allows me to study the development of labor quality for both the US labor
force as a whole, as well as the change across individual sectors and industries. I find
that labor quality exhibited a steady increase in the decades between 1900 and 1950.
The average growth during this period was just over 0.7 percent per annum which, by
comparison to both more recent decades as well as the development of human capital
in other countries was quite rapid.44 This growth resulted primarily from a general
shift of employment from the low-productive agricultural sector to high-productive
sectors (e.g. finance, professional services, etc.) in conjunction with a general rise in
the educational attainment of the workforce. At the sectoral level, my new estimates
show some notable variations in the rates of growth. Overall, labor quality change was
much more pronounced in agriculture and industry than it was for the service sector,
stressing the need for a disaggregate analysis when studying human capital and its
eﬀects on productivity change.
These new estimates closely agree with the continuous increase in the average years
of schooling observed by Goldin and Katz.45 Consequently, I conclude that Field’s
claim that the change in labor-quality during the depression years played only a mi-
nor role in the rapid growth of output per hour and TFP does not stand up under
scrutiny. He based his calculations on the work of John Kendrick, who estimated an
average rate of growth for the 1900–1950 period half as large as even my most conser-
vative estimates.46 Most importantly, however, Kendrick claims there was little to no
growth in labor quality between 1920 and 1940, whereas my figures indicate a contin-
42. Z. Griliches, “The Sources of Measured Productivity Growth: United States Agriculture, 1940–60,”
Journal of Political Economy 71 (1963): 340; D. Jorgenson and Z. Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity
Change,” Review of Economic Studies 34 (1967): 249–283.
43. D. Jorgenson, M. Ho, and K. Stiroh, “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resur-
gence,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22 (2008): 3–24.
44. E. Denison and J. Poullier,WhyGrowth Rates Diﬀer: Postwar Experience in NineWestern Countries (Wash-
ingtonD.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1967); Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology.
45. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology.
46. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 32–4.
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Chapter 1. The Roaring Thirties 9
uous and strong growth throughout the interwar era. Regardless of the considerable
growth in labor quality for most sectors of the American economy, the improvements
in human capital cannot account for all of the technological growth observed in chap-
ter 4, however. My estimates do highlight that the American labor force continued to
improve rapidly during the depression years, preparing her for the technological and
organizational innovations characterizing this decade.
Overall, the 1930s – though scarred by relentless unemployment, mass migration
and profound social and cultural change – were far from gloomy in terms of technolog-
ical and business innovation. The advances in products and materials, improvements
in plant layout, management and human capital, and the emergence of new produc-
tion techniques placed both the American and the British economy in a position to em-
bark on a new pattern of growth and development. In light of this, the Time’s epithet
of “Threadbare Thirties” does not really do the 1930s justice. The “Roaring Thirties”
is a label more befitting the great technological advances and the extensive modern-
ization that marked this tumultuous decade – perhaps even more so than the 1920s,
the decade commonly aﬃliated with this adjective.47
47. The title of this study is actually based on the title of David Henderson’s book review of A Great Leap
Forward, which he was so kind to let me borrow. See, D. Henderson, “The Roaring Thirties,” Policy Review
169 (2011): 91–96.
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Chapter 2
Taking Over
A New US/UK Productivity Benchmark and the Nature
of American Economic Leadership ca. 1910
2.1 Introduction
From the 1940s onwards such notable economists as Simon Kuznets and Brian
Mitchell in the US and Colin Clark in the UK have been active in the field of com-
parative economic performance of nations.1 At present the best known comparisons
of long-run productivity performance come from the seminal work of Angus Mad-
dison.2 Part of the appeal of his approach is the wide temporal and spatial coverage
of his data, the transparent methodology and his sole reliance on national time-series
published by statistical oﬃces, which makes it exceptionally well suited for research
on comparative economic growth.
The Maddison time-series, or any of the long-term studies on economic growth
for that matter, suﬀer from at least one major drawback: time-series projections do not
adequately account for shifts in sectoral output and changes in product prices. This be-
comes particularly apparent when time-series of diﬀerent origins are projected from a
. Parts of this chapter have previously been published in E. Frankema, P.Woltjer, and J. Smits, “Changing
Economic Leadership: A New Benchmark of Sector Productivity in the United States and Western Europe,
ca. 1910,” Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis 10 (2013).
1. S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread (Yale: Yale University Press, 1966);
B. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics. Europe 1750–2005, 6th ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007); C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 2nd (London: MacMillan, 1951).
2. A. Maddison, Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); A. Maddison,
Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); A. Maddison,Monitoring
the World Economy 1820–1992 (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation & Development, 1995); A.
Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation &
Development, 2001).
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12 The Roaring Thirties
certain benchmark-year into distant periods. In recent years, economic historians have
stressed the need for new, more detailed, comparisons of welfare and productivity for
earlier periods, particularly for the pre-World War I era.3
As the debate between Broadberry versus Ward and Devereux in the Journal of Eco-
nomic History has emphasized, direct benchmark comparisons between countries are
a much wanted alternative for the long-span projections.4 In this discussion, Mari-
anne Ward and John Devereux challenge the conventional picture of relative income
levels and the timing of the American take-over in particular. The consensus view of
US/UK relative income is based almost exclusively on the work of Maddison.5 Maddi-
son’s extrapolations shows that income levels in the United Kingdom exceeded that of
the United States by approximately one-third in 1870. As illustrated in the second col-
umn of table 2.1, Maddison’s time-series evidence reveals that, from 1870 onwards, the
Anglo-American income gap declined until, sometime around the turn of the century,
the US definitively took over the lead. These projections all hinge on an income bench-
mark for the year 1990, whichMaddison extrapolates backwards to the late nineteenth
century, relying on a collection of well over 100 years worth of national accounts to
bridge the gap. Economists have cast severe doubts, however, whether these long-span
projections are actually viable and produce credible results in the face of two World
Wars, several major depressions, and the host of new products and services introduced
over the course of the twentieth century.6
Ward and Devereux provide an alternative measure of the US/UK income relatives
based on direct Purchasing-Power-Parity (PPP) adjusted benchmarks of expenditure.7
For the period between 1872 to 1930, Ward and Devereux constructed seven Anglo-
American expenditure benchmarks, which they supplemented with existing bench-
marks from Gilbert and Kravis and the work done under the auspices of the Interna-
3. L. Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons of Real Product, 1820–1990,” Explorations in
Economic History 37 (2000): 1–41; K. Fukao, D. Ma, and T. Yuan, “Real GDP in Pre-war Asia: A 1934–36
Benchmark Purchasing Power Parity Comparison with the U.S.,” Review of Income and Wealth 53 (2007):
503–537; J. van Zanden, “Rich and Poor Before the Industrial Revolution: A Comparison Between Java and
the Netherlands at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 40 (2003):
1–23.
4. M. Ward and J. Devereux, “Measuring British Decline: Direct Versus Long-Span Income Measures,”
Journal of Economic History 63 (2003): 826–851; S. Broadberry, “Relative Per Capita Income Levels in
the United Kingdom and the United States since 1870: Reconciling Time-Series Projections and Direct-
Benchmark Estimates,” Journal of Economic History 63 (2003): 852–863; M. Ward and J. Devereux, “Relative
U.K./U.S. Output Reconsidered: A Reply to Professor Broadberry,” Journal of Economic History 64 (2004):
879–891.
5. Maddison, The World Economy.
6. See Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons of Real Product” for a discussion.
7. Ward and Devereux, “Measuring British Decline.”
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Chapter 2. Taking Over 13
Table 2.1: Comparative GDP per capita, US and UK
(UK=100, 1872–1990)
Ward & Ward &
year Devereux Maddison year Devereux Maddison
1872 118 78 1955 217 143
1874 118 79 1967 175 147
1878 127 84 1970 167 143
1884 130 87 1973 169 143
1891 122 90 1975 156 141
1905 122 105 1980 154 147
1930 133 118 1985 167 152
1950 208 143 1990 145 145
Source:M. Ward and J. Devereux, “Measuring British Decline:
Direct Versus Long-Span Income Measures,” Journal of Economic
History 63 (2003): 840; A. Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the
World Economy, 1–2008 AD,” Groningen Growth & Development
Centre, 2008, accessed on 11 March 2011.
tional Comparison Project.8 In all they provide sixteen ‘snapshots’ which renders a
complete overview of relative US/UK performance over the course of the long twen-
tieth century (see table 2.1). From this Ward and Devereux conclude that – contrary
to the estimates by Maddison – the US, not the UK, led in terms of income per capita
in the 1870s. “The UK kept pace with the US throughout the late Victorian era, while
most of the British relative decline occurred between 1905 and 1950.”9
The findings by Ward and Devereux met with harsh criticism from Broadberry,
who disputed their direct benchmarks on account of the implied revision of the rela-
tive US/UK price levels as well as their handling of the historical national accounts.10
Mostly though, Broadberry deplored the fact that no attempt was made toward a rec-
onciliation of the long-span time-series projections and the direct benchmarks. He
states that, “a satisfactory account of the evolution of relative per capita incomes
over a long period should be able to encompass both sorts of evidence.”11 As a check
against the time-series extrapolations, Broadberry proposes a set of sectoral productiv-
ity benchmarks, for which he suggests basing the benchmark estimate of relative Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) on output as opposed to the expenditure approach taken by
Ward and Devereux.
8. M. Gilbert and I. Kravis, An International Comparison of National Products and the Purchasing Power
of Currencies (Paris: The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, 1954); M. Gilbert, Compara-
tive National Products and Price Levels (Paris: The Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, 1958);
Maddison,Monitoring the World Economy.
9. Ward and Devereux, “Measuring British Decline,” 826.
10. Broadberry, “Relative Per Capita Income Levels.”
11. ibid., 852.
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14 The Roaring Thirties
To this aim, Broadberry and Douglas Irwin presented a comprehensive Anglo-
American industry-of-origin benchmark for the year 1910.12 This industry-of-origin
benchmark – based primarily on earlier work by Broadberry – provides a full break-
down of the relative productivity and income diﬀerentials between the US and the UK
at the sectoral level.13 Broadberry and Irwin conclude that their benchmark estimate
of both GDP per capita and per workermove closely in line with the time-series projec-
tions.14 They trace the source of the initial British lead in GDP per capita to a slightly
higher level of labor productivity in the UK coupled with a substantially higher share
of the British population in the labor force. The latter greatly boosted overall British
output per capita.
In their sectoral decomposition of labor productivity, Broadberry and Irwin show
that “the United States had roughly equal labor productivity in agriculture, much
higher productivity in industry, and a rapid catch-up in service sector productivity.”15
The UK, already by 1870, engaged a large share of its labor force in industry and ser-
vices, while US labor was still primarily engaged in the low-productive agricultural
sector. The initial British aggregate labor-productivity lead was thus the result of com-
positional eﬀects rather than superior productivity at the sectoral level. On the basis
of this evidence, Broadberry claims that the US take-over, both in terms of overall
productivity and per capita income, was the result of a structural shift away from
agriculture together with rapid relative productivity increases in the American service
sector.16 The close correspondence between the evidence presented by Broadberry and
Irwin and the Maddison projections, led the former to suggest that the conventional
view is indeed correct. Consequently, they reject the claim by Ward and Devereux,
as well as Leandro Prados de la Escosura, that index number problems introduce a
considerable bias in the long-span Anglo-American projections.17
Recent literature emphasizes, however, that comparative productivity in manufac-
turing was more dynamic than asserted by Broadberry and that technological devel-
opments in this sector played a substantial role in explaining the productivity gap be-
12. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom.”
13. S. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing During the Nine-
teenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 31 (1994): 521–548; Broadberry, The Productivity Race; S.
Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up: A Sectoral Analysis of Anglo-American Pro-
ductivity Diﬀerences, 1870-1990,” Research in Economic History 17 (1997): 1–37; S. Broadberry, “How Did
the United States and Germany Overtake Britain? A Sectoral Analysis of Comparative Productivity Levels,
1870-1990,” Journal of Economic History 58 (1998): 375–407.
14. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 273.
15. ibid., 262.
16. Broadberry, The Productivity Race; Broadberry, “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake
Britain?”
17. Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons of Real Product”; Ward and Devereux, “Measuring
British Decline.”
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Chapter 2. Taking Over 15
tween the US and UK for the inter-war era.18 In addition, it appears unlikely that the
American agricultural sector was left entirely unaﬀected by the rapid developments
in industry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Given the strong
increase in demand for agricultural goods (in particular from the textile and food and
drink industries), rising wages accompanying the labor productivity gains in industry,
as well as access to cheap fertilizers, energy, farm machinery, and the abundance of
land, one would expect the American agricultural sector to develop in line with the in-
dustrial sector. As noted by Habakkuk, “scarcity of labor ensured that, within the lim-
its set by geology and climate, American agriculture developed along land-intensive,
labor saving lines, that is, assumed high labor-productivity forms.”19 Studies of the
American and British mining sectors also appear to suggest a greater US lead in pro-
ductivity terms than suggested by Broadberry and Irwin. American miners were keen
to take full advantage of the major improvements in labor-saving technologies – such
as mechanized coal-cutting and electric lighting – whereas the British mine-owners
generally displayed a conservative attitude toward these innovations.20 Unfavorable
geological conditions and a dwindling supply of natural resources in the UK explain
this reflechesitant attitude and point at a much greater productivity potential in the
US.21
In this chapter I revisit the Anglo-American benchmark around the year 1910. Sim-
ilar to Broadberry and Irwin I opt for the industry-of-origin approach, as I agree with
these authors that it is doubtful whether direct estimates of relative income and pro-
ductivity between the US and UK should be based solely on expenditure benchmarks.
The expenditure approach, as implemented by Ward and Devereux, establishes a di-
rect link between comparative income levels and consumption possibilities, making
those estimates particularly well suited for international comparisons of income and
living standards. However, for the international comparisons of productivity and eco-
nomic performance in general, a direct comparison of output at the industry level is
preferable.22 Whereas expenditure PPPs are influenced by imports, trade margins and
transport costs, industry-of-origin conversion factors are based on ex-factory prices,
excluding these elements. Industry-of-origin PPPs thus produce a more refined com-
18. A. Field, “Technological Change and US Productivity Growth in the Interwar Years,” Journal of Eco-
nomic History 66, no. 1 (2006): 203–236; also see chapter 3.
19. J. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century. The Search for Labour-saving
Inventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 34–7.
20. A. Taylor, “Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry, 1850–
1914,” Economic History Review 14 (1961): 59; R. Walters, “Labour Productivity in South Wales Steam-coal
Industry, 1870–1914,” Economic History Review 28 (1975): 296.
21. D.McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity? Coal and Steel in America and Britain Before
World War I,” chap. 11 in Essays on a Mature Economy, ed. D. McCloskey (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1971), 293.
22. Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity.
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16 The Roaring Thirties
parison of labor productivity levels. More importantly, however, the expenditure ap-
proach does not allow for a breakdown of labor productivity at a sectoral level. The
industry-of-origin approach provides a more in-depth view of the sources of growth
and the eﬀects of structural change. As I will illustrate in this chapter, these relative
sectoral productivity diﬀerences and structural eﬀects are key to understanding the
Anglo-American comparative economic performance in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. I focus my eﬀorts on agricultural, mining and manufacturing, the
sectors in which the US had the greatest productivity potential, but provide a compar-
ative productivity for the total economy as well.
I find that, on the eve of the First World War, the gap between the US and the UK
was larger than suggested by most previous studies in terms of relative income per
head of the population. Compositional eﬀects in general and a high level of productiv-
ity in American agriculture and mining in particular are instrumental in explaining
these revised income per capita estimates. The UK appears to have ceded productiv-
ity leadership earlier than conventional estimates have shown. I date the US take-over
around the 1880s and not post-1900, as suggested by Broadberry and Maddison.23
Section 2.2 provides an extensive discussion of the methods behind the benchmark
comparison and presents an overview of the data sources used. My main results, the
sectoral purchasing power parities and productivity levels, are presented in sections
2.3 and 2.4. I will discuss the implications for both the total-economy estimates as well
as the time-series projections in section 2.5. In the last section I conclude.
2.2 Methodology and data
For the construction of my early twentieth century benchmark I opt for the industry-
of-origin approach. My choice of industry-of-origin methodology does diﬀer from the
method applied by Broadberry and Irwin, however. The latter establish their sectoral
productivity measures on the basis of a comparison of physical quantities of output,
relying on a methodology first proposed in 1948 by Rostas.24 The benefit of the quan-
tity approach is that it is generally less demanding in terms of data requirements,
which has made it the method of choice for direct benchmarks for the period prior to
the SecondWorldWar. Data availability for the post-war period has allowed a more so-
phisticatedmethodology though, based on the calculation of real value added at the in-
dustry level using relative producer prices. Instead of a direct comparison of physical
23. Maddison, Monitoring the World Economy; Maddison, The World Economy; Broadberry, “Relative Per
Capita Income Levels”;Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United King-
dom.”
24. L. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1948).
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 17 — #29 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 2. Taking Over 17
quantities, this method measures the value of gross and net output by industry (in na-
tional currency) which is then translated into a common currency with a sector-specific
purchasing power parity (PPP). This procedure was first applied by Paige and Bom-
bach in an Anglo-American comparison for 1950.25 The methodology behind these
industry-of-origin benchmarks was subsequently further refined and used in a host of
international benchmark comparisons for the post-war period; most notably the In-
ternational Comparison of Output and Productivity (ICOP) project by Maddison and
van Ark.26 Recently however, the extended ICOP methodology has also been applied
to international comparisons for the period preceding the Second World War.27 These
historical industry-of-origin studies not only prove that it is feasible to apply modern
techniques for earlier periods, but they also stress the advantages of these methods
over the earlier quantity based benchmark comparisons.
Although the basic concepts behind the available industry-of-origin benchmark
techniques are similar, there are some marked diﬀerences between the ICOP and the
earlier quantity approach. In this section I will only discuss the basic methodology
behind the ICOP approach, but appendix 2.A provides an in-depth discussion of the
methodological diﬀerences between both approaches. Here, I show that the quantity
approach can be easily rewritten to approximate a basic version of the ICOP approach.
I will also show, however, that in practice the outcomes of these methods can deviate
substantially. Particularly the necessity, within the quantity approach, to assign labor
to individual commodities instead of industries limits this method’s ability to esti-
mate productivity for industries producing a wide array of heterogeneous products.
In addition, as I will illustrate below, the ICOP framework allows for diﬀerences in
the relative prices of both outputs and inputs and takes diﬀerences between coun-
tries in their share of intermediate inputs in the value of gross output into account. I
demonstrate the basic ICOP methodology on the basis of a simple single industry, two
country, k product framework.
The ICOP approach
In the ICOP approach, the first step in the calculation of comparative labor productiv-
ity is the matching of products into unit values (p). The unit value, p
ij
, which repre-
sents the local average price of commodity i in country j, can be obtained by dividing
25. D. Paige and G. Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity of the United Kingdom and
the United States (Paris: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, 1959).
26. A. Maddison and B. van Ark, “Comparison of Real Output in Manufacturing,” Policy, Planning and
Research Working Papers 5 (1988): 1–33; Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity.
27. R. Fremdling, H. de Jong, and M. Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Com-
pared: A New Benchmark for 1935/36 Based on Double Deflated Value Added,” Journal of Economic History
67 (2007): 350–378; J. Dormois, “Episodes in Catching-Up: Anglo-French Industrial Productivity Diﬀeren-
tials in 1930,” European Review of Economic History 8 (2004): 337–373; also see chapter 3.
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18 The Roaring Thirties
the output value (v
ij
) by the respective quantity (q
ij
) for this product; as shown in
equation (2.1) below. In a bilateral comparison, broadly defined products with simi-
lar characteristics are matched – e.g. iron ore, refined sugar, cement or bicycles – and
the ratio of the unit values in both countries is taken; see equation (2.2).28 These unit
value ratios (uvr) thus reflect the product specific relative prices expressed in terms of
country n’s currency per unit of the base country o’s currency.
p
ij
=
v
ij
q
ij
(2.1)
uvr
io
=
p
in
p
io
(2.2)
The uvrs can then be aggregated to the industry level. For an industry which holds
k matched products, the respective uvrs are weighted according to their share in total
matched output (v
i
=
P
v
i
). The resulting aggregated output uvrs are generally referred
to as purchasing power parities (PPP). In a bilateral comparisons the weights of ei-
ther the base country (o) or the numerator country (n) can be used, which provide a
Laspeyres and a Paasche type PPP respectively.29 The Laspeyres gross output purchas-
ing power parity, L
go
, is then given by
L
go
=
P
v
io
 pinp
ioP
v
io
=
P
v
io
uvr
ioP
v
io
(2.3)
whereas the Paasche gross output purchasing power parity, P
go
, is given by
P
go
=
P
v
inP
v
in
 piop
in
=
P
v
inP
v
in
=uvr
io
(2.4)
Throughout this paper, I will use the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche
price indices, the Fisher price index, as the currency conversion factor for my pro-
ductivity comparisons; see equation (2.5). The Fisher PPPs, as well as the Paasche and
Laspeyres PPPs, are still expressed in terms of country n’s currency per unit of the
28. A complete list of the unit value ratios, on which the industry-specific PPPs presented in this chapter
are based, is provided in appendix 2.B.
29. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 14; Note
that as v is equal to p  q, the Laspeyres gross output PPP Lgo can also be expressed as
P
pnqoP
po qo , while the
Paasche gross output PPP, P
go
, is identical to
P
pnqnP
po qn .
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Chapter 2. Taking Over 19
base country o’s currency, in line with the uvrs on which they are based.
F
go
=
p
Lgo  P go (2.5)
As illustrated by Paige and Bombach, suitable conversion factors can be obtained
from output price data alone (single deflation) or from price data for both outputs as
well as intermediate inputs (double deflation).30 Double deflation is generally consid-
ered to be the preferred approach for sector comparisons of output and productivity. A
number of recent studies have shown that the adjustment for diﬀerences in the prices
of intermediate inputs is particularly important for benchmark studies for the early
twentieth century.31
Unfortunately, direct quantity and price information for inputs is not widely avail-
able in the early twentieth century British production statistics. For the construction
of the intermediate input PPPs, I thus relied on implicit input-output relations in-
stead. By definition inputs for one industry are made up of the output of other sectors
and industries. The input PPP for an industry can thus be derived as a weighted set
of output PPPs from the industries furnishing its inputs. For example, around 1900
the British food and drink industry obtained well over 60 percent of its inputs from
the agricultural sector, while most of the remaining inputs originated from within the
food and drink industry itself.32 A weighted average of the output PPPs for the food
and drink industry and the agricultural sector will thus provide a good proxy of the
intermediate input PPP for the food and drink industry.
I relied on the Anglo-American Laspeyres and Paasche output PPPs, previously
introduced, as the basis for my intermediate input PPPs. These were subsequently
weighted on the basis of information on the flow of goods between sectors and indus-
tries from input-output tables. Note that this procedure does not take diﬀerences in
the cost of transport or trade margins into account, which I implicitly assume to be
similar for both countries (relative to total costs). Even if the trade and transport mar-
gins for both countries diﬀer, however, the diﬀerences in these costs are unlikely to be
so large as to have a substantial eﬀect on the resulting input PPPs.
The equation for the derivation of the PPPs for intermediate inputs is similar to
the calculation of the output PPPs in equations (2.3)-(2.5). The Laspeyres input PPP is
30. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity, 82.
31. See chapter 3 and Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity
Compared.”
32. In practice, a substantial proportion of the inputs consumed by an industry will originate from within
this industry itself. This reflects the production of semi-manufactured, or partly finished goods, by separate
establishments within an industry (e.g. flour mills) and the use of these intermediate products by establish-
ments still part of this industry, but further down the production chain (e.g. bakeries).
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20 The Roaring Thirties
given by
L
ii
=
P
w
io
Lgo
iP
w
io
(2.6)
and the Paasche input PPP by
P
ii
=
P
w
inP
w
in
=P go
i
(2.7)
where w
i
=
P
w
i
represents the share of intermediate inputs supplied by industry i in
the total of inputs consumed by the industry for which the PPP is calculated.
The output and input PPPs in turn allow me to calculate the double deflated value
added PPPs. go
j
and ii
j
denote respectively the value of gross output and intermediate
input for a single industry in country j, at national prices. The Laspeyres value added
PPP, L
va
, is given by
L
va
=
go
o
Lgo   ii
o
Lii
go
o
  ii
o
(2.8)
while the Paasche value added PPP is given by
P
va
=
go
n
  ii
n
go
n
=P go   ii
n
=P ii
(2.9)
Again, the Fisher value added PPP is derived as the geometric mean of the Laspeyres
and Paasche price indices
F
va
=
p
Lva  P va (2.10)
The double deflated value added PPPs can in turn be used to convert either coun-
tries’ output per unit of labor to the other countries’ currency; see equation (2.12).
Throughout this chapter I use value added (va) as the measure of output, as in (2.11).
LP
o
thus measures the industry-specific level of PPP-adjusted value added per worker
in country n relative to the value added per worker in the base country o.
lp
j
=
va
j
emp
j
(2.11)
LP
o
=
lp
n
=F
va
lp
o
(2.12)
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Sources
The gross output PPPs presented in the next section are based on the oﬃcial agricul-
tural, mining and manufacturing production censuses of the United Kingdom and the
United States. These surveys contain detailed information on quantities and values of
produced items as well as average prices, enabling me to construct currency conver-
sion factors bottom-up. For the US I based my PPPs on the agricultural, mining and
manufacturing reports of the Thirteenth Census of the United States, all taken in the
year 1909, as well as the Mineral Resources of the Unites States published as part of
the United States Geological Survey for the year 1910.33 For the UK I relied primar-
ily on the First Census of Production of 1907 and the 1908 Agricultural Output of Great
Britain.34 Supplementary information for UK agriculture came from the Agricultural
Statistics, while Fabricant provided additional information for a number of American
manufacturing industries.35
Data on gross output, intermediate input, value added and employment was taken
from a variety of sources. For the US, I primarily relied on output data for the year
1909 from the Historical Statistics, supplemented with data by King, Fabricant and
the 1909 censuses of mining and manufacturing.36 1909 employment data was taken
from Kendrick for all sectors except agriculture, which is based on figures by Leber-
gott.37 Total gross domestic product is also based on Kendrick.38 For the UK, 1907
gross domestic product, value added and employment are all based on figures by Fe-
instein, which is supplemented by data on the use of intermediate inputs from the
33. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Agriculture,” in Thirteenth Census
of the United States Taken in the Year 1910, vol. V (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce, 1913); United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” in Thirteenth
Census of the United States, vol. VIII; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Mines
and Quarries,” in Thirteenth Census of the United States, vol. XI; United States Department of the Interior,
United States Geological Survey: Mineral Resources of the United States 1910 (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Oﬃce, 1911).
34. Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the United Kingdom (1907) (London:
H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1912); Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Agricultural Output of Great Britain
(1908) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1912).
35. Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agricultural Statistics (1910) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce,
1911); S. Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899–1937 (New York: National Bureau Eco-
nomic Analysis, 1940).
36. S. Carter et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); W. King, The National Income and Its Purchasing Power (New York: National Bureau
Economic Analysis, 1930); Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries; United States Department of
Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures”; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the
Census, “Mines and Quarries.”
37. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 308; S. Lebergott,Manpower in Economic Growth: The
American Record Since 1800 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 118.
38. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 296–7.
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22 The Roaring Thirties
production censuses.39 Population data for both countries was taken from Maddison’s
Historical Statistics.40
For the construction of the intermediate input PPPs, I relied on the 1899 American
input-output table by Whitney and the input-output table for Edwardian Britain by
Thomas.41 I adjusted the row and column totals for both the US and UK input-output
tables to match the level of gross output and intermediate input for the years 1909 and
1907 respectively. The totals for output and input were then translated to the cells of
the matrix to create a fit as close as possible to the original input-output table.
The choice of benchmark years was at least partly determined by the availability
of the production censuses listed above. For this benchmark comparison I took care to
select two stable years on the eve of the First World War. Whenever possible I selected
data from 1907 for the UK and 1909 for the US respectively. Table 2.2 shows that the
unemployment rate at that point in timewas relatively low or stable and that the actual
per capita income level for the census years chosen was close to those of 1910. I see this
as an essential requirement as I strive to determine the level of potential productivity
diﬀerentials between the countries under comparison. I thus aim to exclude the eﬀects
of business cycles and capacity under-utilization as much as possible, which, I am
convinced, is the case for the selected census years.42
2.3 Purchasing power parities
Table 2.3 presents my gross output PPP estimates at the sectoral level. These relative
prices were constructed on the basis of 149 ex-factory and ex-farm unit value ratios for
both intermediate and final goods. The sample of products in this study ranges from
wheat to pigs meat for the agricultural sector, iron ore to petroleum in mining and jute
yarn to sulfuric acid in manufacturing; a complete list is presented in appendix 2.B.
The number of matches for each sector and the value of these matched products in
sectoral gross output (the coverage ratio) are shown in the first three columns of table
2.3. In agriculture and mining I was able to cover nearly 90 percent of total gross out-
put in the UK and approximately 70 percent in the US. The coverage ratio for the man-
39. C. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855–1965 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972), 208; C. Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and
Output of the UK, 1855–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), T10, T125–6, T131; Board of
Agriculture and Fisheries, The Agricultural Output of Great Britain; Board of Trade, Final Report on the First
Census of Production of the UK.
40. A. Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy, 1–2008 AD,” Groningen Growth & Devel-
opment Centre, 2008.
41. WWhitney, The Structure of the American Economy in the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard
University Dissertation, 1968); M. Thomas, An Input-Output Approach to the British Economy, 1890–1914
(Oxford: Nuﬃeld College Dissertation, 1984), 152.
42. See chapter 3 for an elaborate discussion of the business cycle and capacity utilization eﬀects and a
sensitivity analysis for the interwar period.
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Table 2.2: GDP per capita and unemployment, US and UK (1905–1913)
variables 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
US GDPpc (1913=100) 75 84 85 79 88 89 92 96 100
UK GDPpc (1913=100) 87 89 91 87 89 92 95 96 100
US unemployment (%) 3.9 2.5 3.1 7.5 5.6 5.9 7.0 5.9 5.7
UK unemployment (%) 7.4 6.0 5.5 8.7 9.1 6.6 5.2 4.8 4.1
Source: US and UK Gross Domestic Product per capita, see A. Maddison, “Historical Statistics
of the World Economy, 1–2008 AD,” Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 2008,
accessed on 11 March 2011; US unemployment, see D. Weir, “A Century of U.S.
Unemployment, 1890–1990,” Research in Economic History 14 (1992): 341–3; UK
unemployment, see G. Boyer and T. Hatton, “New Estimates of British Unemployment,
1870–1913,” Journal of Economic History 62 (2002): 662.
ufacturing sector was substantially lower, however, which is explained by the greater
heterogeneity of products in this sector, as well as the unique national character and
qualitative diﬀerences of some of the commodities produced. Nonetheless, I was able
to cover well over 30 percent of the American and 40 percent of British manufacturing
output. This is comparable to coverage ratios found in previous prewar productivity
studies.43
Table 2.3 demonstrates that substantial relative price diﬀerences existed between
the three main sectors at this time. The last column of this table compares the Fisher
output PPPs to the 1909 US/UK exchange rate.44 From this column we can see that the
American mining products, which primarily consisted of coal, iron ore and petroleum,
were relatively inexpensive as compared to the UK. In addition, American agricul-
tural products were also relatively cheap, especially when compared to the price level
of manufactured goods. Note that these large cross-industry variations in the output
PPPs confirms that a uniform currency converter, such as the oﬃcial exchange rate,
will not generate accurate productivity comparisons at the sectoral level, since it rules
out the possibility of inter-industry price diﬀerences.45
For this bilateral comparison, the weights of either the base country (UK) or the
numerator country (US) can be used, which provide a Laspeyres- and a Paasche-type
PPP respectively. The gap between both these indices can be interpreted as a measure
43. R. Fremdling, H. de Jong, and M. Timmer, “Censuses Compared: A New Benchmark for British and
German Manufacturing 1935/1936,” Groningen Growth and Development Centre Memorandum 90 (2007):
16; H. de Jong and P. Woltjer, “A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity for British and American
Manufacturing in 1935,” Groningen Growth and Development Centre Memorandum 108 (2009): 1–34.
44. Source for exchange rate: I. Svennilson,Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva: United
Nations, 1954), 318–9.
45. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity.
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24 The Roaring Thirties
Table 2.3: Gross output PPPs, US and UK (1909/07)
coverage (%) gross output PPP ($/£)
Las- rel.
branch/sector matches US UK peyres Paasche Fisher exch.a
Agriculture 29 69 88 4.4 4.2 4.3 0.88
Mining 9 71 93 3.0 3.1 3.0 0.63
Manufacturing 111 33 46 5.5 4.6 5.1 1.04
Food, drink and tobacco 20 40 37 5.4 5.1 5.2 1.07
Textile and apparel 20 40 59 5.7 5.5 5.6 1.15
Lumber and wood products 3 7 1 4.0 3.9 3.9 0.81
Paper and printing 6 17 22 5.1 4.6 4.8 0.99
Chemicals and rubber 20 30 44 5.3 5.0 5.2 1.06
Petroleum and coal products 3 28 98 4.3 3.2 3.7 0.76
Leather and leather products 4 60 78 9.1 8.4 8.7 1.80
Stone, clay, and glass products 2 30 35 5.3 5.1 5.2 1.06
Metal industries 25 39 66 4.9 4.3 4.6 0.95
Machinery and transport eq. 5 20 19 4.8 4.0 4.4 0.90
Instruments and miscellaneous 3 9 4 8.2 7.4 7.8 1.60
a Fisher gross output PPP relative to exchange rate (4.87). Source for exchange rate, see
I. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy (Geneva: United Nations, 1954),
318–9.
Source: see text.
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Chapter 2. Taking Over 25
of the structural output diversity of both countries.46 Only for the manufacturing sec-
tor do my estimates show a notable bias as the result of such structural diﬀerences (see
table 2.3). The relatively low PPPs in mining and agricultural therefore do not appear
to be the result of product specialization, but reflect the consistently lower American
relative prices for the majority of sampled products in these sectors. Nonetheless, to
overcome the potential structural bias, I rely on the geometric average of the Laspeyres
and Paasche indices, the Fisher index, as the currency conversion factor for my pro-
ductivity comparisons. As noted in section 2.2, this is considered common practice in
this type of research.47
A further decomposition of the manufacturing sector oﬀers additional insights into
the price structure of these two economies. Table 2.3 reveals that the relative price dif-
ferences across themanufacturing industries were quite substantial. These price diﬀer-
ences testify to a specific pattern of industrial specialization, as already hinted at above
by the substantial Paasche-Laspeyres spread for manufacturing as a whole. Whereas
the textiles industries engaged the greatest share of British workers, American manu-
facturing was more geared toward the production of heavy and durable goods (metals,
machinery, etc.). This is reflected in the relative price structure between the two coun-
tries as well. The PPP for the textile, apparel and leather industries rise above the
manufacturing average, while the gross output PPP for metals and particularly the
machinery and transportation equipment industries are below-average. Even within
these branches considerable structural diﬀerences existed, again illustrated by the gap
between the respective Paasche and Laspeyres PPPs. In the transportation equipment
industries for instance, British producers were engaged primarily in the production
of ships while the US transportation sector had already shifted its focus toward the
production of automobiles.
Double deflation
The substantial diﬀerences in the gross output PPPs between the major sectors, ob-
served in table 2.3, hint at a potential gap between relative output and input prices.
Particularly the intermediate input PPPs for manufacturing industries that are depen-
dent on inputs from the agriculture or mining sectors (e.g. food and metal products)
are likely to deviate substantially from the single deflated gross output PPPs. As noted
by Fremdling et al., “when relative prices of output and input diﬀer across countries,
single deflated productivity measures might be misleading.” They demonstrate that
46. Generally, using a single countries’ production shares as weights in the comparison will introduce a
bias in the PPP as the products which constitute a large share of the total production are those for which
the country sustains a comparative advantage and for which her prices will thus, by and large, be relatively
low.
47. Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity.
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26 The Roaring Thirties
“single deflated measures can diverge substantially from double deflated measures
when there are major diﬀerences in the technical input-output coeﬃcients of an in-
dustry between two countries. This might be due to, for example, diﬀerences in pro-
duction methods, the type of materials used, and the amount of imported material.”48
Table 2.4 lists the intermediate input PPPs, in addition to the gross output PPPs
discussed above. As illustrated in section 2.2, the intermediate input PPPs are based on
uvrs of intermediate products weighted by data on the flow of these goods from input-
output tables.49 The intermediate input PPPs show a large cross-industry variation,
although not as large as those observed for the gross output PPPs. The input PPPs
for agriculture and particularly mining are below average, whereas the industries that
rely on (semi-)manufactured goods – apparel and machinery, for instance – exhibit
above-average PPPs.
On the basis of these gross output and intermediate input PPPs, I can now calculate
the double deflated value added PPPs; see equations (2.8)-(2.10). The results for these
value added PPPs are also shown in table 2.4. Given the similarity between input and
output PPPs in the agriculture and mining sectors, combined with a relatively low
share of intermediate inputs in gross output, the value added PPPs for these sectors
stay close to the original single deflated output PPPs. For the manufacturing sector I
do observe a notable gap between input and output PPPs, however. Table 2.4 shows
that the relative US/UK price level for outputs was substantially higher than it was
for inputs, which reflects the American access to cheap intermediate inputs flowing
from the agricultural andmining sectors. These inputs represented a sizable portion of
manufacturing gross output. For both countries, well over 50 percent of gross output
consisted of intermediate inputs. Overall, the PPP for value added is raised by 13
percent (compared to the original manufacturing gross output PPP) to 5.74 $/£, well
above the oﬃcial exchange rate, which stood at 4.87 $/£ in 1909.50
2.4 Comparative labor productivity
What new light do these PPP estimates shed on the international labor-productivity
comparison debate? Table 2.5 presents the comparative labor-productivity estimates
with the UK as base-country. The first column of this table present the relative levels
of gross output per worker, converted on the basis of the single deflated Fisher PPPs
listed in table 2.4. The second column presents the comparative levels of real value
48. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “Censuses Compared,” 13.
49. For two manufacturing industries, leather and leather products and instruments and miscellaneous
manufactures, information on the flow of inputs was missing, rendering the calculating of specific value
added PPPs impossible.
50. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, 318–9.
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28 The Roaring Thirties
Table 2.5: Comparative labor productivity, US and UK
(1909/07)
comparative labor productivity (UK=100)
single deflated double deflated Broadberry
branch/sector gross outputa value addeda & Irwinb
Agriculture 159 181 109
Mining 278 263 161
Manufacturing 198 214 209
a Source: see text.
b Source: S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the
United States and the United Kingdom During the Nineteenth
Century,” Explorations in Economic History 43 (2006): 261;
S. Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up: A
Sectoral Analysis of Anglo-American Productivity Diﬀerences,
1870-1990,” Research in Economic History 17 (1997): 26–30;
S. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American
Manufacturing During the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in
Economic History 31 (1994): 524.
added per worker, converted using the double deflated Fisher PPPs of table 2.4. The
latter represents my preferred estimate of Anglo-American productivity around 1910.
The last column lists the figures by Broadberry and Irwin, the original benchmark of
US/UK productivity for the early twentieth century. Broadberry and Irwin estimate
productivity on the basis of a direct comparison of physical quantities of output per
worker which, as discussed in appendix 2.A, makes them conceptually comparable to
the single deflated productivity estimates listed in the first column of table 2.5.
So far my findings are in line with a large body of literature discussing the compar-
ative advantages of the American economy during the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century. The double deflated productivity figures in table 2.5 confirm the exis-
tence of a large transatlantic productivity gap in manufacturing, a phenomenon which
has been extensively documented.51 I find that the US manufacturing productivity
level was about 214 percent of the UK. My new estimates underline the US dominance
in mining productivity as well, even though I do find a substantially greater Anglo-
American productivity gap for this sector than originally reported by Broadberry and
Irwin. Contrary to the consensus view, however, the present study also highlights the
comparatively strong performance of the American agricultural sector. Below I will
show that these upward revisions of sectoral productivity levels, particularly those
for agriculture, raise the benchmark estimate of American total-economy productivity
51. See for instance: Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry; Broadberry, The
Productivity Race; Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century”; R. Gordon, “Two
Centuries of Economic Growth: Europe Chasing the American Frontier,” Centre for Economic Policy Research
Discussion Paper 4415 (2004): 1–48.
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relative to the UK. This brings my aggregate estimates much closer to the GDP per
worker and GDP per capita figures reported by Ward and Devereux and directly chal-
lenge the conclusions made by Broadberry and Irwin. Prior to discussing the results at
the total-economy level, I will first discuss the origin and rational behind the revisions
for each of the major sectors individually.
Agriculture
The main source for the discrepancy in the agricultural labor productivity estimates
is not the method of productivity comparison – as Broadberry and Irwin also ap-
plied the ICOP approach here – but is the underlying figure of US value added per
worker for this sector. Table 2.6 provides an overview of the sources and figures behind
both Anglo-American comparisons of agricultural productivity. In an earlier study, on
which Broadberry and Irwin base their estimate, Broadberry lists a US net output per
employee value of 347$.52 I base my considerably higher estimate of 488$ per worker
on the value added figures listed in the Historical Statistics and the agricultural em-
ployment reported by Lebergott.53 Although the estimation of employment and par-
ticularly value added in agriculture is considerably more diﬃcult than it is for other
sectors, none of the primary sources point in the direction of a figure as low as sug-
gested by Broadberry.54
Although Broadberry does not list the value added and employment figures under-
lying his labor productivity figures in US agriculture directly, they can be implicitly
derived on the basis of the sectoral employment shares listed in his paper.55 Table
2.6 shows that this employment figure broadly matches the estimate by Lebergott, on
which I rely.56 Total value added in the agricultural sector, derived from the productiv-
ity figure listed by Broadberry and the implicit employment estimate, lies considerably
52. Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27.
53. Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States, 4:193; Lebergott, Manpower in Economic Growth,
510.
54. Cited estimates of US value added per worker in 1910 range from 426$ to 575$. For alternative sources
on employment see: Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 308; Carter et al., Historical Statistics
of the United States, 4:77; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Population,” in
Thirteenth Census of the United States, IV:40; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (1913), 36 (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Oﬃce, 1914), 229; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census,
“Population: Comparative Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940,” in Sixteenth Decennial
Census of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1942), 104. For al-
ternative sources on agricultural output see: United States Department of Agriculture, “Value Added to the
U.S. Economy by the Agricultural Sector Via the Production of Goods and Services, 1910–1919,” 2011, ac-
cessed on 1 November 2011; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Agriculture,”
474, 494, 505, 517, 519, 532.
55. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and AmericanManufacturing,” 524; Broadberry and
Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 261.
56. Lebergott,Manpower in Economic Growth, 510.
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below my own measure, however. Broadberry’s figure of approximately 3,875 million
dollars does not appear to be supported by any of the primary sources available, which
cite figures of total value added in agriculture ranging from 5,780million to 6,077mil-
lion dollars.57 Broadberry’s underestimation of American agricultural output by over
30 percent accounts for a large share of the diﬀerence between his comparative pro-
ductivity figure and those presented in the present study.
In addition, net output per worker in the British agricultural sector appears to be
overstated by Broadberry; 78£ versus my estimate of 64£.58 The higher estimate by
Broadberry is the result of his choice to exclude the agricultural production in Ireland
from his productivity estimate. This, however, is inconsistent with the definition used
by Feinstein as well as the industrial benchmark.59 I reincorporated Irish production
and employment in the productivity figures and made a (minor) revision to the PPP –
from 4.12 $/£ listed by Broadberry to 4.20 $/£.60
These adjustments to the productivity estimates listed above are not only in line
with those suggested in a recent paper by Ward and Devereux, they also substantiate
Habakkuk’s claim of relatively high levels of productivity in American agriculture.61
In his monograph, Habakkuk argues that during the nineteenth century “America[n]
improvements in agriculture took the form primarily of increasing output per head
and the increase initially was probably more rapid than in industry; in England on
the other hand, agricultural improvement was devoted primarily to increasing yields
per acre.”62 Reflecting his well-known thesis for industry, Habakkuk contends that
the abundance of resources and scarcity of (skilled) labor in the US forced American
farmers to pursue capital-intensive methods of production. Machinery and particu-
larly land were substituted for labor, resulting in high levels of labor productivity.
The importance of labor-saving innovations also features prominently in subsequent
accounts of the American agricultural development, stressing the relative productiv-
ity of this sector in international perspective.63 Furthermore, Olmstead and Rhode
demonstrate the importance of biological innovations in the form of improved crops
57. Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States, 4:193; United States Department of Agriculture,
“Value Added to the U.S. Economy by the Agricultural Sector,” accessed on 1 November 2011; United States
Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Agriculture,” 474, 494, 505, 517, 519, 532.
58. Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27; Feinstein, National Income, Expen-
diture and Output of the United Kingdom, 208; Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and
Output of the UK, T60, T131; Board of Agriculture and Fisheries, The Agricultural Output of Great Britain,
17, 26; Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK, 20.
59. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom.
60. Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27.
61. M. Ward and J. Devereux, “Relative British and American Income Levels During the First Industrial
Revolution,” Research in Economic History 23 (2005): 267–8.
62. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, 11–4.
63. W. Hayami and V. Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective (Baltimore: John Hop-
kins University Press, 1985).
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32 The Roaring Thirties
and livestock.64 These biological innovations allowed the farm frontier to be pushed
to the drier and harsher West and North, continuously expanding the available land
for cultivation. This depressed the price of farmland in relation to labor even further.
These developments allowed American agriculture to become regionally specialized,
reaping all the benefits of returns-to-scale and raising productivity levels in the pro-
cess.
The developments in American agriculture should not be viewed in isolation. As
noted in section 2.1, it appears highly unlikely that the American agricultural sec-
tor was left entirely unaﬀected by the rapid developments in industry during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Demand for agricultural goods increased dra-
matically, both from the domestic as well as the international market, while the wage-
level continued to rise, reflecting the sizable labor productivity gains in industry. Had
productivity levels in agriculture remained stagnant, it would have become even more
diﬃcult to attract labor from the industrial areas of the US. This in itself would have
provided further incentive for farmers to economize on labor and adopt even more
land-intensive forms of agriculture, raising labor productivity in the process. Over
and above, American industry provided farmers with cheap fertilizers, energy and
farm machinery which had the eﬀect of raising the output per acre as well as allowing
farmers to work greater stretches of land unaided.
In the UK land was scarce and there were few opportunities to expand the arable
acreage. Consequently, British farmers primarily adopted land-saving, as opposed
to labor-saving improvements and were mostly interested in raising the output per
acre.65 In an attempt to overcome this barrier, from the 1840s to the 1870s – the period
known as ‘high farming’ – a considerable amount of new acreage was added, mostly
through drainage.66 Still, this investment came at considerable expense and the sup-
plemental farmland, approximately 4.5 million acres, was not enough to overcome
the constraints posed by land-scarcity on the growth prospects of British agriculture.
Doubt could thus be cast on the appropriateness of the designation ‘high farming’,
as it is not evident that the addition of arable acreage made strict economic sense.67
From 1870 up to the First World War, other forms of land-saving technologies devel-
oped rapidly and began to spread across British agriculture; the primary applications
were the use of chemical fertilizers and concentrated feeds.68 When compared to other
64. A. Olmstead and P. Rhode, Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Devel-
opment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
65. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, 101–2.
66. M. Turner, “Agriculture, 1860–1914,” chap. 6 in Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History
of Modern Britain, 2:139.
67. ibid., 139.
68. J. van Zanden, “The First Green Revolution: The Growth of Production and Productivity in European
Agriculture, 1810–1914,” Economic History Review 44 (1991): 231–2.
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Western-European countries though, the average consumption of fertilizers in the UK
was still relatively low, while the level of consumption of imported animal feeds stag-
nated after 1880.69 In contrast to the US and parts of Europe, the improvements in
labor-saving technology in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain were
limited and the main agricultural activities remained largely dependent on draft ani-
mals and human labor.70
As noted by Turner, British agriculture appears to have been in more or less un-
remitting decline from 1860 down to the First World War.71 The UK became more
and more dependent on imports of agricultural goods to satisfy the needs of the ever-
growing urban population. Initially this flow of imports was composed largely of cash
crops, such as wheat from North America. The influx of cheap grains caused a sharp
realignment of the agricultural sector from crop production toward a livestock econ-
omy.72 In the 1860s and 1870s, Britain’s isolated position and legislation still aﬀorded
the livestock producers some respite from foreign competition, and livestock’s share
in total agricultural output increased to well over 50 percent during the decades to
follow. Yet, by the 1880s the free-trade policies and the development of chilled trans-
portation opened the British meat market to foreign competition. Turner shows that,
“the benefits of bulk carriage and the attendant economies of scale meant that even
after incurring substantial freight charges many overseas suppliers from the 1880s
could compete more successfully in home markets than home producers.”73
The inability of British farmers to compete with foreign competitors and the sub-
stantial imports of American agricultural produce appear to support my finding of
comparatively low levels of productivity in the British agricultural sector. This also
aligns with Ó Gráda’s estimates of TFP growth in the range of 0.4 percent per year
between 1870 and 1910, which in comparison to the US and other European countries
was fairly slow.74 Whereas American agriculture took full advantage of the major im-
provements in labor-saving technologies prior to 1910, British improvements focused
primarily on the saving of land. By and large British farmers had trouble adapting to
the rapidly changing economic and social conditions.75
69. ibid., 232.
70. ibid., 234.
71. Turner, “Agriculture, 1860–1914,” 133.
72. ibid., 144.
73. ibid., 134.
74. C. Ó Gráda, “British Agriculture, 1860–1914,” chap. 6 in The Economic History of Britain Since 1700,
2nd ed., ed. R. Floud and D. McCloskey, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 148–9;
Zanden, “The First Green Revolution,” 229.
75. ibid., 237–8.
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Table 2.7: Value added and employment shares in mining, US and UK
(%, 1909/07)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1907)b
branch/sector value added employment value added employment
Coal 49.3 68.8 91.0 87.9
Iron ore 8.8 4.8 1.5 1.2
Other metals 19.4 10.7 1.1 1.9
Fuel oils 13.9 4.4 1.3 1.0
Miscellaneous 8.5 11.3 5.1 8.1
Total mining 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Source: United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Mines and
Quarries,” in Thirteenth Census of the United States, XI:24.
b Source: Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the United
Kingdom (1907) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1912), 39.
Mining
The estimate of labor productivity for mining by Broadberry and Irwin again appears
to understate the relative lead of the US in comparison to the UK. The double deflated
figures of value added per worker, listed in table 2.5, appraise American mining at 263
percent of the UK level. Broadberry and Irwin cite an estimate of 161. The main source
for the discrepancy between both benchmark estimates is the method of productivity
comparison. Broadberry and Irwin rely on Rostas’ original quantity approach and esti-
mate comparative productivity inmining solely on the basis of the physical production
of coal and iron ore. Even though coal and iron ore comprise the bulk of output and
employment in this sector, as shown in table 2.7, by focusing solely on these two items
Broadberry and Irwin ignore the contribution of other upcoming mining products,
most notably gas and fuel oils (e.g. petroleum).76
The average value added per wage earner in these uncovered mining branches –
at least for the American mining sector – was substantially greater than that observed
in coal and iron ore mining. Table 2.7 shows that the nonferrous metal ores, fuel oils
and miscellaneous mining branches covered approximately 26 percent of employment
and 42 percent of value added in US mining, raising the average labor productivity
by about 27 percent when I include these to the coal and iron ore sample. For the
76. Even though the share of oil and natural gas in the world’s total energy consumption was still fairly
low prior to the First World War (approximately 5.9 percent), their relative contribution to the total power
supply increased rapidly in the decades to follow; by 1935 the share of these commodities in the world’s
power supply had risen to just over 20 percent. The American reliance on gas and oil was substantial greater
than it was in the UK, however. According to the International Labour Oﬃce, in 1936 the American share
of oil and gas in the total energy consumption was 37.4 percent, whereas the British share was only 8.7
percent. International Labour Oﬃce, The World Coal-mining Industry, vol. I (Geneva, 1938), 33–6.
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UK, coal and iron ore already encompassed 89 percent of mining employment and
about 93 percent of value added. Here, the addition of the other mining branches
actually lowers the average value added per worker for the total British mining sector
by 4 percent. The complete coverage of mining, which is made possible by the use of
the ICOP methodology, thus raises the comparative productivity estimate by over 30
percent in favor of the US, accounting for a large part of the discrepancy between my
new estimate and the original Broadberry and Irwin benchmark.
Apart from its limited coverage, the figure cited by Broadberry and Irwin also ap-
pears to understate productivity in coal mining directly. Given coal’s large share in
mining output, the estimate for this branch has serious implications for both Broad-
berry and Irwin’s as well as my own estimation of overall mining productivity. Broad-
berry and Irwin’s estimate is based on earlier work by Broadberry, who cites the total
tonnage of coal extracted and the number of wage earners in American and British
coal mining.77 In his figures Broadberry erroneously includes the labor and output of
the coke production at the American collieries. This lowers his estimate of output per
worker for the US substantially. In an earlier study, McCloskey uses identical methods
and sources to compare Anglo-American productivity in the coal mining branch, but
he adjusts the output and employment figures to exclude the production of coke.78
Table 2.8 lists both these estimates and the underlying country-specific output per
worker figures, showing McCloskey’s comparative US/UK productivity figure for coal
mining to come out substantially higher at 188 compared to the Broadberry estimate
of 163.79
On the basis of the same sources as McCloskey, but comparing the gross output
value per wage earner instead, I arrive at an identical level of comparative productiv-
ity (see row 3 in table 2.8). For this estimate, I converted US gross output per wage
earner to British Pounds Sterling on the basis of the ratio of the American and British
unit values for all types of coal combined.80 This is in line with the approach taken by
Broadberry and McCloskey who also aggregated the total tonnage of coal excavated
prior to comparing the quantity output per worker. The aggregation of the total ton-
nage and output value of coal implicitly ignores the variations in the quality and price
77. Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27.
78. McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity?,” 291.
79. An international comparison of the coal-mining industry by the International Labour Oﬃce reports
an even greater gap in productivity between the US and UK. Comparing the output of bituminous coal per
man-shift in 1913 they observe an average production of 3,270 kg. per shift in the US and only 1,090 in
Britain. Relative to other European countries, productivity in the UK was slightly above-average; produc-
tivity in the German Ruhr area was approximately 943 kg. per shift; for Belgium the ILO reports a figure
of 528; 701 for France; 820 for the Netherlands; and 1,202 for the East Upper Silesia region in Poland.
International Labour Oﬃce, The World Coal-mining Industry, 109.
80. The unit values and unit value ratios for coal are based on equations (2.1) and (2.2). The underlying
quantity and value data and sources are given in table 2.9.
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Table 2.8: Comparative labor productivity in coal mining, US and UK
(1909/07)
output per comparative
worker PPP productivity
unit US UK ($/£) (UK=100)
Quantity: Broadberrya tons/worker 530 326 163
Quantity: McCloskeyb tons/worker 613 325 188
ICOP: uvr ‘coal: total’c go/worker 826 146 3.01 188
ICOP: Fisher PPPd go/worker 826 146 2.78 203
a Source: Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27.
b Source:McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity?,” 291.
c Source: Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK, 42, 44;
United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Mines and
Quarries,” 186. The employment figures for the US were adjusted to exclude coke
workers and take peak employment into account, while British employment was
corrected for absenteeism and excludes iron miners working under the Coal Mines
Regulation Act; see McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity?,” 291. The
price deflator is based on the unit value ratio for all coal combined, see table 2.9.
d Source: see c. The price deflator is based on the Fisher PPP for coal, see table 2.9.
for the diﬀerent types of coal, however. Table 2.9 illustrates that in both countries
the price for anthracite coal was markedly higher than the price for bituminous coal,
and that the share of the former in the output of the American coal mining branch
was also substantially greater than the share of anthracite in British coal production.
As an alternative measure, using equations (2.3)-(2.5), I estimated a new purchasing
power parity for coal, taking both the price variations and the diﬀerent value shares
of anthracite and bituminous coal into account. This Fisher PPP was then used to re-
estimate comparative productivity in table 2.8, resulting in a US/UK productivity level
of 203.
The example of coal mining above highlights both the similarities between the
quantity and the ICOP approach as well as the potential advantages of the latter. Based
on the same sources, a direct comparison of the tonnage of coal per worker yields an
identical productivity estimate as a comparison of the per worker value of coal pro-
duction (based on the unadjusted average price of coal). The capacity of the ICOP
approach to account for diﬀerences in prices between the various commodities pro-
duced within the same industry distinguishes it from the original quantity approach,
however. Still, it should be noted that the quality adjustment illustrated above does
not guarantee that the products being compared are fully equivalent between the two
countries. The chemical composition of coal (e.g. carbon, moisture or volatile content)
as well as the physical characteristics – which can diﬀer markedly between geological
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Table 2.9: Relative price of coal, US and UK (1909/07)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1907)b
quantity value unit value quantity value unit value uvr
(ton, mln.) ($, mln.) ($/ton) (ton, mln.) (£, mln.) (£/ton) ($/£)
coal: anthracite 73.5 149.4 2.03 4.0 2.3 0.58 3.51
coal: bituminous 344.5 405.5 1.18 266.9 117.3 0.44 2.68
coal: total 418.0 554.9 1.33 270.8 119.6 0.44 3.01
Laspeyres Paasche Fisher
PPP 2.69 2.86 2.78
a Source: United States Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey: Mineral
Resources of the United States 1910 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce, 1911);
United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1910), 33 (Washington D.C.: United States
Government Printing Oﬃce, 1911), 202–4.
b Source: Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the United Kingdom
(1907) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1912), 42.
regions – ultimately determine the suitability for specific consumption purposes.81
In the early twentieth century, the world’s coal markets recognized hundreds of indi-
vidual classifications of coal, illustrating that the distinction between anthracite and
bituminous coal is still fairly rough.82 Nonetheless, the expanded sample of products
discussed previously, as well as the reliance on value added and sectoral employment
figures and the application of double deflation in the present study, yields a markedly
higher and, in my opinion, more representative estimate for the comparative Anglo-
American productivity in the mining sector as a whole.
The superior performance of the American mining sector can, in part, be explained
by the sheer quantity and quality of natural resources in this country. For the coal-
mining sector, McCloskey shows that the “American seams were generally thicker,
closer to the surface, freer from faults, flatter and drier than British seams.”83 The fa-
vorable geological conditions allowed American miners to introduce new mechanized
methods of production and work considerably more eﬃciently than their British coun-
terparts. Taylor illustrates the British mine-owners conservative attitude toward the
81. The International Labour Oﬃce report on the world coal-mining industry provides an extensive de-
scription of the characteristics of diﬀerent ranks and grades of coal and their consumption purposes, see
International Labour Oﬃce, The World Coal-mining Industry, 17–24.
82. Neither the British nor the American census fully distinguish between bituminous, sub-bituminous
and even lignite. See, United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (1910), 33 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce, 1911), 203; Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK, 42–3.
83. McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity?,” 293.
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adoption of new innovations and technologies through, for instance, the late adop-
tion of electricity as well as the hesitant introduction of the mechanized coal-cutter in
the British mines.84 “By 1913 almost nine times as much coal was being cut by ma-
chine in the United States as in Britain.”85 As was the case for agriculture, American
miners took full advantage of the major improvements in labor-saving technologies
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whereas British improvements
focused primarily on overcoming the diminishing returns to land as the coal and ore
deposits were slowly being exhausted.86 These developments drove a wedge between
the labor productivity levels of both countries, resulting in a productivity ratio in the
mining sector of 2.63 to 1 in favor of the US.
Manufacturing
As illustrated in table 2.5, the estimate of labor productivity in manufacturing by
Broadberry and Irwin is actually very close to my own double deflated value added
per worker figure for this sector. Broadberry and Irwin estimate a US/UK compara-
tive productivity level of 209 versus my estimate of 214. Both these estimates con-
firm the existence of a large transatlantic productivity gap for manufacturing in the
early twentieth century. Britain’s falling behind during the nineteenth century and
its inability to catch-up has been extensively documented and has traditionally been
explained by diﬀerences in factor and resource endowments as well as demand pat-
terns.87 The abundance of land and natural resources in the US gave rise to more
capital- and resource-intensive production, a process which was further facilitated by
a relatively homogenous demand for goods.88 In contrast, in Britain natural resources
were scarce while skilled labor was in ample supply, providing an incentive to econo-
mize on fixed capital in the form of machinery.89 The role played by resources in the
Anglo-American manufacturing productivity gap is underscored by the relatively low
input PPP for manufacturing, presented in table 2.4, which illustrates the American
access to cheap intermediates flowing from the agricultural and mining sectors.
Table 2.10 shows that the new comparative labor productivity figures for the under-
lying industries deviate more substantially from the original estimates. Still, the over-
all picture sketched by Broadberry and Irwin remains intact. American producers ex-
84. Taylor, “Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry,” 59; see also,
Walters, “Labour Productivity in South Wales Steam-coal Industry,” 296.
85. Taylor, “Labour Productivity and Technological Innovation in the British Coal Industry,” 58.
86. McCloskey, “International Diﬀerences in Productivity?,” 289–90.
87. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century; Broadberry, The Productivity
Race; Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century”; Gordon, “Two Centuries of
Economic Growth.”
88. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing,” 291.
89. P. Temin, “Labour Scarcity in America,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History Vol. 1 (1971): 162.
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Table 2.10: Comparative labor productivity in manufacturing, US and UK
(1909/07)
comparative labor productivity (UK=100)
single deflated double deflated Broadberry
industry/sector gross output value added & Irwina
Food, drink and tobacco 200 155 146
Textile, apparel and leather 157 184 151
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 169 176 143
Metal industries 203 224 288
Engineering and transport eq. 227 268 203
Miscellaneous 216 239 227
Manufacturing 198 214 209
a Source: S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the
United Kingdom During the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 43
(2006): 261; S. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American
Manufacturing During the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 31
(1994): 524.
celled in the production of durable goods (e.g. metal, engineering and wood products),
while the British manufactures were relatively productive in the non-durable indus-
tries (e.g. food, textile and chemicals). As noted by Broadberry, the industry-specific
productivity results are also broadly in line with the figures on revealed comparative
advantage in British and American manufacturing trade by Crafts and Thomas.90
A comparison of the real gross output and real value added figures in table 2.10
reveals that the application of the double deflation procedure can have a significant
impact on the productivity estimates. As previously noted, the use of gross output in
international benchmark comparisons introduces a potential bias as a result of diﬀer-
ences in the share of inter-industry deliveries in the value of production. This is of
importance particularly when the ratio of intermediate inputs to gross output varies
between countries as well as industries. These variations can occur as a result of diﬀer-
ences in production methods, the types of materials used, and the amount of imported
materials, but can also be caused by diﬀerences in industry classifications between the
countries under comparison.91 In addition, as discussed in section 2.3, double defla-
tion takes both relative prices of output and inputs into account. The diﬀerence be-
tween the use of value added instead of gross output for the productivity comparison
is most evident for the engineering and transportation equipment sector. Here the rel-
90. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership inManufacturing,” 523; N. Crafts
and M. Thomas, “Comparative Advantage in UK Manufacturing Trade, 1910–1935,” Economic Journal 96
(1986): 639.
91. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 360.
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ative input and output prices vary only marginally, but the share of input in gross
output is relatively high in the UK (see table 2.4). Consequently, British gross output
is inflated by the large share of intermediates used in the production process and will
considerably overestimate the added value of British machine builders in comparison
to their American counterparts. In contrast, the share of intermediate inputs in the
food, drink and tobacco industry is roughly identical for the UK and the US (73 and
71 percent respectively), but the use of relatively cheap agricultural inputs in the US
leads to a considerable upward adjustment of the value added PPP. Taking the relative
prices for outputs as well as inputs into account thus results in a substantial downward
adjustment of the comparative productivity figure for this industry.
In appendix 2.A, I demonstrate that the quantity approach – the method on which
Broadberry and Irwin rely – is conceptually on the same footing as my measure of real
gross output per worker. For the textile, apparel and leather as well as the engineer-
ing and transportation equipment industries, the gap between the new productivity
figures and the original estimates by Broadberry and Irwin appear to be explained
by the latter’s implicit reliance on gross output instead of value added. The moderate
upward revision for the productivity estimates in the chemical industries illustrates
one of the drawbacks of the quantity approach. Because of the complex structure of
the chemical industries and the heterogeneous nature of its products, it is simply not
possible to aggregate the quantities produced to a single measure or to assign labor to
the various products. The assignment of labor used to produce a single good, as dis-
cussed in appendix 2.A, is economically less sensible when the share of output for that
good only comprises a small fraction of the total production value in that industry. As
a result, the Broadberry and Irwin estimate for chemicals is primarily based on those
chemical industries that produce a single or homogeneous set of products (e.g. seed
crushing, coke, soap, fertilizers), disregarding the biggest industry in this sector: basic
chemicals.
Hours of work
So far the productivity figures have been expressed solely in terms of output per
worker. I implicitly assumed the average length of the working week as well as the
number of vacation and holidays to be identical in both countries. This assumption is
born out of necessity, unfortunately, as detailed figures on hours of work are gener-
ally unavailable for most sectors in the early twentieth century. For the manufacturing
industries, however, statistics on the length of the working week are available. Table
2.11 provides an overview of the weekly and annual hours of work in both countries.
The UK figures in table 2.11 were taken from the British Labour Statistics, which
i
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Table 2.11:Weekly and annual average hours worked in manufacturing, US and
UK (1909/06)
United States (1909)a United Kingdom (1906)b
weekly annual weekly annual
branch/sector hours hours hours hours
Food, drink and tobacco 54.7 2,722 54.4 2,657
Textile, apparel and leather 54.2 2,697 53.9 2,631
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 56.9 2,827 53.2 2,597
Metal industries 55.5 2,760 53.1 2,593
Engineering and transport eq. 54.2 2,692 53.2 2,596
Miscellaneous 54.3 2,699 53.6 2,617
Manufacturing 54.7 2,718 53.7 2,619
a Source: United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” in
Thirteenth Census of the United States, VIII:316–9; E. Jones, “New Estimates of Hours of Work
per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900–1957,” Review of Economics and Statistics 45 (1963): 375;
M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They are not Changin’: Days and Hours of Work in
Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in Economic History 44 (2007): 546.
b Source: Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics:
Historical Abstract 1886–1968 (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1971), 95; R. Matthews,
C. Feinstein, and J. Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973 (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1982), 566.
contains detailed statistics on the 1906 average hours of work per week for nearly
all of the large industries within the British manufacturing sector.92 The American
industry-specific estimates were taken from the Census of Manufactures of 1909 and
the work of Jones.93 Data from Matthews, Feinstein and Odling-Smee on the number
of vacations and holidays in Britain and Huberman and Minns for the US allowed
me to estimate the annual totals for hours worked.94 Overall, the length of the average
working week was fairly similar between the US and the UK. American manufacturing
wage-earners worked, on average, 1 additional hour per week compared to the British
wage earners. The relative gap in the annual hours of work is slightly larger as a result
of the greater number of vacation and holidays in the UK.
Table 2.12 presents the labor productivity statistics on a person-hour basis. The
industry-specific employment data have been multiplied by the data on annual hours
of work taken from table 2.11. Given the comparable length of the average working
92. Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract
1886–1968 (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1971), 95. Note that I assumed the average length of the work-
ing week to remain unchanged between 1906 and 1907.
93. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” 316–9; E. Jones, “New
Estimates of Hours of Work per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900–1957,” Review of Economics and Statistics
45 (1963): 375.
94. R. Matthews, C. Feinstein, and J. Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973 (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1982), 566; M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They are not Changin’: Days and Hours of
Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in Economic History 44 (2007): 546.
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Table 2.12: Real value added per worker and per hour in
manufacturing, US and UK (1909/07)
value added value added
per worker per hour
branch/sector (% US/UK) (% US/UK)
Food, drink and tobacco 155 151
Textile, apparel and leather 184 180
Chemicals, petroleum and rubber 176 162
Metal industries 224 211
Engineering and transport eq. 268 258
Miscellaneous 239 232
Manufacturing 214 207
Source: see tables 2.10 and 2.11.
week in the UK and the US, the hourly productivity estimates do not deviate much
from the per worker figures. The hour-adjusted figures indicate that overall manufac-
turing productivity in the US stood at ca. 207 percent of the UK level, approximately
7 percentage points below the per worker estimate. At the detailed industry level, the
drop in measured labor productivity ranged from 4 percentage points (food, drink and
tobacco) to 14 percentage points (chemicals, petroleum and rubber). Overall, the per
hour figures confirm the existence of a large transatlantic productivity gap in manu-
facturing, in the order of approximately 2:1, at the start of the twentieth century.
2.5 Total economy
In order to assess the impact of the new sectoral benchmarks on the overall produc-
tivity levels of the two countries, table 2.13 presents the reconciliation of comparative
GDP per worker and per capita for the US and the UK. As a first step in the output
based estimate of comparative productivity, I calculated a PPP deflator at the total
economy level. This PPP is a weighted average of the value added PPPs for the agri-
cultural, mining and manufacturing sectors listed in table 2.4, supplemented with
implicit price deflators for the construction and service sectors. The latter are based
on the comparative productivity estimates for these two sectors by Broadberry and Ir-
win which, when combined with the nominal value added per worker data listed in
table 2.13, yield the comparative price levels at the sectoral level.95
The PPP for total economy, at 6.14 $/£, comes out considerably higher than the
95. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 261.
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Table 2.13: Comparative labor productivity and income, US and UK
(1909/07)
employment value added per
shares (%) PPPc worker/capita
branch/sector USa UKb ($/£) US ($)d UK (£)e US/UKf
Agriculture 32.8 11.8 4.2 488 64 181
Industry 29.1 43.5 5.6 1,026 89 206
Mining 3.0 6.3 3.0 860 110 263
Manufacturing 21.3 32.1 5.7 1,063 86 214
Construction 4.8 5.1 9.1 970 80 134
Services 38.0 44.7 7.2 1,137 132 119
GDP per workerg 100.0 100.0 6.1 892 105 138
GDP per capitah 6.1 354 46 126
a Source: J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton: National Bureau
Economic Research, 1961), 296–7, 308; S. Lebergott,Manpower in Economic Growth: The
American Record Since 1800 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 118.
b Source: C. Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and Output of the UK,
1855–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 131.
c Fisher value added PPPs from table 2.4. PPPs in italics were derived implicitly from the
value added per worker figures in the last three columns of this table.
d Source: S. Carter et al., eds., Historical Statistics of the United States: Millennial Edition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); W. King, The National Income and Its
Purchasing Power (New York: National Bureau Economic Analysis, 1930); S. Fabricant, The
Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899–1937 (New York: National Bureau Economic
Analysis, 1940).
e Source: C. Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United Kingdom,
1855–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 208.
f Double deflated value added per worker estimates from table 2.5. Productivity figures in
italics were taken from S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United
States and the United Kingdom During the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic
History 43 (2006): 261.
g Source: C. Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and Output of the UK,
1855–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), T10, T125–6; Kendrick,
Productivity trends in the United States, 296–7, 308; S. Lebergott,Manpower in Economic
Growth: The American Record Since 1800 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 118.
h Population figures from A. Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy,
1–2008 AD,” Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 2008.
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oﬃcial exchange rate which, in 1909, stood at 4.87 $/£.96 In a study of the relative cost
of living in Britain and the US, Williamson obtains a fairly similar PPP of 6.48 $/£,
however.97 This PPP, based on the relative prices of primarily food stuﬀs and rents,
appears to corroborate the finding of a comparatively high American price level.
On the basis of the estimates of GDP at factor costs and total employment, the total
economy PPP can be utilized to compare output per worker between the two countries.
As shown in table 2.13, I find a US GDP per worker level of about 138 percent of
the UK. This is nearly 10 percent above the original industry-of-origin estimate by
Broadberry and Irwin – who value the American output per worker at 125 percent of
the British level.98 The new estimate puts the US comfortably in the lead in terms of
total economy labor productivity at the start of the twentieth century.
As noted by Broadberry, “the aggregate comparative level of labor productivity at
a point in time is the result not only of the levels of comparative labor productivity in
each sector but also of diﬀerences in the structure of employment.”99 Table 2.13 shows
that a large share of the American labor force was engaged in agriculture, while in the
UK the labor force was concentrated in the high value-added service sectors. These
structural diﬀerences provided the UK with a notable advantage – as value added per
worker was substantially lower in agriculture than in industry or services – helping
to explain the relatively modest lead in GDP per worker despite the large US/UK
productivity gap in agriculture and industry.100 Had the structure of the labor force
been identical between the US and the UK at the start of the twentieth century, then
the level of US output per worker would have been 150 or 157 percent of the British
level – depending on whether the US or UK employment shares from table 2.13 are
applied.
On the basis of Maddison’s figures for the 1909 American and 1907 British popu-
lation, an estimate of comparative GDP per capita can also be derived.101 Table 2.14
compares this estimate with previous attempts to measure economy-wide income dif-
ferences between the two countries. My industry-of-origin estimate is set against the
expenditure-based productivity calculations by Ward and Devereux, the estimates by
Broadberry and Irwin, and various versions of the Maddison data-set expressed in
96. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy, 318–9.
97. J. Williamson, “The Evolution of Global Labor Markets Since 1830: Background Evidence and Hy-
potheses,” Explorations in Economic History 32 (1995): 184.
98. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 261.
99. Broadberry, “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain?,” 386.
100. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 263.
101. Note that the GDP per capita figures are based on the estimates of GDP at factor costs and PPP deflator
listed in table 2.13.
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Table 2.14: Diﬀerent approaches to estimate comparative GDP per
capita, US and UK (ca. 1910)
rel. GDP p.
author approach year capita (UK=100)
This study ICOP 1909/07 126
Ward & Devereux Expenditure 1905 122
Broadberry & Irwin Quantity relatives 1909/11 113
Broadberry & Irwin Expenditure 1909/11 105
Maddison 1990 GK$ 1910 108
Maddison 1985 GK$ 1910 125
Maddison 1970 GK$ 1910 127
Source:M. Ward and J. Devereux, “Measuring British Decline: Direct Versus
Long-Span Income Measures,” Journal of Economic History 63 (2003): 826–851;
M. Ward and J. Devereux, “New Perspectives on International Standards of
Living in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in XIV International Economic History
Congress (Helsinki, 2006), 1–28; S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor
Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom During the
Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 43 (2006): 257–279;
A. Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organisation
for Economic Cooperation & Development, 2001); A. Maddison, Dynamic Forces
in Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); A. Maddison,
Phases of Capitalist Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
1970, 1985 and 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars respectively.102
Overall, my Anglo-American GDP per capita estimate is higher than the figures
suggested by Broadberry and Maddison. I appraise the American relative income per
capita level to be 126 percent of the UK, which is actually very close to the figures
provided by Ward and Devereux. It is interesting to note that my estimate also ap-
proximates the earlier estimates by Maddison, expressed in 1985 or 1970 dollars. This
similarity seems to suggest that the earlier benchmarks of international dollars reflect
the actual price diﬀerences around 1910 better than the later benchmarks, backing up
earlier claims in this respect by Prados de la Escosura.103
A backward projection of my benchmark estimates on existing time-series again
yield some interesting conclusions. Figure 2.1 summarizes the main findings of the
changes in relative income levels. For the time series I rely on figures by Maddison,
allowing me to compare the extrapolated GDP per capita figures against the Anglo-
American comparative per capita income figures by Broadberry and Irwin.104
102. Ward and Devereux, “Measuring British Decline”; M. Ward and J. Devereux, “New Perspectives on
International Standards of Living in the Late Nineteenth Century,” in XIV International Economic History
Congress (Helsinki, 2006), 1–28; Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the
United Kingdom”; Maddison, The World Economy; Maddison, Dynamic Forces in capitalist development; Mad-
dison, Phases of Capitalist Development.
103. Prados de la Escosura, “International Comparisons of Real Product.”
104. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 261; Mad-
dison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy: 1–2008 AD.”
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Figure 2.1: Comparative GDP per capita, US and UK (UK=100, 1870–1930)
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Source: Benchmark 1909/07 based on double deflated estimate listed in table 2.13. Time series
output and population, see A. Maddison, “Historical Statistics of the World Economy, 1–2008 AD,”
Groningen Growth & Development Centre, 2008; Broadberry and Irwin time series comparative per
capita income, see S. Broadberry and D. Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the
United Kingdom During the Nineteenth Century,” Explorations in Economic History 43 (2006): 270.
The estimates by Broadberry and Irwin show a substantial British lead in per capita
income terms between 1870 and 1890. According to their estimates, the US overtook
the UK in GDP per capita not until 1910.105 My benchmark extrapolation dates the
overtaking considerably earlier. I find that around 1870 the UK enjoyed a small lead
in per capita income terms. By 1880 this lead had dissipated and between 1880 to 1900
the US level of GDP per capita remained roughly on par with the UK. During the first
three decades of the twentieth century, however, the US charged ahead and the income
gap widened to nearly 60 percent in the 1920s.
Even though my new estimate of relative GDP per capita is very similar to the early
twentieth century benchmark by Ward and Devereux (see table 2.14), the long-run
trend illustrated in figure 2.1 does not correspond well to their nineteenth century
expenditure benchmarks. As noted in section 2.1, Ward and Devereux show the US
leading in terms of income per capita as early as 1872. In addition, they estimate a
considerable gap in relative income levels between the US and the UK throughout the
1872–1905 period. On the basis of the new industry-of-origin benchmark and time-
series evidence, I come to the conclusion that this appears to overstate the actual rel-
ative American income level in comparison to the UK. Still, the 1909/07 benchmark
confirms the existence of a large gap in comparative productivity between the US and
105. Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States and the United Kingdom,” 269.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 47 — #59 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 2. Taking Over 47
the UK in agriculture and industry and provides strong evidence for a sizable Amer-
ican advantage in terms of GDP per worker and GDP per capita at the start of the
twentieth century.
2.6 Conclusion
This study oﬀers a new benchmark for agriculture, mining and five manufacturing
branches in the US and the UK around 1910. On the basis of the ICOP approach, I
measure the value of net output by industry translated to a common currency on the
basis of sector-specific double deflated PPPs. This procedure takes both the diﬀerences
in the relative prices of outputs as well as inputs into account, which proved to be of
particularly importance for the productivity estimate of the manufacturing sector. In
this sector I observe a notable gap in the relative PPPs for inputs and outputs, reflect-
ing the American access to cheap intermediate inputs flowing from the agricultural
and mining sectors.
The new benchmark estimates confirm the existence of a large transatlantic pro-
ductivity gap in manufacturing, supporting earlier claims to this eﬀect by Rostas and
Broadberry. Contrary to the consensus view, however, I demonstrate that the Atlantic
productivity gap in the early twentieth century extended to mining and agricultural
sectors as well. Industrial productivity in the US stood at ca. 206 percent of the UK
level, while American agriculture maintained a lead of 181 percent against its British
counterpart. I show that American farmers took full advantage of labor-saving tech-
nologies, greatly improving their productivity level in comparison to the British farm-
ers who focused instead on the saving of land. In similar vein, productivity in British
mining was hampered by the relative hesitant introduction of technological improve-
ments and unfavorable geological conditions.
The substantial US lead in agriculture and industry provides firm evidence for a
strong overall lead in total economy productivity. However, as argued by Broadberry,
diﬀerences in the employment structure between both economies did play a role in
the relative income and productivity diﬀerentials. The low share of British employees
in the agricultural sector provided Britain with a structural advantage that substan-
tially reduced the gap in the overall level of productivity between the US and the UK.
Applying the new benchmark estimates for ca. 1910 to long term projections of value
added and total population back into the nineteenth century reveals an interesting
new perspective on the dynamics of comparative long-term economic development,
suggesting an earlier American takeover in terms of GDP per capita.
Rather than oﬀering any definitive answers to the questions of long run economic
growth and dynamics, my new benchmark estimate serves as a starting point for fur-
i
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ther investigations based on an industry-of-origin approach. A lot of work remains to
be done on improving the quality of time-series of gross output, value added and em-
ployment for the nineteenth century, and in many cases the early twentieth century as
well. In addition, expanding and improving estimates of service sector productivity is
crucial to arrive at a more complete picture of convergence and divergence of income
and productivity levels since the industrial revolution.
i
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2.A Benchmark methods compared
Although the basic concepts behind the available industry-of-origin benchmark tech-
niques are similar, there are some marked diﬀerences between the ICOP approach,
used in this chapter, and Rostas’ quantity approach. In this section, I discuss both the
basic methodology behind the quantity approach and provide an in-depth discussion
of the methodological similarities and diﬀerences between both approaches. Below, I
show that the quantity approach can be rewritten to approximate a basic version of
the unit value approach. I will also show, however, that in practice the outcomes of
these methods can deviate substantially. Particularly the necessity to assign labor to
individual commodities instead of industries within the quantity approach, limits this
methodology’s ability to estimate productivity for industries producing a wide array of
heterogeneous products. I demonstrate the basic methodology on the basis of a simple
single industry, two country, k product framework.
Rostas’ quantity approach
In the quantity approach, labor productivity (lp
ij
) for product i of country j, is defined
as the ratio between the physical quantity produced (q
ij
) and the employment used to
produce this particular commodity (emp
ij
).
lp
ij
=
q
ij
emp
ij
(2.13)
Unfortunately, employment at the commodity level is rarely available in histori-
cal sources. Broadberry shows that when quantity data is not available for the whole
output of the trade, the estimate of operatives in the trade (emp
j
) can be reduced in
proportion to the ratio of the value of covered items (v
ij
) to the value of total gross
output (go
j
), as shown in equation (2.14).106
emp
ij
= emp
j
 vij
go
j
(2.14)
The comparative labor productivity ratio, LP
io
, can then be obtained by dividing la-
bor productivity of country n by the labor productivity of country o. In equation (2.15),
the subscript n represents the numerator country, whereas the subscript o represents
106. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing,” 523; Rostas, Com-
parative Productivity in British and American Industry, 19–20.
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the base country.107
LP
io
=
lp
in
lp
io
(2.15)
=
q
in
emp
n
 pin qingon
=
q
io
emp
o
 pio qiogoo
=
go
n
emp
n
 p
in
=
go
o
emp
o
 p
io
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o
=
p
in
p
io
Substituting equation (2.14) into (2.13) – for both country n and o – in the compara-
tive labor productivity ratio above, reveals that the outcome for the quantity approach
is identical to the ratio of single deflated gross output per worker for both countries.
In the case of a single commodity, the price deflator is given by the unit value ratio
for this commodity. The uvr from equation (2.2) is used to transform either countries’
gross output into the other countries’ currency, making productivity in both countries
directly comparable.
In the case when there are multiple clearly distinct products being produced in the
same trade, the quantity output of these products can be weighted according to their
relative prices. Broadberry provides an example of this procedure for the comparison
of productivity in the American and British automobile, cycle and motorcycle indus-
tries.108 He shows that the heterogeneous output of this industry (i.e. automobiles,
cycles and motorcycles) can be converted to automobile equivalents using the relative
unit values for either the US or the UK. Equation (2.16) illustrates this step on the basis
of country o’s relative prices.
Q
j(o)
=
P
p
io
 q
ij
p
1o
(2.16)
The outcome of equation (2.16) above, represents the sum of the output of k prod-
ucts for country j, expressed in quantities of the base product 1 (e.g. automobiles, as
in Broadberry’s example).109 This aggregate quantity, Q
j(o)
, can in turn be used to esti-
mate comparative labor productivity for the entire industry; see equation (2.17). Note
that the estimate of operatives in the industry (emp
j
) is now reduced in proportion to
107. Note that the total production value of commodity i (vij ) is, by definition, equal to the physical quantity
produced (qij ) times the unit value (pij ) of this product.
108. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing,” 525–6; Rostas, Com-
parative Productivity in British and American Industry, 18–9.
109. Note that, for the calculation of the labor productivity ratios in (2.17) and (2.19), the choice of base
product is irrelevant as it cancels out in the equation.
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the ratio of the total value of all covered items (
P
p
ij
 q
ij
) to the value of gross output
(go
j
).
LP
o(o)
=
P
p
io
q
in
p1o
emp
n

P
p
in
q
in
gon
=
P
p
io
q
io
p1o
emp
o

P
p
io
q
io
goo
(2.17)
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o

P
p
io
 q
inP
p
in
 q
in
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o
=P
go
Rearranging the terms in equation (2.17) shows that the resulting productivity es-
timate will still be identical to the single deflated gross output per worker, only now
using the Paasche gross output PPP (P
go
) from section 2.2 as deflator. If I rely on the
relative prices of country n instead, I obtain the aggregate quantity,Q
j(n)
, which in turn
translates into the comparative productivity ratio given in equation (2.19). This pro-
ductivity estimate is still equivalent to single deflated gross output per worker, now
using the Laspeyres gross output PPP (L
go
) from equation (2.3) as the price deflator.
Q
j(n)
=
P
p
in
 q
ij
p
1n
(2.18)
LP
o(n)
=
P
p
in
q
in
p1n
emp
n

P
p
in
q
in
gon
=
P
p
in
q
io
p1n
emp
o

P
p
io
q
io
goo
(2.19)
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o

P
p
io
 q
ioP
p
in
 q
io
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o
=L
go
Broadberry shows that, in line with the ICOP approach, the geometric average of
these two estimates is taken as the overall productivity estimate in the quantity ap-
proach – thus reflecting both the relative prices of the numerator country n as well as
the base country o.110 Equation (2.20) illustrates that this is equivalent to the Fisher
110. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing,” 525.
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deflated ratio of gross output per worker.
LP
o
=
q
LP
o(o)
LP
o(n)
(2.20)
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o
=
p
Lgo  P go
=
go
n
=emp
n
go
o
=emp
o
=F
go
The ICOP versus the quantity approach
As illustrated above, the comparative labor productivity estimates at the industry level
based on the quantity approach will be identical to those based on single deflated gross
output, provided that employment at the commodity level is estimated according to
equation (2.14). For his 1907/09 benchmark of Anglo-American manufacturing pro-
ductivity – the study against which I contrast my own findings – Broadberry applies
this method throughout, making his estimates directly comparable to the single de-
flated productivity ratios reported in table 2.10.111
In section 2.4, I show that Broadberry’s quantity based estimates do in fact diﬀer
from my own single deflated figures, however. These diﬀerences stem primarily from
the increased coverage of this study, both with respect to the products matched as well
as the number of industries incorporated into the productivity comparison. For the
manufacturing sector, Broadberry directly compared 35 diﬀerent products between
both countries.112 In contrast, I matched a total of 111 products, considerably broad-
ening the range of products covered and taking important variations in the quality of
goods into account.113 As noted in section 2.4, this underscores one of the drawbacks
of the quantity approach. The assignment of labor used to produce a single good is
economically less sensible when the share of output for that good only comprises a
small fraction of the total production value in that industry. Consequently, this lim-
its the quantity approach’s ability to estimate productivity for industries producing a
wide array of heterogeneous products.114
In addition, I base my productivity results on the total gross output (or net output)
and employment for the entire manufacturing sector. I implicitly assume that the rela-
tive price ratios are representative conversion factors for both the industries for which
products were covered as well as those for which no matches could be made. Broad-
berry does not make this assumption, and his productivity estimates are based on 29
111. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing,” 538–45; see also,
Broadberry, “Forging Ahead, Falling Behind and Cathing-Up,” 27.
112. Broadberry, “Comparative Productivity in British and American Manufacturing,” 538–45.
113. See table 2.3 and appendix 2.B for further details.
114. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 12–4.
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industries covering 42 percent of British and 37 percent of American employment.
Although, both approaches have their merits, the complete inclusion of all manufac-
turing industries does impact the productivity estimates.
Furthermore, the ICOP framework allows for several extensions which serve to im-
prove the quality of the international benchmark estimates. The primary extension is
the use of value added and the application of the double deflation technique. As illus-
trated above, the quantity approach relies on gross output as a measure of output in
labor productivity, whereas modern international comparisons generally opt for value
added.115 This is of importance particularly when the ratio of intermediate inputs to
gross output varies between countries as well as industries. As noted in the main text,
these variations can occur as a result of diﬀerences in production methods, the types of
materials used, and the amount of imported materials, but can also be caused by dif-
ferences in industry classifications between the countries under comparison.116 In ad-
dition, I apply the double deflation technique, which does not only take relative prices
for gross output into account, but also compensates for relative price diﬀerentials for
intermediate inputs.117 Double deflation is generally considered to be the preferred
approach for sector comparisons of output and productivity, and recent studies have
shown that this adjustment could be of particular importance for benchmark studies
that examine the turbulent interwar years.118 As governments put in place increas-
ingly restrictive foreign trade regimes and tight currency controls during this period,
the internal price level and ratios between input and output prices tended to deviate
substantially.119
Another extension to the ICOP framework is the stratified sampling approach,
which introduces an alternative weighting scheme. The stratified sampling theory pro-
poses that the process of aggregation of the relative price ratios can be made more
precise if a heterogeneous population (the products matched) is divided into more ho-
mogeneous sub-populations, referred to as strata. These strata usually take the form
of industries, the output of which can be used as alternative weights to aggregate the
price ratios. For an elaborate description of the stratified sampling theory see the work
of Timmer.120
115. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity; Maddison and Ark, “Compari-
son of Real Output in Manufacturing”; Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity.
116. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 360.
117. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity, 82.
118. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared.”
119. ibid., 352.
120. M. Timmer, “On the Reliability of Unit Value Ratios in International Comparisons,” Groningen Growth
and Development Centre Memorandum 31 (1996): 1–31; M. Timmer, The Dynamics of Asian Manufacturing: A
Comparative Perspective in the Late Twentieth Century (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2000), 21.
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2.B Output unit value ratios
Table 2.15: Output UVRs, US and UK (1909/07)
United States United Kingdom
description quantity unit quantity value quantity value uvr
(x,000) ($,000) (x,000) (£,000) ($/£)
Wheat Cubic meters 24,081 657,657 1,911 10,370 5.0
Barley Cubic meters 6,108 92,459 1,990 9,177 3.3
Oats Cubic meters 35,491 414,697 4,496 13,264 4.0
Rye Cubic meters 1,040 20,422 72 220 6.4
Beans Cubic meters 396 21,771 338 1,735 10.7
Peas Cubic meters 251 10,964 223 1,130 8.6
Buckwheat Cubic meters 523 9,331 4 22 3.1
Hay Tons (metric) 62,444 685,042 9,876 31,818 3.4
Potatoes Tons (metric) 9,709 166,424 3,981 9,892 6.9
Hops Tons (metric) 18 7,845 24 1,059 9.6
Straw Tons (metric) 507 3,280 7,112 12,660 3.6
Strawberries Tons (metric) 145 17,914 42 1,036 5.0
Raspberries Tons (metric) 35 5,132 10 309 5.0
Currants Tons (metric) 6 790 6 153 5.5
Gooseberries Tons (metric) 3 417 18 208 11.8
Other small fruit Tons (metric) 53 5,721 13 252 5.4
Apples Tons (metric) 3,181 83,231 228 1,490 4.0
Pears Tons (metric) 196 7,911 9 90 4.2
Cherries Tons (metric) 75 7,231 9 194 4.5
Plums Tons (metric) 393 10,299 36 357 2.7
Milk: farm Liters (x000) 22,007 757,562 5,492 35,274 5.4
Butter: farm Tons (metric) 451 222,861 25 2,940 4.2
Cheese: farm Tons (metric) 4 1,142 25 1,400 4.9
Eggs: farm Dozens 1,591,311 306,689 92,374 3,772 4.7
Horses Number 1,768 210,264 53 1,590 4.0
Meat: cattle and calves Tons (metric) 3,635 710,015 482 27,264 3.5
Meat: sheep Tons (metric) 287 67,073 265 18,169 3.4
Meat: pigs Tons (metric) 3,898 717,674 321 14,362 4.1
Wool: unprocessed Tons (metric) 131 65,472 40 2,600 7.7
Coal: anthracite Tons (metric) 73,536 149,416 3,972 2,297 3.5
Coal: bituminous Tons (metric) 344,498 405,487 266,864 117,256 2.7
Iron pyrite Tons (metric) 251 1,028 11 5 9.2
Petroleum Liters (x000) 28,957 128,249 179 357 2.2
Iron ore Tons (metric) 51,332 106,540 15,226 4,315 7.3
Gypsum Tons (metric) 2,044 5,907 205 98 6.0
Arsenic oxides Tons (metric) 1 53 4 41 4.8
Salt: unrefined Tons (metric) 3,825 8,344 1,264 576 4.8
Sand Tons (metric) 53,035 17,174 1,977 165 3.9
Barytes Tons (metric) 53 199 35 43 3.0
Coke Tons (metric) 35,666 89,965 11,526 9,516 3.1
Coke breeze Tons (metric) 1,489 5,723 7,706 4,434 6.7
Tar Tons (metric) 604 3,284 787 767 5.6
Cotton: yarn Tons (metric) 230 132,249 675 78,304 4.9
Cotton: piece goods Sq. meters 5,280,169 443,163 5,869,387 81,313 6.1
Cotton: waste Tons (metric) 141 10,874 195 3,749 4.0
Wool: tops Tons (metric) 5 8,027 26 4,751 8.6
Wool: noils Tons (metric) 12 8,939 8 866 6.5
Wool: waste Tons (metric) 11 3,525 13 746 5.4
Wool: shoddy and mungo Tons (metric) 22 5,699 58 1,859 8.1
Wool: yarns worsted Tons (metric) 42 83,918 72 17,524 8.2
Wool: yarns woollen Tons (metric) 18 9,649 18 2,150 4.5
Wool: flannels Sq. meters 17,219 4,390 40,530 1,774 5.8
Wool: carpets Sq. meters 47,807 48,476 21,490 3,251 6.7
Wool: rugs Sq. meters 20,102 18,490 3,182 638 4.6
continued on next page. . .
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Table 2.15 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Wool: woollen tissues Sq. meters 412,078 271,013 196,733 24,403 5.3
Jute: yarns Tons (metric) 28 4,362 138 4,022 5.3
Jute: piece goods Sq. meters 59,798 4,057 218,450 3,579 4.1
Hemp: yarns Tons (metric) 2 983 7 375 7.4
Hosiery: hose, half-hose Pairs 748,688 65,121 172,668 4,402 3.4
Cordage, cables, ropes and
twine
Tons (metric) 419 76,295 106 4,701 4.1
Skins: fellmongery Number 97,681 75,648 9,831 996 7.6
Skins: tanned Number 67,572 53,119 186,344 14,688 10.0
Gloves: leather Dozen Pairs 40,424 22,526 7,020 839 4.7
Boots and shoes: leather Pairs 247,643 442,631 97,984 20,066 8.7
Hats: felt Number 40,267 46,146 18,888 2,491 8.7
Shawls Number 2,627 916 1,219 238 1.8
Pig iron Tons (metric) 26,063 387,830 10,276 33,304 4.6
Steel: ingots Tons (metric) 129 3,594 6,627 29,740 6.2
Iron and steel: bars, rods and
structural shapes
Tons (metric) 5,533 192,642 3,283 24,246 4.7
Iron and steel: rails Tons (metric) 2,690 77,811 970 5,638 5.0
Iron and steel: plates and
sheets
Tons (metric) 3,023 133,272 1,639 11,977 6.0
Iron and steel: armor plates Tons (metric) 24 10,649 18 1,771 4.5
Iron and steel: hoops and
strips
Tons (metric) 309 10,430 396 3,045 4.4
Iron and steel: pipes and
fittings, cast
Tons (metric) 1,891 64,515 347 2,013 5.9
Iron and steel: tires and axles Tons (metric) 93 3,831 139 1,910 3.0
Iron and steel: scrap metal Tons (metric) 1,124 18,164 710 2,231 5.1
Iron and steel: blooms, billets
and slabs
Tons (metric) 4,511 110,762 609 3,376 4.4
Steel: sheets and tinplate bars Tons (metric) 1,499 37,745 1,007 5,308 4.8
Tinplate: tinplate and
terneplate
Tons (metric) 597 45,815 537 7,402 5.6
Tinplate: black plates and
sheets
Tons (metric) 573 30,956 145 1,343 5.8
Iron and steel: pipes and
fittings, wrought
Tons (metric) 1,578 90,622 309 6,090 2.9
Iron and steel: wire rods Tons (metric) 2,082 61,948 119 882 4.0
Iron and steel: wire Tons (metric) 1,043 52,727 189 2,801 3.4
Iron and steel: nails Tons (metric) 46 2,218 16 176 4.3
Iron and steel: wire nails and
staples
Tons (metric) 657 28,900 5 55 3.7
Iron and steel: galvanized
sheets
Tons (metric) 392 25,912 505 7,157 4.7
Bicycles Number 168 2,388 624 3,441 2.6
Motor cycles Number 19 3,016 4 139 4.4
Motor cars Number 127 164,308 10 3,323 3.8
Vessels: wood and steel Tonnage (gross) 467 37,680 1,614 24,178 5.4
Copper: ingots Tons (metric) 496 142,084 42 3,422 3.5
Copper: plates, sheets, rods Tons (metric) 138 40,916 51 4,881 3.1
Copper: wire Tons (metric) 140 47,184 13 1,350 3.2
Brass: wire Tons (metric) 16 5,580 3 218 4.2
Lead: pig Tons (metric) 321 30,460 29 518 5.4
Tin: pig Tons (metric) 0 16 13 2,177 4.0
Flour: wheat Tons (metric) 10,497 557,815 4,037 43,139 5.0
Oﬀals: wheat Tons (metric) 3,788 91,407 1,959 8,694 5.4
Flour: barley, corn, buckwheat Tons (metric) 2,972 117,213 1,459 11,100 5.2
Animal feed Tons (metric) 5,444 164,735 150 1,006 4.5
Rice: cleaned Tons (metric) 298 21,048 92 895 7.3
Pork: bacon Tons (metric) 336 97,856 87 5,326 4.7
Pork: hams Tons (metric) 358 101,089 23 1,663 3.9
Pork: salted Tons (metric) 432 95,959 1 35 6.1
continued on next page. . .
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Table 2.15 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Lard Tons (metric) 564 134,397 31 1,479 5.0
Butter: factory Tons (metric) 186 115,098 56 5,840 5.9
Cheese: factory Tons (metric) 139 42,435 4 193 6.0
Cream: factory Tons (metric) 37 9,829 5 398 3.4
Margarine: factory Tons (metric) 19 5,964 45 2,094 6.5
Ice Tons (metric) 12,909 44,139 619 389 5.4
Sugar: refined Tons (metric) 747 71,741 574 8,995 6.1
Molasses Tons (metric) 249 3,975 56 303 3.0
Fish: cured Tons (metric) 0 10 133 3,712 4.7
Cigars Tons (metric) 64 193,807 2 1,146 4.5
Cigarettes Tons (metric) 14 35,373 14 4,532 7.7
Manufactured tobacco Tons (metric) 159 131,660 34 4,478 6.3
Acid: acetic Tons (metric) 26 1,337 6 91 3.5
Acid: nitric Tons (metric) 12 1,357 6 91 7.3
Acid: sulphuric Tons (metric) 1,340 10,085 550 955 4.3
Sulphates: alum Tons (metric) 33 654 73 213 6.7
Sulphates: ammonia Tons (metric) 56 3,227 306 3,271 5.4
Bleaching materials Tons (metric) 14 226 111 444 3.9
Borax Tons (metric) 38 1,202 14 205 2.2
Essential oils Tons (metric) 0 1,129 0 112 7.6
Soda compounds Tons (metric) 842 17,270 693 3,317 4.3
Sulphur Tons (metric) 260 4,605 31 148 3.8
Tallow and animal fat Tons (metric) 117 20,372 56 1,459 6.7
Fertilizer: superphosphate Tons (metric) 1,375 16,957 615 1,321 5.7
Fertilizer: other Tons (metric) 3,379 75,413 520 2,353 4.9
Glue and gelatine Tons (metric) 13 1,944 43 653 10.2
Soap: hard Tons (metric) 802 89,830 302 7,266 4.7
Soap: soft Tons (metric) 27 1,269 83 1,499 2.6
Glycerin Tons (metric) 53 16,591 16 604 8.4
Paraﬃn wax Tons (metric) 161 9,389 4 99 2.1
Seedcrushing Tons (metric) 1,652 91,100 1,393 12,940 5.9
Hard wood: oak Cubic meters 10,417 90,512 102 237 3.7
Hard wood: ash Cubic meters 687 7,116 17 37 4.7
Hard wood: elm Cubic meters 820 6,088 17 21 5.8
Paper: fine Tons (metric) 172 29,079 120 3,059 6.7
Paper: printing Tons (metric) 1,589 89,702 462 5,894 4.4
Paper: packing and wrapping Tons (metric) 692 42,221 191 2,032 5.7
Paper: printed and coated Tons (metric) 102 11,397 39 975 4.5
Paper: boards Tons (metric) 801 29,498 54 626 3.2
Paper: other Tons (metric) 15 1,736 14 440 3.9
Bricks Thousands 12,473 94,993 4,760 6,329 5.7
Cement Tons (metric) 13,407 68,752 2,923 3,439 4.4
Organs, reed Number 64 2,595 4 30 5.8
Pianos Number 331 46,188 58 972 8.3
Pianolas Number 45 10,750 1 23 5.1
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Chapter 3
Depression Dynamics
A New Estimate of the Anglo-American Manufacturing
Productivity Gap in the Interwar Period
3.1 Introduction
The large productivity lead that the US achieved over western Europe by the mid-
twentieth century is one of the most characteristic long-term aspects of US economic
development. Whether it was created by ‘good fortune, Yankee ingenuity, or European
stupidity’, however, still remains an open question.1 The present chapter contributes
to the discussion of when and how manufacturing labor productivity in the US moved
far ahead of the UK and of continental Europe.
From the statistical evidence collected by Broadberry, as well as that presented in
the previous chapter, we know that the US/UK productivity gap of the order of 2:1
dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, and was carried over into the twentieth cen-
tury.2 However, according to Broadberry, there seems to be no clear trend in the move-
ment of comparative performance: “US/UK comparative labor productivity in manu-
facturing over the whole period 1850–1989 is best described as stationary, exhibiting
neither upward nor downward trend”.3 Deviations from this long-term equilibrium
. This chapter is an adapted version of H. de Jong and P.Woltjer, “Depression Dynamics: A New Estimate
of the Anglo-American Manufacturing Productivity Gap in the Interwar Period,” Economic History Review
64 (2011): 472–492.
1. L. Hannah, “Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early Twentieth Century: A Global View,”
Journal of Economic History 68 (2008): 74.
2. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 3; see also Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United
States and the United Kingdom,” 265.
3. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 39. For the period after the Second World War Broadberry reported
comparative US/UK levels of 2.5/1 until 1960, followed by a decline.
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have been associated with the disruptions brought on by the two world wars. From his
own figures Broadberry concluded that Britain and Germany failed to close the gap on
the US in the interwar period; the gap widened during the 1920s, but was followed by
a ‘temporary cyclical narrowing’ during the Great Depression.4
Recent studies, however, have emphasized the depression’s contribution to growth
of potential output in the US economy. Field has shown that US growth in the first
part of the twentieth century was exceptionally high, in particular between 1929 and
1941.5 In several publications he conjectures that the fastest productivity growth in
the US took place across the depression years of the 1930s and not during the Second
World War.6 Between 1929 and 1941 total-factor productivity (TFP) in the non-farm
economy grew at a rate of 2.3 percent per year, being the highest peak-to-peak rate of
the century. Almost 50 percent of TFP growth originated from manufacturing. For the
1920s, he estimated that manufacturing’s contribution was about 80 percent of a total
TFP increase of 2.0 percent per year. During the interwar years, he suggests, the foun-
dations were laid for much of the US productivity growth of the 1950s.7 The Great
Depression did not push down the underlying productivity trend of the US econ-
omy. Although Field conjectures that the gap with Europe widened further during
the 1930s, he does not come forward with comparative evidence.8 If we look at man-
ufacturing alone, however, the much cited estimate by Broadberry claims a US/UK
comparative productivity level on a per worker basis of 250 in 1929 and a level of 192
in 1938, which suggests a relative decrease in US comparative productivity.9 This esti-
mate sits uncomfortably with Field’s revisionist account of US manufacturing produc-
tivity during the depression. Moreover, existing studies provide a rather bleak picture
of British manufacturing performance during the 1930s. In the literature we find a
critical account of the functioning of British capital markets, competition in product
markets, and the eﬀects of industrial relations, which were not very favorable for long-
4. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 291. See also P. Temin, “The Golden Age of European Growth Re-
considered,” European Review of Economic History 6 (2002): 12–9, which explains the fast post-1945 growth
by pointing at an arrested development of structural change in many European countries between 1914 and
1945.
5. Field built on prior work by Gordon, who identified the ‘one big wave’ more generally with the sec-
ond quarter of the twentieth century (1928–1950); R. Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big
Wave?,” American Economic Review 89 (1999): 123–128; R. Gordon, “Interpreting the One Big Wave in US
Long-term Productivity Growth,” chap. 2 in Productivity, Technology, and Economic Growth, ed. B. van Ark,
S. Kuipers, and G. Kuper (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 60. See also Bernstein, The Great
Depression, 121–43.
6. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” 1399. For a treatment of the
moderate supply-side eﬀects of the war, see A. Field, “The Impact of the Second World War on US Produc-
tivity Growth,” Economic History Review 61 (2008): 672–694.
7. Field, “Technological Change and US Productivity Growth,” 205, 216, 228.
8. Field, “The Equipment Hypothesis and US Economic Growth,” 49.
9. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 48–9. See also S. Broadberry and N. Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity
Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected Factors,” Journal of Economic History 52 (1992): 532–3; they estimate TFP
growth in the British economy at 1.9 percent per year between 1924 and 1937.
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run productivity performance.10 There was a shortfall on a broad front nurtured by a
‘cozy collusive environment’ that presumably diﬀered a lot from the US competitive
environment characterized by modern antitrust legislation.11 Given the political and
economic disarray of Europe between 1914 and 1945 and the apparent productivity
growth realized in the US economy during this period, the alleged persistence of a
nineteenth- and twentieth-century US/UK manufacturing productivity gap of 2:1 is
clearly a subject that needs to be addressed.
Themost important quantitative assessment of the comparative performance of the
British and US economies in the 1930s is the widely used study by Rostas published
in 1948.12 Later studies of relative US/UK performance, including the quantitative as-
sessment carried out by Broadberry and Crafts, rely heavily on Rostas’s detailed study
of physical output per worker, which is based on the manufacturing censuses of the
UK (1935) and the US (1937/39).13 We believe that this comparison needs to be re-
vised and completed according to modern standards. The study by Rostas is based
on only 31 industries, it uses physical output per worker as a measure of productiv-
ity performance instead of real value added per working hour, and it applies diﬀerent
census-reporting years between the UK and the US. Therefore it is hard to make the re-
sults of his comparisons consistent with the methods of historical national accounting
that are applied today.
In the present study we introduce new methods of US/UK comparison and focus
on one common census year for both countries, 1935, to guarantee complete and con-
sistent coverage of all industries that were reported in the oﬃcial censuses. We use
real value added as the measure of output and productivity of industries, instead of
‘traditional’ indicators such as physical output per worker. We show that, aside from
the construction of new comparative value added estimates, the adjustment for the
variation in the interwar working week between the US and the UK is an important
factor in reconciling the diﬀerent positions in the US/UK productivity debate.
One of the central findings of this chapter is that the US/UK productivity gap dur-
ing the 1930s was not stationary but becamemuch wider than existing estimates show,
once we adjust for hours worked. The new estimates display larger cross-industry vari-
ations in productivity levels than those resulting from Rostas’s study, and present a
clear picture of the key industries that were responsible for widening the gap between
10. N. Crafts, “Long-run Growth,” chap. 1 in Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of Mod-
ern Britain, 2:22.
11. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between theWars,” 340. See A. Booth, “TheManufacturing Failure
Hypothesis and the Performance of British Industry During the Long Boom,” Economic History Review 56
(2003): 1–33 for a revisionist interpretation of UK manufacturing performance in the period immediately
after the Second World War.
12. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry.
13. Broadberry and Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s,” 543.
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US and British manufacturing performance.
3.2 Data
The data for our benchmark comparison come from the oﬃcial production censuses.
For the UK we used the Fifth Census of Production of 1935, published by the Business
Statistics Oﬃce (BSO) of the Board of Trade.14 For the US we relied on the Biennial
Census of Manufactures of 1935, published by the Bureau of the Census of the US De-
partment of Commerce.15 Both surveys contain detailed information on quantities and
values of produced items, average prices, gross output, intermediate inputs, and em-
ployment. As the information for output and inputs is based on one and the same
questionnaire – for which the information is supplied at the level of firms – internal
consistency is guaranteed.16
Business cycle and capacity utilization eﬀects may influence the results of mea-
surement of output and productivity levels for one particular year. Rostas addressed
this issue in his study of prewar British and US manufacturing and concluded that
1937 was the best year for comparison, as, at this point in time, the degree of capacity
utilization was roughly similar in both economies.17 However, data for manufacturing
in the UK were not fully available for that year. The Import Duties Act Inquiry of 1937
does cover some of the manufacturing branches, but information for the majority of
the manufacturing industries was not yet tabulated or published by the time Rostas
started his study.18 To overcome this problem he decided to compare the year 1935 for
Britain with the year 1939 for the US, working back toward 1937. The primary reason
why Rostas relied so heavily on the US 1939 Biennial Census of Manufactures and not
the 1935 or 1937 census reports is that it met the sizable data requirements of the
quantitative study he employed.19
We believe that for the purpose of the present comparison the 1935 censuses for
the UK and the US are a good match. Both reports provide a systematic and detailed
assessment of all manufacturing industries in the two countries. The British census
distinguishes 108 manufacturing industries or trades, whereas the US census covers
14. Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fifth Census of Production and the Import Duties Act Inquiry (1935)
(London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1938–44).
15. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Biennial Census of Manufactures 1935
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1938).
16. See Jong and Woltjer, “A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity,” appendix A, for a discussion
of the comparability of the British and US census reports.
17. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 24.
18. Board of Trade, Preliminary Reports of the Import Duties Act Inquiry 1937 (London: H.M. Stationery
Oﬃce, 1937–8).
19. This particular census is part of the 1940 decennial census and contains detailed figures on the size of
plants, horse power of machinery installed, and so on. See United States Department of Commerce: Bureau
of the Census, “Manufactures: Statistics by Subjects,” in Sixteenth Decennial Census of the United States.
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Table 3.1: Output, employment, and labor productivity in manufactur-
ing, US and UK (1929–1937)
variables 1929 1931 1933 1935 1937
US output 100.0 72.0 62.8 82.8 103.3
UK output 100.0 89.2 96.3 114.6 132.9
US hours worked 100.0 63.1 53.8 64.8 79.4
UK hours worked 100.0 80.5 86.1 94.5 105.8
US productivity 100.0 114.1 116.8 127.9 130.1
UK productivity 100.0 110.8 111.8 121.3 125.6
Comparative US/UK productivity 100.0 102.9 104.4 105.4 103.6
Source: US output: J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton:
National Bureau Economic Research, 1961), 465–6, UK output: S. Broadberry, The
Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42–5, US hours worked: J. Kendrick,
Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton: National Bureau Economic
Research, 1961), 465–6. Annual average hours worked: E. Jones, “New Estimates of
Hours of Work per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900–1957,” Review of Economics and
Statistics 45 (1963): 375; M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They are not
Changin’: Days and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations
in Economic History 44 (2007): 546–8. UK hours worked: S. Broadberry, The
Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 42–5. Annual average hours worked:
M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They are not Changin’: Days and Hours of
Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in Economic History 44
(2007): 465–6; R. Hart, “Hours and Wages in the Depression: British Engineering
1926–1938,” Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001): 7; C. Clark, The Conditions of
Economic Progress, 2nd (London: MacMillan, 1951), 68; International Labour Oﬃce,
The ILO Year-book (Geneva, 1931); International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour
Statistics 1939 (Geneva, 1939); International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour
Statistics 1962 (Geneva, 1962).
327 industries and sub-industries.We have reclassified the industries of both countries
into 12 branches and 93 common industries, based on the classification of the UK
census.20
Potential eﬀects of the business cycle can be detected by making use of existing
time series of output and employment (adjusted for hours worked) to calculate the av-
erage movement in productivity levels in the manufacturing sector for both countries.
Table 3.1 shows the biennial movement of manufacturing output, employment and
productivity in the 1930s.
During the first phase of the Great Depression, output in US manufacturing de-
clined faster than in British manufacturing. Recovery in the US was much slower. In
20. The production censuses cover not only the entire manufacturing sector, but also contain data on
mining, construction works, public utilities, and government industries. For the purpose of this study we
excluded the latter industries and focused primarily on the manufacturing sector. See Jong and Woltjer,
“A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity,” appendix B, for a comparative overview of inputs and
output of US and UK manufacturing industries in 1935.
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62 The Roaring Thirties
both countries the drop in hourly employment was larger than the decline in output.
Recovery of US manufacturing employment was also slower than in Britain. Labor
productivity movements in both countries show an upward tendency throughout the
1930s. For the period 1929–1933 the observations seem to contradict the fact, observ-
able in much empirical work, that average labor productivity is pro-cyclical. Still, we
have to keep in mind that many of these studies refer to detrended measures of TFP
for the whole economy and not to labor productivity within manufacturing.21 Should
we, nevertheless, accept the idea of pro-cyclical labor productivity, it would imply that
the comparatively lower US capacity utilization (measured by employment levels) in
our comparison year 1935 might be an indication of lower productivity outcomes rel-
ative to the UK. Measured productivity levels calculated from the census of 1935 may
therefore underestimate potential output and thus productivity in the US vis-á-vis the
UK for this particular year.22 Note, however, that the year 1935 only shows a slightly
diﬀerent comparative ratio of US/UK productivity levels relative to other years. From
these numbers we can conclude that the relative positions of 1935 manufacturing pro-
ductivity levels in the business cycle do not reveal a substantial eﬀect of capacity uti-
lization diﬀerentials between the US and the UK.
3.3 Purchasing power parities
This section presents the method of comparison used in this study.23 We calculated
comparative levels of productivity by systematically measuring output and employ-
ment in each industry, which is also known as the industry-of-origin approach. Using
this approach one can apply either the quantity or the value method. The first method
was used by Rostas, who made direct comparisons of physical quantities of output (in
tons, gallons, or units).24 The second proceduremeasures the value of gross output and
net output by industry (in national currency) which is then translated into a common
currency with a sector-specific purchasing power parity (PPP). As Paige and Bombach
have demonstrated in their US/UK comparison for the postwar period, suitable con-
version factors can be obtained by constructing so-called industry-of-origin PPPs from
either output price data alone (single deflation) or from price data for output as well
21. For a study of the British economy between 1871 and 1997, see J. Chadha and C. Nolan, “A Long View
of the UK Business Cycle,” National Institute Economic Review 182 (2002): 72–89. See Field, “The Procyclical
Behavior of Total Factor Productivity in the United States,” for a long-term study of the US economy. B.
Bernanke andM. Parkinson, “Procyclical Labor Productivity and Competing Theories of the Business Cycle:
Some Evidence From Interwar US Manufacturing Industries,” Journal of Political Economy 99 (1991): 445,
find pro-cyclical labor productivity for the interwar period in a sample of US industries, covering 20 percent
of the manufacturing sector.
22. Broadberry and Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s,” 542.
23. See chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the ICOP approach.
24. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry.
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Chapter 3. Depression Dynamics 63
as intermediate inputs (double deflation).25 We used their method and calculated av-
erage factory gate prices from the values and quantities of the items reported in the
oﬃcial production censuses of both countries for the year 1935.
The first step in the calculation of the PPPs is the matching of products between the
two countries. The level of detail of the census data with respect to output allowed us
to match 359 products.26 On the intermediate inputs side we could match 67 items.27
An average value of a product or an intermediate input, the unit value (UV), reflects
the domestic producer price of an item. Next, unit value ratios (UVRs) of identical
products in both countries have been calculated and aggregated into a specific industry
or branch PPP. With this PPP, output and intermediate inputs of the two countries
were converted into a common currency.28
Table 3.2 features the Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher gross output PPPs per branch
and for total manufacturing. These PPPs are based solely on output unit value ratios,
aggregated to the branch and sector level using a stratified sampling approach.29 For
these bilateral comparisons the weights of either the base country (the UK) or the US
can be used, which provide a Laspeyres and a Paasche type PPP, respectively. We used
the geometric average of both indices, the Fisher index, as the currency conversion
factor for our productivity comparisons, which is considered common practice in this
type of research. The overall Fisher gross output PPP is 4.84 US dollars per pound
sterling, which is very close to the oﬃcial exchange rate of 4.94 $/£. However, the
large cross-industry variation of the output PPPs shows that the exchange rate would
function poorly as a PPP on a sector level.
Direct quantity and price information for inputs is available for a wide range of
industries in the British census, but in the US census it is available for textiles and
iron and steel only. To acquire intermediate input PPPs for all branches within the
manufacturing industry we applied a procedure that explicitly takes input-output re-
lations into account. By definition inputs for one industry are made up of the output
of another industry, meaning it is possible to derive an intermediate input PPP for an
industry as a weighted set of output UVRs from the industries furnishing its inputs.
We used the detailed US/UK output UVRs for all manufacturing output items, as de-
scribed above, as the basis for our intermediate input PPPs. Next we applied weights
that were constructed with information on the flow of goods between industries from
25. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity.
26. See appendix 3.A for further details.
27. Intermediate inputs were covered for the textiles and iron and steel branches only; see appendix 3.B.
28. The methodology and formulas which we applied are similar to the procedures that were used in
the study on British and German manufacturing by Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German
Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 375–6.
29. A detailed description of the stratified sampling approach is provided in Timmer, The Dynamics of
Asian Manufacturing, 20–6.
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Chapter 3. Depression Dynamics 65
existing input-output tables.We used the 1935 table for the UK fromBarna, and for the
US the 1939 table from Leontief.30 These input-output tables reveal that the great ma-
jority of the intermediate inputs for manufacturing industries originate from within
the manufacturing sector itself. For example, in the large clothing and engineering
trades nearly 90 percent of the inputs came from other manufacturing industries. It
should be noted, however, that we have worked solely with ex-factory output prices
and did not adjust for the costs of transport or trade margins, as the diﬀerences in
these costs for both countries are unlikely to be so large as to have a substantial eﬀect
on the resulting intermediate input PPPs. We therefore implicitly assumed the trade
and transport margins (relative to total costs) to be similar for both countries.
To construct the intermediate input PPPs we first estimated the US 1935 input-
output table based on the available 1939 table. We adjusted the row and column totals
for the 1939 input-output table to the 1935 gross output and intermediate inputs taken
from the Biennial Census of Manufactures of 1935. The changes in the structure of the
manufacturing sector could then be translated to the cells of the matrix itself to create
a fit as close as possible to the original input-output table. Based on the structure
of the British manufacturing sector, the Laspeyres output PPPs for products that are
used further on in the production process (thus excluding the PPPs for final products)
were then weighted by the flow of goods in the British input-output table to estimate
industry and branch specific intermediate input PPPs. The same was done for the US;
in this case the resulting PPPs were based on the US structure and Paasche PPPs. Only
for the building materials and timber trades was it impossible to construct PPPs for
intermediate inputs.
The resulting intermediate input PPPs are presented in table 3.2, in addition to
the gross output PPPs and the resulting double deflated value added PPPs. As previ-
ously noted, for the textile and iron and steel branches the US census does provide
specific value and quantity data on intermediate inputs, which made it possible to
cross-check the reliability of the results we obtained from the input-output approach.
The Fisher intermediate input PPPs between brackets are based on unit values derived
directly from the manufacturing censuses, whereas all other intermediate input PPPs
are derived from the input-output procedure. For the textile and iron and steel trades
the intermediate input PPPs constructed by the alternative procedures diﬀer within
a margin of less than 4 percent, which we believe is reassuringly close and justifies
our procedure of using the input-output tables to calculate input prices. Table 3.2 also
shows that in some large branches PPPs for inputs are very diﬀerent from those for
30. T. Barna, “The Interdependence of the British Economy,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 115
(1952): 29–81, table 3; W. Leontief, The Structure of the American Economy, 1919–1939 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1951), table 24.
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output, notably in clothing, chemicals, and engineering.
3.4 Comparative labor productivity
Table 3.3 provides our new estimates of comparative labor productivity between the
US and the UK. The first column presents the relative levels of gross output per
worker, converted to a single currency by the single deflated Fisher PPPs listed in table
3.2. These output estimates are conceptually comparable to the direct comparisons of
physical quantities of output as adopted by Rostas.31 The second column presents the
comparative levels of real value added per worker, converted by the double deflated
Fisher PPPs of table 3.2. The latter represents our preferred new comparison of US/UK
productivity for 1935.
Table 3.3 confirms the US lead for the manufacturing sector as a whole, as dis-
cussed in the introductory section. The double deflated estimate of 224 percent for US
labor productivity is well over twice the level of the UK; the single deflated estimate is
slightly lower at 212 percent. In both estimates, the UK performed comparatively well
in textiles, leather, and food products, while the US had a solid lead in engineering,
chemicals, and paper. Nonetheless, table 3.3 clearly shows that – as was the case for
the Germany/UK comparison carried out by Fremdling et al. – the double deflation
procedure does aﬀect the comparative productivity estimates, particularly at the sec-
toral level.32 For example, for the engineering, shipbuilding, and vehicles branch the
single deflated productivity outcome underestimates US performance relative to the
UK by a substantial margin. The diﬀerences between single and double deflated esti-
mates stem from two sources. The main diﬀerence between the two approaches can be
related to the fact that the double deflated benchmark estimates are a reconstruction
of real value added, which provides a better approximation of economic performance,
or the actual contribution of an industry to the value of the final product, than esti-
mates of single deflated gross output do. This is of importance in particular when the
ratio of intermediate inputs to gross output varies between countries as well as indus-
tries (what we call the input-share eﬀect). Secondly, double deflation takes both the
relative prices of industrial output and intermediate inputs into account (what we call
the price eﬀect). As shown by Fremdling et al., this procedure may give a more precise
estimate of comparative performance because it adjusts for the price-distorting ef-
fects of policies that influence the foreign trade regime or the currency exchange rate.
During the interwar period, protectionism and monetary policies led to substantial
31. See appendix 2.A in chapter 2 for a comparison between the ICOP approach, used in this chapter, and
Rostas’ quantity approach.
32. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 353.
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Table 3.3: Comparative labor productivity in manufacturing, US and UK
(1935)
labor productivity per worker (%, US/UK)
single deflated double deflated
branch/sector gross outputa value addedb
Textiles 124 144 (136)
Leather 127 157
Clothing 215 237
Iron and steel 173 186 (177)
Engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles 285 327
Non-ferrous metals 146 182
Food, drink and tobacco 177 152
Chemicals and allied products 287 263
Clay and building materials 201 201
Timber 293 293
Paper 285 278
Miscellaneous 211 231
Manufacturing 212 224
a The gross output per worker estimates were deflated by the Fisher gross output PPPs
listed in table 3.2.
b The value added per worker estimates were deflated by the Fisher value added PPPs listed
in table 3.2, with the exception of the ‘clay and building materials’ and ‘timber’ branches
(in italics) which were deflated by the Fisher gross output PPPs. The figures in parentheses
were deflated by ‘standard’ Fisher value added PPPs based on intermediate input UVRs
taken directly from the UK and US censuses; see appendices 3.A and 3.B.
Source: Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fifth Census of Production and the Import Duties
Act Inquiry (1935) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1938–44);
United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Biennial Census of
Manufactures 1935 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1938); for
further details see H. de Jong and P. Woltjer, “A Comparison of Real Output and
Productivity for British and American Manufacturing in 1935,” Groningen Growth and
Development Centre Memorandum 108 (2009): 1–34, appendix B.
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Table 3.4: Comparative labor productivity in five major industries, US and UK
(1935)
share int. input in Fisher labor productivity
gross output (%) PPP ($/£) p. worker (%, US/UK)
single double
industry US UK GO II VA defl. GO defl. VA
Cotton products 61 71 5.7 5.4 6.2 113 142
Electrical engineering 43 46 4.1 5.4 3.4 245 318
Motor vehicles and bicycles 71 57 3.9 4.9 2.5 439 462
Chemical products 42 46 4.0 4.5 3.6 229 269
Rubber products 54 49 4.6 5.1 4.1 231 222
Source: see table 3.3.
diﬀerentials in relative input and output price movements, as shown in table 3.2. This
supports the usefulness of the double deflation approach for the 1935 benchmark.33
To illustrate these eﬀects, we have listed in table 3.4 the relevant statistics for five
industries. For the cotton products, the share of intermediate inputs in gross output
was considerably higher in the UK (71 percent) than in the US (61 percent). Using gross
output as a proxy for the value added in this industry would thus potentially overes-
timate the comparative British labor productivity. Additionally, US relative prices for
inputs (5.4 dollars per pound sterling) were lower than for output (5.7 $/£), result-
ing in a higher PPP for value added (6.2 $/£). Converting US output to pounds using
the double deflated value added PPP, instead of the single deflated gross output PPP,
obviously results in a downward adjustment of the productivity ratio. For the cotton
products the eﬀect of the adjustment for input shares is actually stronger than the ad-
justment for prices, and results, in this particular case, in an upward revision of the
comparative productivity in favor of the US, from 113 to 142.
The eﬀects of input-shares and prices can thus move in opposite directions. This is
also the case in the motor vehicle and bicycle industry. US car manufacturers acquired
a much larger percentage of gross output from intermediate inputs (71 percent) than
their British counterparts (57 percent), which in this case points at a more developed
pattern of specialization; an observation confirmed by Lewchuk.34 In addition, the
comparative price level of intermediate inputs between the US and the UK – relative
to that of gross output – aﬀects the actual levels of real value added per worker, when
33. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 371.
34. W. Lewchuk, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1987), 138–42. As a result of the diﬀerent patterns of specialization for the motor vehicle and bicycle
trade, the use of gross output as a measure of industrial productivity clearly overestimates the output of a
US worker as compared to its British counterpart, since a considerable portion of US production consisted
of intermediate inputs acquired from other industries.
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the double deflation methodology is applied. Table 3.4 demonstrates that the PPP for
gross output in the motor vehicle and bicycle industry (3.9 $/£) is considerably lower
than the PPP for intermediate inputs (4.9 $/£), resulting in a PPP for value added
(2.5 $/£) that is below the single deflated output PPP. The price eﬀect turns out to
be stronger than the input-share eﬀect. Consequently, comparative US value added
reveals a substantial lead over British car manufacturing (462), which is higher than
the single deflated gross output per worker estimate (439).
The chemicals, dyestuﬀs, and drugs industry – which makes up the bulk of the
chemicals branch – shows that both eﬀects need not always be opposite. Here US pro-
ducers required less inputs per unit of output, albeit only by a small margin, even
though the relative price of these inputs was high compared to the relative price of
outputs. Both the input-share eﬀect and price eﬀect raised the productivity estimate,
resulting in an estimate much more in line with the other industries in the chemicals
branch (see table 3.3).
3.5 Comparison with Rostas
In this section we compare our new estimates of labor productivity with the outcome
of the physical output per worker estimates by Rostas. The problem we face here is
that the theoretically more appropriate double deflated productivity figures are not
directly comparable with Rostas’s outcomes. Therefore we rely on our real gross out-
put per worker estimates (and not on our preferred real value added estimates), as they
are conceptually on the same footing as the comparative productivity figures provided
by Rostas. Whereas we were able to draw on nearly complete sets for all manufactur-
ing industries in the censuses, Rostas’s choice was dictated by the availability of about
30 pairs of industries – as listed in table 3.5 – covering less than half of total output in
manufacturing. Important industries such as shipbuilding, non-ferrous metals, tim-
ber, heavy chemicals, petroleum refining, tailoring, printing, and leather were omit-
ted in the study by Rostas. In these cases he was not able to collect systematic data
on employment and output for both countries, which he noted himself was a major
shortcoming of his work.35
Table 3.5 compares the outcomes of both studies and reveals substantial diﬀer-
ences on the level of individual industries.36 These diﬀerences are caused by two main
factors. Firstly, the classification of industries as listed by Rostas is not in line with
the classification used in the US or British census, and for that matter, with our own
35. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 29.
36. Rostas’s results listed in table 3.5 are based on a 1935/1937 comparison summarized by Broadberry
and Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s.”
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classification. As the quantity method utilized by Rostas required him to match em-
ployment with a specific quantifiable measure of output – either in the form of a single
product or a group of broadly comparable items – his choice of industries was limited
to those with a fairly homogenous product structure and prevented him from aggre-
gating over industries to match the US and British industry classifications. Hence the
industries listed in Rostas’s study are at the lowest possible level of aggregation, and in
some cases represent only parts of an industry as defined in both censuses. Secondly,
even though Rostas restricted his study to those industries with a very homogenous
product structure, in several cases he was forced to combine the physical output of
several clearly distinct products to get a measure of comparative productivity. Our
study actually makes it possible to compare separate products within a single indus-
try between the US and the UK one by one. This method allowed us to cover a much
broader sample of products and to take quality diﬀerences into account. For the mo-
tor vehicle and bicycle trade, for example, we were able to compare the prices of 15
diﬀerent products in the US and the UK, ranging from car-axles to 15-ton trucks, thus
increasing both the coverage and accuracy of our conversion factors.
The only industry covered by Rostas in the clothing trades was the boots and shoes
trade, about 25 percent of the total size of the branch. Rostas’s relatively low estimate
for this industry can most likely be explained by the non-homogeneity of the final
products for this category. He had to rely on a rather rudimentary conversion factor
and in addition had to integrate the sizable US ‘boot and shoe, cut stock and findings’
trades into the industry. As our present estimate reveals, the boots and shoes trade
is not representative of the clothing branch as a whole, which is primarily driven by
the substantial US productivity lead in the large tailoring, dressmaking, and millinery
trades.37
Our present study confirms the large productivity lead of the US in the machinery
and electrical engineering industries. However, the extent of the US lead in the ma-
chinery industry, in terms of real gross output per worker, is overstated substantially
by the method applied by Rostas. Due to the complex nature of machinery production,
Rostas chose to deflate the total value of output using the oﬃcial exchange rate. This is
likely to have biased the comparative productivity estimate, as the cross-country diﬀer-
ences in the comparative price ratios between the goods produced in this industry were
not taken into account. For electrical engineering Rostas was able to match two prod-
uct groups, radios and electric lamps, which comprised together only 13 percent of the
industry. However, he was unable to aggregate these product groups into the broader
group of electrical engineering that was delimited in both census reports. In addition,
37. See table 3.3; in addition, see Jong and Woltjer, “A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity,”
appendix B, for an overview of all industries.
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Table 3.5:Gross output per worker in manufacturing, US and UK
(1935)
output per worker (% US/UK)
This study (real Rostas (physical
gross output output per
Industrya per worker) worker
Bricks 155 132
Glass containers 206 264
Cement 93 99
Coke and by-products 205 236
Soap 288 285
Matches 593 336
Seed crushing 94 105
Blast furnaces 311 362
Steel works 119 197
Iron foundries 179 154
Machinery 218 268
Radios 245 347
Electric lamps 245 543
Motor cars 439 294
Cotton spinning and weaving 113 150
Woollen and worsted 100 131
Rayon 117 185
Hosiery 184 156
Boots and shoes 170 141
Grain milling 136 173
Biscuits milling 268 345
Beet sugar 106 102
Margarine 140 152
Fish curing 98 50
Manufactured ice 163 219
Brewing 201 201
Tobacco 117 160
Paper 258 247
Rubber tyres and tubes 223 285
Linoleum and oilcloth 162 170
a The product group ‘tin cans’ has been omitted from this list, as it was not
possible to distinguish it as a separate industry in the British census. For
reasons of comparability we kept the arrangement of the industries and the
names above in line with the list provided in S. Broadberry and N. Crafts,
“Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected Factors,” Journal
of Economic History 52 (1992): 543. Note that the figure of comparative
productivity we provide for the industry ‘motor cars’ is identical to ‘motor
vehicles and bicycles’ listed in table 3.4; the figures for ‘radios’ and ‘electric
lamps’ are based on ‘electrical engineering’, ‘cotton spinning and weaving’
is based on ‘cotton products’, and ‘rubber tyres and tubes’ is identical to the
‘rubber products’ category.
Source: Real gross output per worker, see table 3.3. Physical output per
worker: L. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948); S. Broadberry and
N. Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s: Some Neglected
Factors,” Journal of Economic History 52 (1992): 543.
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the comparative productivity for the small sample of products, on which Rostas based
his estimate for the electrical engineering industry, is substantially above our own es-
timate for this industry, and serious doubts can be cast on the representativeness of
these specific products for the productivity estimate for the group as a whole. Fur-
thermore, because Rostas used quantity indicators of output for his comparison, his
estimates reflect gross output per worker instead of value added per worker.38 Thus
he could not take account of the eﬀects of relative diﬀerences in the shares and prices
of intermediate inputs between the two countries. Table 3.3 has shown that such an ad-
justment is essential in the case of the engineering, shipbuilding, and vehicles branch.
Rostas noted the latter point as a major limitation of his quantity approach but was
unable to address it at the time.39
The absence of the sector of chemicals, dyestuﬀs, and drugs among the estimates
of table 3.5 reflects another weakness in the quantity approach. Because of its com-
plex structure – the sector encompassed well over 200 appreciably diﬀerent products
– it was simply not possible for Rostas to find a common conversion factor, or to as-
sign labor to the various products. Consequently he decided to omit this industry, even
though it was by far the largest industry of the branch. Our new estimate of the chemi-
cal and allied trades – which includes the chemicals, dyestuﬀs, and drugs trades and is
based on 83 important products in this category – thus presents a major improvement
over the original estimation by Rostas.
Overall, the discrepancies between our new estimates and the quantity method
fundamentally challenge studies relying on Rostas’s disaggregated figures. His study
is less representative for the total manufacturing sector and the methodology applied
is unable to account for the eﬀects of relative prices and volumes of intermediate in-
puts used in the British and US production process. Studies using Rostas’s estimates in
analyzing comparative productivity figures for British and American manufacturing
industries are undoubtedly biased. Regardless of the shortcomings of his approach,
however, the comparative productivity estimate by Rostas for the manufacturing sec-
tor as a whole is remarkably close to the present estimate. On the total industry level
Rostas arrived at a figure of US/British comparative productivity of 212–215 percent,
whereas we have estimated a level of 212 percent (single deflated gross output, see ta-
ble 3.3).40 This may be seen as good news for those studies that continue to use quan-
tity comparisons on the practical grounds that there are insuﬃciently reliable prices
available. However, we firmly believe that this result for the aggregate manufactur-
ing sector is more likely to mirror the hard work and impeccable judgment of Rostas,
38. See appendix 2.A in chapter 2 for a comparison between the ICOP approach, used in this chapter, and
Rostas’ quantity approach.
39. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 3.
40. ibid., 33.
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rather than the validity of using physical quantities as the measure in productivity
comparisons.
3.6 Hours of work
Most historical cross-country productivity comparisons apply the concept of output
per worker or real value added per worker. However, we think that in the present con-
text real value added per person-hour is the preferred indicator of labor productivity,
as it is best suited to the concepts of economic eﬃciency and technological capabilities.
For the present study this distinction is of particular importance since the decline in
weekly actual hours worked in the US wasmore pronounced than in Britain during the
1930s. The practice of work sharing was widespread in the US depression economy. If
we do not adjust for this we would underestimate US comparative productivity. Clark
estimated the average working week in Great Britain in 1935 at 47.8 hours, compared
to only 37.2 hours in the US.41 Likewise, Rostas assumed the average length of the
UK and US working week to be 47.8 and 36.6 hours, respectively. However, he did not
analyze the eﬀects of this gap in working hours on the actual level of Anglo-American
comparative productivity.42 The lower levels of US working hours are confirmed in the
study of actual hours of work per week by Jones.43 For the UK, systematic evidence
is more diﬃcult to find.44 Some occasionally published government statistics give the
percentage of short-time workers and the quantity of short-time work.45 However, we
made estimates of actual hours worked on the basis of information given by Hart, and
by Huberman and Minns.46
The Yearbook of Labour Statistics of 1939 contains detailed statistics on average
hours of work per worker per week for several industries and industry groups within
manufacturing for both the UK and the US.47 We weighed these outcomes by em-
41. Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress, 68.
42. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 25, 27, 29, 43–4, 48–9. He did not
adjust for hours worked for two reasons. Firstly, he was more interested in measuring manpower require-
ments than in measuring the eﬀect of comparative productivity on production costs. Secondly, he (mistak-
enly) held the belief that the relatively short hours in the US were part and parcel of the mass-production
methods utilized there and for that reason per worker comparisons would be more realistic.
43. Jones, “New Estimates of Hours of Work per Week,” 375; see also International Labour Oﬃce, Year
Book of Labour Statistics 1939 (Geneva, 1939), and Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States.
44. N. Whiteside and J. Gillespie, “Deconstructing Unemployment: Developments in Britain in the Inter-
war Years,” Economic History Review 44 (1991): 674, 677.
45. M. Thomas, “Labour Market Structure and the Nature of Unemployment in Interwar Britain,” chap. 5
in Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective, ed. B. Eichengreen and T. Hatton (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1988), 136.
46. R. Hart, “Hours and Wages in the Depression: British Engineering 1926–1938,” Explorations in Eco-
nomic History 38 (2001): 7; Huberman and Minns, “Days and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds,”
546–8.
47. International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour Statistics 1939.
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Table 3.6: Weekly and annual average hours worked in manufacturing,
US and UK (1935)
United States United Kingdom
weekly annual weekly annual
branch/sector hours hours hours hours
Textiles 35.8 1,774 47.7 2,250
Leather 38.6 1,915 48.8 2,302
Clothing 32.2 1,597 45.4 2,142
Iron and steel 36.6 1,813 48.2 2,274
Engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles 36.5 1,809 48.2 2,274
Non-ferrous metals 37.1 1,838 48.2 2,274
Food, drink and tobacco 39.5 1,962 48.5 2,288
Chemicals and allied products 38.1 1,892 48.0 2,264
Clay and building materials 36.5 1,812 48.0 2,264
Timber 39.5 1,958 48.3 2,278
Paper 38.2 1,896 48.6 2,292
Miscellaneous 33.9 1,682 48.2 2,274
Manufacturing 36.6 1,817 47.8 2,255
Source: International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour Statistics 1939 (Geneva, 1939);
Ministry of Labour, Twenty-Second Abstract of Labour Statistics of the United Kingdom
(1922–1936) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1937), 96–7, 104–7; M. Huberman and
C. Minns, “The Times They are not Changin’: Days and Hours of Work in Old and
New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in Economic History 44 (2007): 546–8.
ployment to obtain the familiar branch classification that adheres to the British cen-
sus. Data from Huberman and Minns on the number of vacations and holidays in the
UK and US in 1938 made it possible to construct the total number of annual hours
worked.48 The data on weekly and annual average hours worked in 1935 are presented
in table 3.6.
The study by Jones illustrates that the decline in weekly hours in the US was ‘deep,
prolonged, and widespread’ during the 1930s.49 Bernanke explained the drop in the
US work week and the introduction of work sharing as an eﬃcient way for firms to
react to falling demand: firms cut production by running certain operations only part-
time; at the same time the work force was left intact by spread-work schedules.50
Table 3.7 presents labor productivity statistics on a person-hour basis. The branch
specific employment data have been multiplied by the data on annual hours worked
from table 3.6. This results in an average level of US labor productivity per hour for to-
48. Huberman and Minns, “Days and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds,” 546.
49. R. Margo, “Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993):
48.
50. B. Bernanke, “Employment, Hours, and Earnings in the Depression: An Analysis of Eight Manufactur-
ing Industries,” American Economic Review 76 (1986): 86.
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Table 3.7: Real value added per worker and per hour in manufacturing, US and
UK (1935)
value added per worker value added per hour
branch/sector (%, US/UK)a (%, US/UK)a
Textiles 144 182
Leather 157 190
Clothing 237 318
Iron and steel 186 235
Engineering, shipbuilding and vehicles 327 410
Non-ferrous metals 182 226
Food, drink and tobacco 152 177
Chemicals and allied products 263 316
Clay and building materials 201 253
Timber 293 345
Paper 278 338
Miscellaneous 231 313
Manufacturing 224 279
a The value added per worker/person-hour estimates were deflated by the Fisher value added
PPPs listed in table 3.2, with the exception of the ‘clay and building materials’ and ‘timber’
branches (in italics) which were deflated by Fisher gross output PPPs.
Source: see tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6.
tal manufacturing of 279 percent of the British level, which is 55 percentage points (or
25 percent) higher than the productivity per worker estimate. On the level of branches
the rise in measured labor productivity ranged from 16 percent (food, drink, and to-
bacco) to 34 percent (clothing). In 1935 hourly productivity in US engineering was
more than four times as high as in the UK.
These new results seem diﬃcult to reconcile with the productivity per worker out-
come of Rostas’s benchmark for manufacturing. The same holds for studies based on
this estimate, such as Broadberry’s backward and forward time series projections of
US/UK productivity. By making these extrapolations Broadberry implicitly assumed
that working hours have moved correspondingly in the UK and the US. The data pre-
sented here show that this was not the case in the interwar period. The line with the
solid triangular markers in figure 3.1 illustrates the comparative labor productivity
for the American and British manufacturing sectors over the period 1890–1990 on a
per worker basis, which is similar to the overview of comparative manufacturing pro-
ductivity in Broadberry’s work.51 With our new information on diﬀerential working
hours we projected a time series backward and forward from the 1935 benchmark
level of 279, on an hourly basis. We used the same time series on output and employ-
51. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 2.
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Figure 3.1: Comparative labor productivity in manufacturing, US and UK (UK=100,
1890–1990)
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Source: Benchmark 1935: based on double deflated estimates listed in table 3.3 (per worker) and
table 3.7 (per hour). Time series output and number of workers: S. Broadberry, The Productivity Race:
British Manufacturing in International Perspective, 1850–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997), 42–5. UK annual average hours worked: M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They
are not Changin’: Days and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in
Economic History 44 (2007): 546–8; R. Hart, “Hours and Wages in the Depression: British Engineering
1926–1938,” Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001): 7; C. Clark, The Conditions of Economic
Progress, 2nd (London: MacMillan, 1951), 68; International Labour Oﬃce, The ILO Year-book
(Geneva, 1931); International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour Statistics 1939 (Geneva, 1939);
International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour Statistics 1962 (Geneva, 1962);
The Conference Board, “Total Economy Database,” 2008. US annual average hours worked: E. Jones,
“New Estimates of Hours of Work per Week and Hourly Earnings, 1900–1957,” Review of Economics
and Statistics 45 (1963): 375; M. Huberman and C. Minns, “The Times They are not Changin’: Days
and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds, 1870–2000,” Explorations in Economic History 44 (2007):
546–8; The Conference Board, “Total Economy Database,” 2008.
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ment (number of workers) as Broadberry, and adjusted it for the movements of average
weekly hours per worker in both countries.52 This new graph reveals that the level of
comparative value added per person-hour was slightly below the level of value added
per worker in 1890. At the end of the nineteenth century the US had a labor produc-
tivity lead of about twice the level of the UK. From the final decades of the nineteenth
century the comparative US level increased, per worker as well as per hour. The two
series move in unison from 1900 into the 1920s. After 1929, however, the value added
per person-hour series does not show the downward movement in comparative labor
productivity that is so typical of the comparative value added per worker series. There
is no longer any indication of a ‘temporary cyclical narrowing’ of the gap before the
Second World War, but an upward trend from the end of the nineteenth century into
the postwar period. After the war there is still a gap between the two series which
persists well into the 1960s.
We conclude from this new series that there is a clear trend in the widening of
the US/UK productivity gap when we measure productivity in terms of actual hours
worked. This long-term process appears not to have been aﬀected greatly by the ex-
ogenous shocks of the world wars. During this period US manufacturing increased its
productivity lead (measured in hours) over the UK from less than 200 percent in 1890
to over 300 percent in the 1950s. This implies that the stylized fact of a 2:1 produc-
tivity ratio between the US and the UK can only be substantiated using the concept
of labor productivity per worker. However, in transatlantic comparisons in particular
it is important to employ the proper measure of productivity based on actual hours
worked. Productivity measured in hours thus provides a fundamentally diﬀerent pic-
ture of the long-term comparative industrial performance of the US, in line with the
results reported by Field.53
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents an industry-of-origin study of interwar US and UK manufactur-
ing productivity performance that has a diﬀerent approach from the estimates made
by Rostas. We have used the census reports of 1935 to calculate Anglo-American com-
parative labor productivity levels for all manufacturing industries. The input-output
structure of both economies has been applied to calculate prices of intermediate in-
puts. Therefore real value added could be estimated by performing a double defla-
tion procedure. Average annual hours worked on both sides of the Atlantic diverged
52. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 465–75; Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income,
Expenditure and Output of the UK, T111–3, T130.
53. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century,” 1399.
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greatly in the interwar period. When we adjust employment figures for actual hours
worked, the US comparative productivity level rises to almost 280 percent of that of
British manufacturing in 1935. Hours adjustment also produces major changes in the
long-term trend of comparative productivity in manufacturing between the two coun-
tries. US/UK hourly productivity in manufacturing steadily moved from a level of 200
around 1900 to a level of 300 in the period directly following the Second World.
Broadberry and Crafts have tried to explain the fundamental long-run forces un-
derlying the interwar US/UK manufacturing productivity gap. Regression estimates
include eﬀects from higher concentration ratios and lower quality of human capital in
British industries.54 Restrictive practices in interwar Britain may also have hampered
competition and the necessary economic adjustment to new technologies. There was
less rapid technical change compared with the US, maintaining a low eﬀort equilib-
rium that was carried over into the postwar period.55 Hannah has stressed the detri-
mental influence of protectionism and of the wars on European performance: ‘it is
surely not necessary to look much further for the sources of the American miracle
than the geopolitical maladies that aﬄicted her major potential competitors’.56
Focusing on ‘European failure’ is only part of the story, however. We believe that
it is also necessary to stress the sources of US success as well. US comparative perfor-
mance resulted from strong domestic modernization in the key sectors of the second
industrial revolution. The interwar years witnessed the implementation and exploita-
tion of new technologies and practices which were to form the basis of much of the
labor and total-factor productivity of the postwar period. The US advance reflected
also the movement along scientific and technological trajectories relatively unaﬀected
by the macroeconomic downturn of the 1930s. Nelson and Wright have mentioned
the rise of electrical and chemical engineering in particular. The shift from coal to
petroleum as the basic feedstock for chemical plants is seen as a “remarkable blend of
mass production, advanced science, and American resources”.57 Superimposed on the
depressed purchasing power of consumers were long-term developments such as ad-
vances in consumer-product and service oriented industries, characterized by techni-
cal change and product innovation. Bernstein has pointed at chemicals, petroleum, to-
bacco, food products, machinery, rubber, plastic products, transportation equipment,
paper, and fabricated metal as being among the most dynamic and successful indus-
54. Broadberry, The Productivity Race; Broadberry and Crafts, “Britain’s Productivity Gap in the 1930s,”
544–5; see chapter 5 for a discussion.
55. ibid., 554; G. Magee, “Manufacturing and Technological Change,” chap. 4 in Floud and Johnson, The
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 2:95; see chapter 4 for a discussion.
56. Hannah, “Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early Twentieth Century,” 210.
57. R. Nelson and G.Wright, “The Rise and Fall of American Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in
Historical Perspective,” Journal of Economic Literature 30 (1992): 1946; see also D. Mowery and N. Rosenberg,
“Twentieth-century Technological Change,” chap. 14 in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States,
ed. S. Engerman and R. Gallman, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 803–925.
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tries.58 Field has stressed the role of disembodied technical change and the advance
of knowledge in the outward shift of the US production possibility frontier. There is
much evidence of important process and product breakthroughs as drivers of produc-
tivity advance, such as floor space savings, automatic process control, larger units of
installations, increased thermal eﬃciency, improved materials, and the expansion of
R&D laboratories.59 Bresnahan and Raﬀ showed that a major role was also played by
the change in the composition of firms within and between industries.60 The US mo-
tor vehicle industry provides an archetypical example of growth of eﬃciency within
an industry as a direct cause of the removal of the low productivity tail in the spread of
plants – due to falling demand during the depression that aﬀected the weakest firms
foremost – resulting in a one-oﬀ change in the composition of the entire industry. Only
the large motor vehicle production plants survived in the depression years and new
entrants had higher productivity.
Our study reveals that many of the industries just mentioned show very high levels
of hourly labor productivity, such as the motor vehicle and bicycle trade (545); blast
furnaces (405); electrical engineering (389); chemicals, dyestuﬀs, and drugs (315); pa-
per (338); and rubber (300).61 It confirms that fast comparative productivity advances
were visible in many branches in US manufacturing, but particularly in engineering,
and in process industries like chemicals and paper. Disentangling each industry’s in-
dividual contribution to overall sectoral productivity growth is an important avenue
for future research into the explanation of high interwar comparative US productiv-
ity levels. Shift-share analysis of the growth of manufacturing branches in the period
1900–1957 reveals that US comparative productivity levels as well as productivity
growth were particularly high in chemicals and engineering.62 In other words, US
manufacturing managed to expand much faster those sectors in which it already had
comparative and competitive leadership.
We conclude that the US overtaking of the UK in terms of aggregate labor pro-
ductivity was not just caused by shifts from labor out of agriculture or the result of
comparative productivity increases in the service sector.63 It was as much the eﬀect
of productivity growth within manufacturing itself. Thus manufacturing can still be
viewed as a major force in driving convergence or divergence of labor productivity.
Finally, our comparative data reveal that it was not the SecondWorld War that was the
58. Bernstein, “The Response of American Manufacturing Industries to the Great Depression,” 228, 237–
41.
59. Field, “Technological Change and US Productivity Growth,” 214–5.
60. T. Bresnahan and D. Raﬀ, “Intra-Industry Heterogeneity and the Great Depression: The American
Motor Vehicles Industry, 1929–1935,” Journal of Economic History 51 (1991): 327–40.
61. Jong and Woltjer, “A Comparison of Real Output and Productivity,” appendices A and B.
62. ibid., 32.
63. Broadberry, “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain?,” 400.
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decisive factor in rapid US comparative productivity growth in manufacturing.64 Dur-
ing the 1930s the transatlantic productivity gap continued to widen, which is manifest
in the 1935 census reports of the UK and the US.
64. See also Field, “The Impact of the Second World War on US Productivity Growth,” 676, 688, 690.
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3.A Output unit value ratios
Table 3.8: Output UVRs, US and UK (1935)
United States United Kingdom
description quantity unit quantity value quantity value uvr
(x,000) ($,000) (x,000) (£,000) ($/£)
Wheat: meal, flour, etc. Tons (long) 12,979 792,164 5,670 46,381 7.5
Maize: flour and meal Tons (long) 671 32,485 974 4,934 9.6
Rice: cleaned Tons (long) 514 41,581 40 556 5.9
Animal feeds Tons (long) 5,555 222,698 736 5,384 5.5
Bread Pounds 9,307,579 706,898 7,028,000 44,700 11.9
Biscuits Pounds 1,323,045 179,602 539,056 16,654 4.4
Cocoa: powdered Pounds 9,003 1,520 34,496 1,778 3.3
Chocolate: bars and blocks Pounds 272,406 43,938 206,528 8,192 4.1
Confectionery: chocolat Pounds 718,157 120,620 228,032 10,030 3.8
Confectionery: hard goods Pounds 251,282 28,109 182,448 4,666 4.4
Confectionery: soft goods Pounds 118,607 15,018 192,976 5,335 4.6
Confectionery: toﬀees Pounds 151,432 14,991 135,184 3,459 3.9
Peas: canned and bottled Pounds 758,944 50,820 67,312 1,138 4.0
Vegetables: canned and bottled Pounds 2,623,810 134,550 68,544 1,014 3.5
Hams: cooked Pounds 108,317 35,581 41,216 2,196 6.2
Pork: salted, pickled and
smoked
Pounds 1,968,107 393,507 232,624 9,810 4.7
Lard Pounds 915,646 128,815 124,544 3,474 5.0
Sausages and meat puddings Pounds 1,333,906 228,464 219,632 7,373 5.1
Sausage casings Pounds 127,876 32,245 14,112 870 4.1
Butter Pounds 1,653,142 464,579 192,954 8,508 6.4
Cheese: cheddar Pounds 491,595 70,494 17,797 341 7.5
Cheese: cream Pounds 41,805 8,136 605 34 3.5
Condensed milk: whole,
sweetened
Pounds 136,481 9,779 154,493 2,618 4.2
Condensed milk: skimmed,
sweetened
Pounds 120,462 5,086 114,150 1,075 4.5
Condensed milk: not
sweetened
Pounds 2,186,928 118,750 63,538 1,080 3.2
Powdered milk: whole Pounds 22,784 3,232 19,230 776 3.5
Powdered milk: skimmed Pounds 296,175 15,824 20,485 195 5.6
Margarine Pounds 388,894 47,257 395,158 6,186 7.8
Casein Pounds 48,987 4,273 1,322 24 4.8
Sugar: unrefined Pounds 521,680 15,953 602,112 2,703 6.8
Sugar: refined Pounds 10,956,872 468,607 4,859,904 33,652 6.2
Beet pulp: dry Pounds 263,454 1,525 85,008 148 3.3
Beet pulp: molassed Pounds 265,906 1,732 534,352 938 3.7
Beet pulp: wet Tons (long) 1,144 928 103 24 3.5
Cured fish: herring Pounds 18,755 1,614 312,480 2,143 12.5
Cured fish: cod Pounds 12,584 1,595 58,464 822 9.0
Manufactured ice Tons (long) 29,161 126,621 1,173 970 5.3
Beer Gallons (UK) 1,007,931 336,490 787,536 54,898 4.8
Malt Pounds 2,005,367 70,926 619,696 4,470 4.9
Fruit juices, syrups and
cordials
Gallons (UK) 40,313 66,771 1,736 533 5.4
Cigarettes Pounds 321,777 294,221 153,187 38,461 3.6
Cotton yarn: single Pounds 390,037 133,569 1,159,628 53,287 7.5
Cotton yarn: doubled Pounds 50,733 13,948 181,203 16,658 3.0
Waste: cotton
(unmanufactured)
Pounds 338,673 21,027 241,429 2,634 5.7
Woven products: cotton Pounds 1,570,868 561,232 761,488 52,679 5.2
Pile fabrics: cotton Pounds 37,242 21,981 9,968 959 6.1
Handkerchiefs: cotton Dozen 31,798 18,122 11,335 1,269 5.1
Bed coverings: cotton Pounds 12,033 5,503 19,264 1,410 6.2
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Towels: cotton Pounds 72,112 30,944 30,352 2,036 6.4
Tops: wool Pounds 7,607 6,192 216,142 19,771 8.9
Noils: wool Pounds 11,874 5,615 30,973 1,802 8.1
Yarns: wool, mohair, etc. Pounds 97,947 101,595 281,090 35,068 8.3
Woollen and worsted tissues Pounds 57,234 60,094 232,990 42,318 5.8
Carpets and rugs: velvet and
tapestry, wool
Sq. Yd. 16,235 30,269 6,741 1,215 10.3
Carpets and rugs: Wilton,
wool
Sq. Yd. 5,285 15,884 4,663 1,927 7.3
Carpets and rugs: Axminster,
wool
Sq. Yd. 24,201 44,239 21,618 6,793 5.8
Blankets: wool Pounds 16,906 23,608 24,889 2,218 15.7
Hosiery: cotton Dozen pairs 27,509 33,575 4,168 1,332 3.8
Hosiery: wool Dozen pairs 881 2,516 12,495 6,167 5.8
Hosiery: silk Dozen pairs 40,877 201,399 4,838 4,542 5.2
Hosiery: artificial silk Dozen pairs 18,404 25,184 9,675 4,025 3.3
Underwear: cotton Dozen 20,044 62,958 6,852 4,322 5.0
Underwear: wool Dozen 1,853 13,888 2,382 3,726 4.8
Underwear: silk Dozen 7,137 59,126 49 165 2.5
Underwear: artificial silk Dozen 13,128 45,722 2,343 2,530 3.2
Fancy hosiery Dozen 11,533 120,807 5,064 9,721 5.5
Neckties, knitted Dozen 425 1,019 291 166 4.2
Knitted fabric: cotton Pounds 10,796 3,856 2,156 228 3.4
Knitted fabric: wool Pounds 8,369 10,650 2,390 529 5.7
Knitted fabric: artificial silk Pounds 28,577 21,383 16,083 4,391 2.7
Cotton net: finished Square yards 7,811 3,666 15,207 365 19.6
Twine: hard hemp, manila Pounds 120 19 1,702 25 10.7
Twine: hard hemp, sisal Pounds 36,841 3,017 32,894 435 6.2
Cordage: hard hemp, manila Pounds 75,390 9,050 72,587 992 8.8
Cordage: hard hemp, sisal Pounds 6,859 547 13,294 180 5.9
Twine, soft hemp Pounds 807 228 16,296 613 7.5
Cordage, soft hemp Pounds 146 49 1,971 116 5.7
Twine: jute Pounds 22,215 2,617 7,963 149 6.3
Twine: flax Pounds 1,556 779 2,397 167 7.2
Cordage: cotton Pounds 22,750 5,908 5,522 307 4.7
Waste: wool (manufactured) Pounds 20,494 2,725 120,736 2,586 6.2
Waste: cotton (manufactured) Pounds 142,164 9,248 98,112 968 6.6
Linoleum: inlaid Square yards 17,675 13,193 19,841 2,181 6.8
Linoleum: printed Square yards 2,197 1,000 42,667 2,744 7.1
Cork carpet Square yards 215 189 659 96 6.0
Floor coverings: felt base Square yards 66,631 14,461 42,270 1,027 8.9
Floor coverings: oilcloth Square yards 8,230 1,593 6,879 270 4.9
Leather cloth and other
oilcloth
Square yards 57,306 17,130 49,155 2,827 5.2
Overcoats: men’s and boys’ Number 6,249 78,792 2,573 2,475 13.1
Rubber/oil proofed garments:
male
Number 5,730 12,801 3,176 1,320 5.4
Rainproof garments: male Number 4,644 13,884 2,683 2,742 2.9
Rubber proofed garments:
male
Number 1,380 3,207 3,081 962 7.4
Oil proofed garments: female Number 49 95 184 60 5.9
Aprons and overalls: male Number 78,903 60,188 10,645 2,039 4.0
Aprons: female Number 31,355 8,698 41,456 3,559 3.2
Undergarments: male Dozen 18,786 147,568 3,222 6,427 3.9
Collars and cuﬀs Dozen 1,212 2,652 3,072 841 8.0
Corsets and allied garments Number 76,975 64,232 24,972 4,197 5.0
Millinery: trimmed hats Dozen 8,743 85,189 871 2,367 3.6
Neckties and scarves Dozen 18,200 58,418 4,097 2,583 5.1
Suspenders and allied
garments
Dozen 7,682 11,944 3,013 908 5.2
Handkerchiefs Dozen 31,798 18,122 644 177 2.1
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Boots and shoes: leather, men’s Pairs 96,650 210,175 30,912 12,951 5.2
Boots and shoes: leather,
women’s
Pairs 146,286 281,067 46,728 16,526 5.4
Boots and shoes: leather, boys’
and youths’
Pairs 18,500 27,922 7,908 1,712 7.0
Boots and shoes: leather, girls’ Pairs 43,521 47,429 13,500 2,386 6.2
Boots and shoes: leather,
infants’
Pairs 19,076 13,325 9,060 828 7.6
Slippers Pairs 39,020 25,290 18,564 2,219 5.4
Hardwood lumber: mahogany Cub. Meters 27 1,423 12 158 4.0
Hardwood lumber: walnut Cub. Meters 55 1,755 1 14 2.9
Hardwood lumber: oak Cub. Meters 2,819 32,433 143 1,054 1.6
Hardwood lumber: ash Cub. Meters 211 2,688 24 213 1.4
Hardwood lumber: beech Cub. Meters 223 2,230 25 139 1.8
Hardwood lumber: elm Cub. Meters 157 1,670 42 216 2.1
Hardwood lumber: other Cub. Meters 4,221 46,230 51 344 1.6
Softwood lumber: redwood
and Douglas fir
Cub. Meters 12,038 86,006 524 1,851 2.0
Softwood lumber: other Cub. Meters 26,303 224,049 547 1,782 2.6
Dressed lumber Cub. Meters 23,618 225,767 1,373 6,107 2.1
Coopering: wet, breweries and
distilleries
Number 3,885 17,503 170 291 2.6
Coopering: wet, other Number 4,216 7,552 208 134 2.8
Coopering: dry Number 21,471 10,021 985 134 3.4
Printing paper: newsprint Tons (long) 846 33,354 857 8,051 4.2
Printing paper: other Tons (long) 1,336 110,268 392 7,714 4.2
Writing paper Tons (long) 453 70,620 146 4,781 4.8
Packing paper: kraft Tons (long) 880 66,180 113 1,805 4.7
Packing paper: sulphite Tons (long) 297 26,337 16 291 4.8
Packing paper: manila Tons (long) 69 6,743 6 155 3.9
Greaseproof paper Tons (long) 11 2,256 14 315 9.2
Paper: oiled, waxed and
waterproof
Tons (long) 33 8,011 25 1,131 5.4
Cigarette paper Tons (long) 27 5,739 4 451 1.8
Blotting paper Tons (long) 10 1,965 6 389 3.0
Vegetable parchment Tons (long) 13 1,813 14 443 4.5
Building paper Tons (long) 393 19,450 28 340 4.1
Strawboard, leatherboard and
imitation leatherboard
Tons (long) 582 24,700 71 662 4.5
Cardboard and millboard Tons (long) 1,796 76,126 192 2,621 3.1
Pressboard Tons (long) 6 947 2 106 2.4
Folding boxes Tons (long) 1,000 51,696 148 5,687 1.3
Toilet paper Tons (long) 200 17,318 11 389 2.4
Hide leather: soles Pounds 238,605 66,206 164,544 7,534 6.1
Upper leather: calf and kip Square feet 462,395 80,744 53,873 1,284 7.3
Upper leather: goat Square feet 181,405 36,106 37,708 1,476 5.1
Upholstery leather Square feet 42,578 6,231 46,157 1,715 3.9
Glove leather: sheep and goat Square feet 96,009 8,948 36,579 1,107 3.1
Machinery belting: leather Pounds 7,653 10,903 3,116 714 6.2
Threads: rubber Pounds 5,415 2,551 2,083 317 3.1
Reclaimed rubber Pounds 266,785 11,774 14,119 165 3.8
Hose: rubber Pounds 93,594 24,390 15,949 760 5.5
Tubing: rubber Pounds 13,608 2,236 2,054 114 3.0
Tyres, outer: motor car and
aeroplane
Number 48,511 321,859 6,223 10,685 3.9
Tyres, inner: motor car and
aeroplane
Number 47,781 44,453 4,473 1,071 3.9
Belting: rubber Pounds 48,363 32,299 13,402 1,422 6.3
Valves, washers, rings, etc.:
rubber
Pounds 5,168 2,106 2,939 237 5.1
Boots: rubber Pairs 3,029 5,534 2,292 462 9.1
continued on next page. . .
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 84 — #96 i
i
i
i
i
i
84 The Roaring Thirties
Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Shoes: rubber Pairs 47,196 31,931 23,160 1,580 9.9
Fabrics: rubberized Square yards 71,346 20,059 19,150 832 6.5
Gloves: rubber Dozens Pairs 1,288 2,857 91 72 2.8
Water bottles: rubber Dozens 580 2,496 245 226 4.7
Natural dyestuﬀ: logwood Pounds 8,706 744 1,064 15 6.1
Natural dyestuﬀ: fustic Pounds 1,360 100 6,350 71 6.6
Tanning: quebracho Pounds 81,226 1,404 27,014 129 3.6
Tanning: other Pounds 321,604 5,184 114,094 574 3.2
Naphtha Gallons (UK) 180,612 13,223 4,118 185 1.6
Tar oils Gallons (UK) 906 194 96,264 1,880 11.0
Acids: acetic Tons (long) 45 5,455 11 327 3.9
Acids: nitric Tons (long) 22 2,143 15 237 6.0
Acids: sulphuric Tons (long) 3,326 31,908 599 1,958 2.9
Sulphates: aluminium Tons (long) 311 7,748 88 375 5.9
Sulphates: alums Tons (long) 23 1,457 8 54 8.7
Ammonia: liquor Tons (long) 20 1,235 44 264 10.1
Bleaching material: calcium
oxide
Tons (long) 35 909 55 278 5.1
Chloroform Pounds 1,799 324 741 104 1.3
Sulphates: copper Tons (long) 24 2,002 35 447 6.4
Ether: ethyl Pounds 7,915 1,305 3,833 104 6.1
Compressed gas: sulphur
dioxide
Pounds 24,628 1,170 7,437 38 9.3
Iodine Pounds 200 238 133 26 6.1
Iodides: other Pounds 45 104 41 16 6.0
Acetates: lime Tons (long) 23 826 1 7 3.1
Sulphates: magnesium Tons (long) 34 1,117 11 79 4.4
Magnesium compounds: other Tons (long) 7 883 11 195 7.4
Mercury compounds: other Pounds 733 739 571 110 5.2
Alcohols: methyl Gallons (UK) 15,784 5,076 2,709 212 4.1
Iodides: potassium Pounds 433 572 325 83 5.2
Sulphates: potassium Tons (long) 2 157 2 14 7.8
Potassium compounds: other Pounds 4,491 359 19,566 262 6.0
Carbonates: sodium Tons (long) 2,349 57,580 1,102 6,852 3.9
Chromates: sodium Tons (long) 38 4,763 6 197 3.9
Phosphates: sodium Tons (long) 118 6,552 4 53 4.2
Sulphates: sodium Tons (long) 263 5,303 97 224 8.7
Sodium compounds: other Tons (long) 694 17,125 166 1,799 2.3
Tartrates: potassium Pounds 3,855 642 426 15 4.7
Chlorides: tin Pounds 16,118 4,151 1,691 98 4.4
Charcoal Tons (long) 219 3,052 7 51 1.9
Arsenic compounds: other Tons (long) 43 6,496 2 43 5.7
Acetates: butyl Pounds 41,354 3,687 5,726 190 2.7
Sulphur Tons (long) 42 1,650 18 113 6.3
Sulphonated oils Tons (long) 15 3,378 9 172 11.3
Carbons Tons (long) 86 6,460 6 120 3.6
Resins, synthetic Pounds 88,521 15,770 30,442 1,224 4.4
Cellulose: acetate, benzyl and
pyroxylin
Pounds 23,736 18,669 739 122 4.8
Buttons: casein Gross 10,823 3,856 2,263 489 1.6
Buttons: mother-of-pearl Gross 20,618 7,348 194 46 1.5
Fertilisers: superphosphates Tons (long) 1,730 19,778 338 825 4.7
Fertilisers: nitrogenous Tons (long) 3,751 93,092 542 2,620 5.1
Fertilisers: bone meal Tons (long) 50 1,414 29 150 5.5
Fertilisers: other Tons (long) 120 3,358 538 3,011 5.0
Glue and size Tons (long) 184 22,724 45 913 6.1
Gelatine Tons (long) 11 8,199 6 482 9.1
Glycerin: crude Pounds 24,043 2,366 41,440 569 7.2
Glycerin: refined Pounds 118,727 12,973 14,000 288 5.3
Soap: intermediate product Pounds 3,665 270 37,072 356 7.7
Soap: soft Pounds 84,227 5,842 42,000 390 7.5
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Soap: bar Pounds 1,144,554 51,812 600,880 7,078 3.8
Soap: toilet Pounds 352,976 53,325 73,584 2,473 4.5
Soap: shaving Pounds 12,868 7,816 3,584 453 4.8
Soap: abrasive Pounds 233,587 7,688 51,408 381 4.4
Soap: powder Pounds 722,166 53,029 239,456 3,641 4.8
Soap: flakes and chips Pounds 458,935 36,329 95,088 1,804 4.2
Soap: liquid Pounds 22,593 1,523 5,600 64 5.9
Paints: paste, white lead Pounds 169,630 12,937 54,992 735 5.7
Paints: colors and pigments Pounds 1,507,754 87,012 115,808 1,894 3.5
Bone-, carbon- and lampblack Pounds 389,573 15,454 6,272 64 3.9
Paints: water and calcimines Pounds 125,165 5,298 72,800 742 4.2
Paints: paste, other Pounds 87,085 10,331 100,128 1,417 8.4
Varnishes and lacquers Gallons (UK) 59,270 91,427 11,250 4,260 4.1
Thinners and driers Gallons (UK) 17,022 14,569 1,526 424 3.1
Oils: cotton seed Tons (long) 495 91,849 137 3,455 7.4
Oils: linseed Tons (long) 216 43,272 104 2,451 8.5
Cake and meal: cotton seed Tons (long) 1,441 54,023 437 1,955 8.4
Cake and meal: linseed Tons (long) 420 13,387 158 1,275 3.9
Tallow: unrefined Tons (long) 197 27,008 25 571 6.0
Tallow: refined Tons (long) 33 4,915 13 381 5.0
Acids: stearic Tons (long) 12 2,777 10 306 7.6
Refined petroleum: kerosene Gallons (UK) 34,687 1,224 32,037 482 2.3
Refined petroleum: gasoline Gallons (UK) 15,409,358 1,023,578 145,385 4,374 2.2
Refined petroleum: lubricating
oil
Gallons (UK) 1,061,147 186,534 11,871 298 7.0
Refined petroleum: gas oil Gallons (UK) 2,255,829 85,550 44,559 652 2.6
Refined petroleum: fuel oil Gallons (UK) 1,483,868 60,983 130,925 1,169 4.6
Explosives: high explosives Pounds 270,018 30,196 43,232 1,770 2.7
Explosives: blasting powder Pounds 35,153 2,148 17,024 391 2.7
Dextrine Pounds 29,493 1,591 19,376 135 7.7
Washing and scouring
materials
Pounds 52,723 4,169 70,784 690 8.1
Ink: printers’ Pounds 150,585 32,561 54,096 2,356 5.0
Coke Tons (long) 4,151 32,510 12,636 9,971 9.9
Building bricks Thousands 2,293 25,495 7,174 15,376 5.2
Glass: beer bottles Gross 1,197 3,708 1,272 897 4.4
Glass: mineral water bottles Gross 1,822 6,373 409 306 4.7
Glass: liquor bottles Gross 6,095 22,983 1,035 864 4.5
Glass: other bottles and jars Gross 27,794 75,204 7,658 3,395 6.1
Glass: milk bottles Gross 2,124 10,980 688 638 5.6
Glass: tubing Pounds 27,302 3,666 3,830 194 2.7
Cement Tons (long) 12,596 113,505 5,949 8,791 6.1
Gypsum Tons (long) 1,117 13,529 265 517 6.2
Concrete: irrigation Tons (long) 816 10,735 141 431 4.3
Concrete: paving materials Tons (long) 49 243 911 1,363 3.3
Concrete: roofing tiles Tons (long) 38 862 408 805 11.4
Concrete: blocks and bricks Tons (long) 1,126 7,360 871 1,737 3.3
Ferro-manganese Tons (long) 237 20,220 75 696 9.2
Spiegeleisen Tons (long) 95 2,145 21 100 4.7
Ingots Tons (long) 211 9,473 673 4,314 7.0
Steel castings, direct Tons (long) 362 67,442 62 2,398 4.8
Steel blooms, billets and slabs Tons (long) 4,043 133,158 1,683 10,862 5.1
Sheet and tinplate bars Tons (long) 2,566 75,799 1,804 9,298 5.7
Wire rods Tons (long) 821 35,980 375 3,124 5.3
Steel bars Tons (long) 2,960 187,357 111 1,728 4.1
Flats, strips and hoop Tons (long) 834 45,405 904 8,662 5.7
Stainless steel, bars, rods, etc. Tons (long) 13 7,639 7 743 5.2
Scrap bars Tons (long) 16 874 13 79 8.5
Structural steel Tons (long) 2,367 160,085 513 3,640 9.5
Steel plates, 1/8 in. / 3/16 in. Tons (long) 1,145 58,894 97 824 6.1
Steel plates, 3/16 in. and over Tons (long) 413 19,887 855 6,842 6.0
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Steel plates, under 1/8 in. Tons (long) 3,086 181,966 715 8,385 5.0
Stainless-steel plates and
sheets
Tons (long) 12 9,148 4 536 5.8
Rails and railway material Tons (long) 877 39,112 627 5,805 4.8
Tyres and axles Tons (long) 112 10,951 85 1,679 4.9
Iron and steel pipes and
fittings
Tons (long) 663 35,315 672 7,122 5.0
Black plates (tinning) Tons (long) 371 27,410 148 1,747 6.2
Tin plates Tons (long) 1,692 175,730 603 11,545 5.4
Terne plates Tons (long) 191 16,593 14 231 5.4
Ingots: copper Tons (long) 26 4,935 27 883 5.7
Plates and sheets: copper Tons (long) 83 26,143 35 2,004 5.5
Rods: copper Tons (long) 99 22,387 73 2,840 5.8
Tubes: copper Tons (long) 30 12,039 19 1,362 5.4
Ingots: brass Tons (long) 66 14,381 33 1,187 6.0
Plates and sheets: brass Tons (long) 130 42,335 47 2,622 5.8
Rods: brass Tons (long) 84 23,894 67 2,902 6.5
Tubes: brass Tons (long) 43 16,626 12 1,023 4.4
Castings: brass Tons (long) 46 19,156 25 2,416 4.3
Ingots: aluminium Tons (long) 43 16,154 32 2,642 4.6
Castings: aluminium Tons (long) 22 17,924 16 2,183 5.9
Ingots: lead Tons (long) 116 11,429 96 1,428 6.7
Plates and sheets: lead Tons (long) 15 2,309 79 1,448 8.1
Plates, sheets and rods: nickel Tons (long) 20 14,113 18 3,031 4.1
Solder: tin Tons (long) 35 16,720 16 1,605 4.7
Ingots: tin Tons (long) 2 2,712 35 7,606 5.0
Ingots: zinc Tons (long) 28 3,044 66 982 7.4
Plates and sheets: zinc Tons (long) 45 8,131 14 348 7.1
Ingots: anti friction metal
(white base)
Tons (long) 10 4,982 5 783 3.2
Ingots: type metal Tons (long) 25 4,234 10 302 5.3
Gold leaf Sheets 43,062 1,188 25,600 114 6.2
Copper wire in coils Tons (long) 19 5,986 73 3,797 6.0
Safety razors Dozen 668 3,524 263 349 4.0
Safety razor, blades Dozen 103,449 17,733 42,180 1,319 26.9
Locomotives: non-regular Number 0 1,002 0 239 9.5
Tractors Number 2 5,028 10 1,358 15.4
Road rollers Number 0 576 1 262 7.0
Boilers Number 16 9,066 49 3,160 9.0
Generators, A.C.: under 2,000
kW
Number 2 1,086 2 260 4.2
Generators, A.C.: over 2,000
kW
Number 0 10,694 0 656 5.9
Generators, D.C. Number 1 862 11 683 19.0
Motors, fractional: under 1
h.p.
Number 7,777 36,980 282 703 1.9
Power transformers Number 109 21,335 83 2,517 6.5
Vacuum cleaners Number 1,112 24,191 409 3,286 2.7
Ignition magnetos Number 396 5,264 71 284 3.3
Incandescent light bulb Number 630,724 60,981 118,707 3,689 3.1
Radio apparatus: receiving
sets
Number 5,570 129,109 1,724 10,463 3.8
Radio apparatus: tubes Number 78,348 30,991 11,777 2,215 2.1
Electricity meters Number 1,166 13,466 1,389 2,499 6.4
Clocks: complete Number 13,072 19,733 731 653 1.7
Clocks: movements Number 955 1,274 223 108 2.8
Watches: complete, jeweled Number 1,326 18,882 47 71 9.4
Watches: complete,
nonjeweled
Number 8,612 8,236 169 36 4.5
Watches: watchcases Number 1,446 2,597 357 239 2.7
Matches: safety Thousands 36,816 4,112 17,986 957 2.1
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.8 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Matches: strike-anywhere Thousands 249,600 19,877 60,847 3,314 1.5
Pianos: complete Number 61 11,628 51 1,242 7.9
Pianos: player, complete Number 0 60 0 13 3.2
Organs: complete Number 0 1,438 0 222 2.6
Wind instruments (except
accordians)
Number 111 3,126 3 22 3.4
Tennis rackets: complete Number 368 803 504 495 2.2
Tennis rackets: frames,
unstrung
Number 170 474 228 146 4.4
Golf clubs: complete Number 1,665 4,406 588 350 4.4
Golf balls Dozens 1,539 3,975 916 509 4.6
Tennis balls Dozens 521 1,264 1,077 428 6.1
Gloves: crisket/baseball and
boxing
Pairs 891 1,162 276 67 5.4
Footballs Number 973 910 360 100 3.4
Skates Pairs 3,210 3,344 108 25 4.5
Private cars Number 3,213 1,752,794 327 48,255 3.7
Taxicabs Number 2 2,914 0 124 4.4
Busses: designed to seat not
more than 20 passengers
Number 1 1,410 0 50 2.0
Busses: designed to seat over
20 and not more than 32
passengers
Number 2 13,420 0 295 5.3
Busses: designed to seat over
32 passengers
Number 1 12,346 0 612 5.8
Trucks: capacity not exceeding
1.5 short tons (30 cwts.)
Number 470 227,393 34 4,253 3.9
Trucks: capacity exceeding 1.5
short tons (30 cwts.)
Number 35 43,809 14 4,393 4.0
Ambulances Number 0 589 0 76 5.5
Chassis: private cars Number 41 13,453 22 3,278 2.2
Chassis: busses Number 1 785 4 3,107 1.5
Chassis: trucks Number 152 71,702 0 14 2.0
Bodies: private cars Number 2,083 351,682 134 5,234 4.3
Bodies: busses Number 11 10,015 5 2,897 1.7
Bodies: trucks Number 174 23,880 50 1,941 3.5
Trailers Number 23 15,919 5 576 6.3
Car parts:
internal-combustion engine
Number 69 6,583 142 2,996 4.5
Car parts: axles, including
shafts
Number 1,874 58,326 180 1,080 5.2
Car parts: spark plugs Number 87,051 17,176 5,386 451 2.4
Bicycles Number 657 12,060 1,987 6,664 5.5
Ships, boats, etc.: over 5 tons Number 0 25,837 1 11,001 4.7
Airplanes Number 1 17,242 2 4,602 5.0
Aircraft engines Number 3 12,610 3 3,918 3.4
Railway carriages Number 0 7,552 0 990 7.8
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3.B Input unit value ratios
Table 3.9: Input UVRs, US and UK (1935)
United States United Kingdom
description quantity unit quantity value quantity value uvr
(x,000) ($,000) (x,000) (£,000) ($/£)
Cotton: raw Pounds 2,478,538 324,420 1,282,970 37,476 4.5
Waste: cotton Pounds 75,442 8,156 130,880 2,252 6.3
Yarn: cotton Pounds 133,206 47,503 983,679 46,881 7.5
Staple fibre: rayon Pounds 2,452 1,157 6,829 405 8.0
Yarn: rayon Pounds 18,926 10,773 22,499 3,279 3.9
Yarn: woollen Pounds 1,089 1,030 1,306 142 8.7
Wool: raw Pounds 95,930 20,629 529,036 30,870 3.7
Wool: recovered Pounds 57,186 12,528 59,113 1,566 8.3
Tops Pounds 66,084 51,490 182,500 16,610 8.6
Yarn: wool Pounds 31,630 14,856 44,105 3,325 6.2
Cotton: raw Pounds 12,512 2,039 5,140 174 4.8
Waste: cotton Pounds 7,802 875 9,649 190 5.7
Yarn: cotton Pounds 57,118 18,410 39,532 2,312 5.5
Yarn: silk Pounds 478 877 337 119 5.2
Staple fibre: rayon Pounds 240 60 278 23 3.0
Yarn: rayon (continuous
filament)
Pounds 250 161 2,373 347 4.4
Yarn: staple rayon Pounds 1,487 1,273 113 18 5.4
Waste: silk Pounds 4,218 965 3,062 266 2.6
Silk: raw Pounds 28,896 44,990 3,672 1,544 3.7
Yarn: cotton Pounds 12,185 5,011 20,584 1,469 5.8
Yarn: woollen Pounds 502 622 294 47 7.7
Yarn: worsted Pounds 587 678 435 73 6.9
Cotton: short staple Pounds 8,020 1,141 8,318 148 8.0
Silk: thrown Pounds 2,639 4,999 350 233 2.8
Yarn: spun silk Pounds 5,434 7,924 348 208 2.4
Yarn: rayon (continuous
filament)
Pounds 139,875 88,720 38,724 5,983 4.1
Staple fibre: rayon Pounds 3,457 1,352 3,032 185 6.4
Flax Pounds 7,769 2,142 3,584 157 6.3
Flax: tow Pounds 3,355 593 13,888 344 7.1
Hemp: soft Pounds 2,129 277 14,336 262 7.1
Yarn: flax Pounds 1,275 942 14,381 807 13.2
Jute: raw Pounds 135,764 5,077 381,472 2,696 5.3
Waste: jute Pounds 18,516 399 13,888 37 8.1
Yarn: cotton Pounds 170,368 67,472 62,345 4,062 6.1
Yarn: wool Pounds 47,412 45,904 60,630 8,479 6.9
Yarn: silk Pounds 17,702 39,727 2,665 1,483 4.0
Yarn: rayon Pounds 54,721 32,770 21,346 3,197 4.0
Yarn: cotton Pounds 11,612 5,936 16,505 1,255 6.7
Yarn: silk Pounds 165 338 83 42 4.0
Yarn: rayon Pounds 689 413 2,968 364 4.9
Hard hemp: Manila Pounds 75,927 3,136 79,038 545 6.0
Hard hemp: Sisal Pounds 158,834 4,922 60,861 436 4.3
Hard hemp: New Zealand Pounds 71 4 2,699 16 8.7
Yarn: cotton Pounds 7,563 1,841 21,728 655 8.1
Iron ore Tons (long) 36,458 169,156 14,982 7,415 9.4
Limestone Tons (long) 6,567 9,126 1,746 492 4.9
Cinder and scale Tons (long) 2,535 4,917 474 330 2.8
Dolomite Tons (long) 834 1,235 253 198 1.9
Scrap: iron and steel Tons (long) 1,012 8,192 276 462 4.8
Pig iron Tons (long) 18,040 268,153 4,506 13,029 5.1
Ferro-alloys Tons (long) 477 44,142 148 2,679 5.1
Scrap: iron and steel Tons (long) 11,387 129,755 4,461 12,054 4.2
continued on next page. . .
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Table 3.9 - continued from previous page
desc unit us_q us_v uk_q uk_v uvr
Ingots: steel Tons (long) 251 7,480 473 2,912 4.8
Blooms, billets and slabs: steel Tons (long) 3,977 118,347 1,592 9,379 5.1
Sheets: steel Tons (long) 212 10,265 984 5,283 9.0
Pig iron Tons (long) 855 14,768 1,447 5,134 4.9
Scrap: iron and steel Tons (long) 562 5,783 645 1,676 4.0
Lead Tons (long) 0 97 1 15 12.5
Solder: tin Tons (long) 6 3,522 10 2,264 2.5
Black plates: iron and steel Tons (long) 57 4,650 171 1,800 7.8
Sheets: iron and steel Tons (long) 166 12,082 135 1,649 5.9
Tinplate Tons (long) 1,405 151,322 214 4,171 5.5
Copper, brass and bronze Tons (long) 1 315 18 886 7.6
Shapes: iron and steel Tons (long) 17 1,040 4 95 2.7
Wire rods: iron and steel Tons (long) 611 27,054 394 3,372 5.2
Copper Tons (long) 62 13,446 53 1,901 6.0
Brass Tons (long) 2 758 3 179 5.7
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Chapter 4
The Great Escape
Technological Lock-in vs Appropriate Technology in
Early Twentieth Century British Manufacturing
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapters, the US forged ahead of Britain in terms of pro-
ductivity levels from the late nineteenth century onwards. Britain’s, as well as other
European countries’ falling behind during the nineteenth century and their inability
to catch-up has traditionally been explained by local circumstances; i.e. factor and re-
source endowments as well as demand patterns.1 In Europe, natural resources were
scarce, whereas skilled labor was in ample supply. This provided European producers
with an incentive to economize on fixed capital in the form of machinery.2 In contrast,
the US was well endowed with natural resources, while skilled labor was relatively ex-
pensive. Therefore, machinery was substituted for skilled labor, resulting in a capital-
intensive production process. Furthermore, as the American demand for goods was
more homogenous, manufacturers could standardize production methods and imple-
ment high throughput systems, thereby raising productivity levels.3 This advantage
was denied to European producers, who faced heterogeneous markets characterized
. Parts of this chapter appeared previously in J. Veenstra and P. Woltjer, “The Yanks of Europe? Tech-
nological Change and Labor Productivity in German Manufacturing, 1909–1936,” in XVIth World Economic
History Congress (Stellenbosch, 2012), 1–29.
1. Habakkuk, American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century.
2. Temin, “Labour Scarcity in America,” 162; A. Field, “On the Unimportance of Machinery,” Explorations
in Economic History Vol. 22 (1985): 379.
3. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing,” 291.
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92 The Roaring Thirties
by a demand for customized goods.4 Thus, local circumstances determined the initial
choice of technology. Technological progress was subsequently directed toward the
particular technological path a country had chosen, leading to lock-in eﬀects.5 Partic-
ularly David puts path dependency center stage when explaining the evolution of dis-
tinctive transatlantic systems of production. In this view, a major shift in technology
applied, for any country, is only feasible if relative factor prices change dramatically.
As illustrated in chapter 3, the transatlantic productivity gap – which had evolved
to a ratio of around 2:1 by 1900 – continued to widen up to the 1950s.6 Broadberry
argues that this lack of productivity convergence reflected the persistence of distinct
industrial technologies in Europe and the United States.7 European producers contin-
ued to pursue a crafts-based production system, losing both productivity and techno-
logical leadership to the American system of mass-production that, up to the 1970s,
proved to be technologicallymore progressive. In the period since the 1970s, according
to Broadberry, craft production once again became more progressive and technolog-
ical leadership reverted back to Europe. For the case of British and American indus-
trial performance, the premise of the coexistence of two distinct industrial systems is
strengthened by time-series evidence which finds that, after 1870, the productivity gap
between both countries was non-stationary and divergent.8 This non-stationarity sug-
gests that industrial productivity followed diﬀerent, independent paths, which pre-
cludes an important role for technology transfer.
As pointed out by Bowden and Higgins, the problem with the above interpretation
is that it is essentially static. “It traces the misfortunes of the interwar years to techni-
cal choices made in the previous century which depended upon specific supply- and
demand-side factors. It presumes that demand can be taken as given and that supply
adjusted accordingly, rather than allowing for the possibility that supply-side changes
may create new demands. It lacks the possibility of change, of adaption to diﬀerent
conditions and changes in resource constraints.”9 Basu and Weil developed an alter-
native analytical framework which illustrates that, regardless of static diﬀerences in
factor and resource endowments or demand patterns, countries have the potential to
rapidly converge in terms of labor-productivity levels if they successfully adopt the
4. Note that recently Hannah has argued against the hypothesis of large heterogeneous Europeanmarkets
and small-scale production, illustrating his point with evidence of relatively low transportation costs and
integrated markets in Europe prior to 1914. Hannah, “Logistics, Market Size, and Giant Plants in the Early
Twentieth Century.”
5. David, Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, 66.
6. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 3; Broadberry and Irwin, “Labor Productivity in the United States
and the United Kingdom,” 265.
7. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing,” 292.
8. Greasley and Oxley, “Comparing British and American Economic and Industrial Performance,” 184.
9. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 383–4.
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leaders’ production technologies.10 They emphasize the fact that technological change
appears to be biased toward the capital-intensive technologies and that spillovers oc-
cur only in a limited range of technologies. Countries operating on a technical level
far below the range of the world’s technology leaders are thus likely to fall behind in
terms of productivity growth. This will eventually induce them to adopt more capital-
intensive production techniques in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers. The
mechanics behind this type of technology transfer are also regarded by Aghion and
various other scholars who argue that countries distanced far away from the produc-
tivity frontier can catch-up by applying an investment-based growth strategy, pro-
vided that the necessary capabilities and resources – mainly primary and secondary
education – are available.11 The speed at which countries are likely to converge is not
only dependent upon the size of the technology gap and the rate of capital deepening
(their savings rate), but is constrained by the eﬀects of learning by doing and other
barriers that raise the cost of adopting a higher level of technology as well.12 These
ideas build upon Abramovitz’ concept of ‘social capabilities’ and Gerschenkron’s ‘ap-
propriate’ economic institutions to encourage technology adoption.13
Several recent studies have found empirical evidence that strongly supports Basu
and Weil’s appropriate-technology hypothesis.14 These studies rely on a novel frame-
work, the data envelopment analysis (DEA), that emphasizes the role of technology
and the potential for technology transfer; factors that, thus far, have received little at-
tention in the empirical convergence literature.15 They confirm the importance of lo-
calized innovation – i.e. technological improvement that is confined to a particular mix
of capital and labor, or more generally, is restricted to a range of similar technologies
– and stress the finding that global technological change is decidedly biased toward
capital-intensive production techniques, both for the period prior to and following
10. Basu and Weil, “Appropriate Technology and Growth.”
11. P. Aghion, “Higher Education and Innovation,” Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik Vol. 9 (2008): 31;
D. Acemoglu, “Directed Technical Change,” Review of Economic Studies 69 (2002): 39; J. Vandenbussche, P.
Aghion, and C. Meghir, “Growth, Distance to the Frontier and Composition of Human Capital,” Journal of
Economic Growth 11 (2006): 98.
12. R. Barro and X. Sala-I-Martin, “Technological Diﬀusion, Convergence, and Growth,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Growth 2 (1997): 1–27.
13. A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Belk-
nap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 113, 116; M. Abramovitz, “Catching-up, Forging Ahead and
Falling Behind,” Journal of Economic History 46 (1986): 387.
14. Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening”; B. Los
and M. Timmer, “The ’Appropriate Technology’ Explanation of Productivity Growth Diﬀerentials: An Em-
pirical Approach,” Journal of Development Economics 77 (2005): 517–531; Timmer and Los, “Localized In-
novation and Productivity Growth in Asia”; F. Caselli and W. Coleman, “The World Technology Frontier,”
American Economic Review 96 (2006): 499–522; R. Allen, “Technology and the Great Divergence: Global
Economic Development Since 1820,” Explorations in Economic History 49 (2012): 1–16.
15. A. Bernard and C. Jones, “Technology and Convergence,” Economic Journal 106 (1996): 1037–8.
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the Second World War.16 This strong capital-bias in conjunction with the exception-
ally progressive nature of technological change during the early twentieth century – as
stressed by authors such as Gordon and Field – is likely to have induced European en-
trepreneurs to increase their rate of capital deepening and adopt American production
techniques.17 This hypothesis is in stark contrast to the static Davidmodel of divergent
transatlantic technological paths, adhered to by Broadberry for the twentieth century.
In this chapter I adopt the DEA framework and apply it to the case of productivity
and technology convergence in Britain and the United States. The aim of this chapter is
threefold. First, I want to confirmwhether technological change in manufacturing dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century was localized (i.e. whether the assumption
of factor neutrality can be rejected). The second aim is to show empirically whether
British industries continued to innovate along their own labor-intensive productiv-
ity path (David’s model) or, if they actively sought to adopt American techniques, by
accumulating physical capital, to benefit from the rapid technological change at the
capital-intensive side of the production frontier (Basu and Weil’s model). The third
and last aim of this chapter is to quantify the eﬀects of technological change, capi-
tal deepening, and barriers to technological diﬀusion on labor productivity growth at
the industry level. This will provide a novel view of the dynamics behind the trans-
Atlantic labor-productivity diﬀerentials during the early twentieth century.
For this purpose I have constructed a new set of internationally comparable,
industry-specific output, employment and capital measures, spanning the period 1899
to 1939. As convergence in terms of labor productivity driven by technology diﬀusion
typically occurs at the level of products or industries rather than at the total econ-
omy level, I retain a highly disaggregate level of analysis on the basis of original cen-
sus data.18 This allows me to study technological change and transfer at the industry
level, which sets my study apart from previous studies that typically maintained a
strong macroeconomic viewpoint.19
In this chapter my primary interest lies in the measurement of technology con-
vergence rather than its causes. Not because I think that a search for the causes of
the patterns of eﬃciency is unimportant, but because I feel uncovering the pattern
comes first. My findings should be interpreted as being complementary to existing ex-
planations in either the neoclassical or endogenous-growth literature that model the
16. A. Atkinson and J. Stiglitz, “A New View of Technological Change,” Economic Journal 79 (1969): 574;
Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening,” 529; Allen,
“Technology and the Great Divergence,” 4–5.
17. Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?”; Field, “The Most Technologically Pro-
gressive Decade of the Century.”
18. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 48.
19. Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening”; Allen,
“Technology and the Great Divergence.”
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Chapter 4. The Great Escape 95
impediments to technology transfer, as well as traditional explanations of the British
growth experience during the early twentieth century. The model and the decompo-
sition exercise is explained in section 4.2. In this section I will also, briefly, discuss
the construction of the data set. Section 4.3 presents the main results, which are con-
sidered in light of the current debate on British technological change in section 4.4.
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Methodology and data
For my study of productivity dynamics in Britain and the United States I apply a data
envelopment analysis (DEA) and perform the decomposition technique recently pro-
posed by Kumar and Russell.20 The DEA approach allows me to estimate a global pro-
duction frontier which represents the various ‘best practice’ production techniques ob-
served for the entire feasible range of input combinations. By tightly enveloping data
points with linear segments using mathematical programming methods, the structure
of the frontier can be revealed without imposing a specific functional form on either
technology or deviations from it.21 Because of its non-parametric nature, the DEA
naturally allows for any form of localized technical change, an important feature in
my framework.22 This approach also lends itself more readily to the decomposition
of productivity growth as, in contrast to traditional growth-accounting exercises, it
distinguishes between both the eﬀects of (global) technological change and relative ef-
ficiency change.23 In later sections I will show that eﬃciency loss, i.e. the movement
away from the frontier, is a crucial factor in explaining the British growth dynamics
during the early twentieth century.
Data Envelopment Analysis
Figure 4.1 depicts a basic example of a DEA involving three producers which use
two inputs (capital K and labor L) to produce a single output (Y ). Assuming constant
returns-to-scale, I can represent the world production frontier in


k;y

space, where y
is labor productivity (Y =L) and k is capital intensity (i.e. individual production tech-
niques, K=L).
As noted above, the frontier () for the observations in figure 4.1 is formed as lin-
ear combinations of observed extremal activities or, following Salter’s definition, ‘best-
20. Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening.”
21. R. Färe, S. Grosskopf, and K. Lovell, Production Frontiers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 12.
22. Los and Timmer, “The ’Appropriate Technology’ Explanation of Productivity Growth Diﬀerentials,”
522.
23. Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, Production Frontiers, 13.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of data envelopment
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practice’ activities.24 An observation is said to be a best-practice activity if it exhibits
full eﬃciency in the Koopmans sense, who defined an activity as technologically eﬃ-
cient if increasing any output or decreasing any input is possible only by decreasing
some other output or increasing some other input.25 As illustrated in appendix 4.C,
the identification of these fully eﬃcient observations can be reduced to a basic linear
programming problem in the form of a distance function.26
Of the three observations in this example, only B and C are classified as best-
practice techniques. The frontier is formed by tightly enveloping these two fully eﬃ-
cient observations with linear segments, as illustrated in the right-hand panel of figure
4.1. The frontier is thus a subset of all feasible techniques that attain the highest labor
productivity for the capital intensity levels they correspond to.27
The panel on the right-hand side of figure 4.1 also shows that the last remaining
observation (A) is located below the frontier. Observation A’s vertical distance to the
frontier indicates the potential for labor-productivity increase. Farrell shows that this
distance can be interpreted as a measure of technical eﬃciency.28 In figure 4.1, the
ratio of A’s observed productivity ya to the optimal productivity level at A’s capital-
intensity y
0
(ka) represents the Farrell eﬃciency index.
24. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change.
25. T. Koopmans, “Eﬃcient Allocation of Resources,” Econometrica 19 (1951): 460.
26. R. Färe et al., “Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and Eﬃciency Change in Industrialized Coun-
tries,” American Economic Review 84 (1994): 68–9.
27. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 52.
28. G. Debreu, “The Coeﬃcient of Resource Utilization,” Econometrica 19 (1951): 273–292; M. Farrell, “The
Measurement of Productivity Eﬃciency,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 120 (1957): 253–290.
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Decomposition
The frontier approach can be used in a decomposition of total-factor productivity
(TFP), a process described by Kumar and Russell as ‘growth accounting with a twist’.29
They break down TFP growth into two components: (1) technological catch-up, and
(2) technological change. They characterize the first component as movements toward
(or away from) the frontier, as countries adopt best practice technologies and reduce
(or exacerbate) technical and allocative ineﬃciencies. The second component reflects
shifts in the global production frontier, determined conceptually by the state-of-the-
art, potentially-transferable, technology.30 To decompose labor productivity growth,
rather than TFP growth, the eﬀects of capital accumulation can be added, which re-
flect movements along the frontier.31
To illustrate this decomposition, I have extended the example of figure 4.1 to in-
clude a second period. As shown in the left panel of figure 4.2, the example now in-
cludes six observations: the three original observations from period 0 and three new
observations for period 1. To form the new frontier, I again utilize the distance func-
tions to locate the fully eﬃcient observations among the six in the sample. These ob-
servations are then enveloped by linear segments. Both the new frontier as well as the
original period 0 frontier are shown on the right-hand side of figure 4.2.32
The panel on the right-hand side of figure 4.2 also displays two ineﬃcient obser-
vations (A and D) which represent the same producer at time 0 and 1 respectively.
Labor-productivity change, between these observations A and D, can be decomposed
according to equation (4.1) below
yd
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(4.1)
The first right-hand side factor measures the change in the Farrell eﬃciency index.
A value larger than 1 represents an increase in the level of technical eﬃciency over
time; hence, I denote this as the eﬃciency component. The second factor, technological
change, measures the increase in labor productivity as a result of a shift in the frontier.
Since the vertical shift of the frontier can be observed both at capital intensity ka as
well as kd , I adopt a ‘Fisher ideal’ decomposition and report the geometric average of
29. Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening,” 529.
30. ibid., 528.
31. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 50.
32. Note that the period 1 frontier (1) in figure 4.2 consists of observations from both the first and the
last period. As a result, the frontier will only shift outward as I will discuss below.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of growth decomposition
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the two measures. The last factor, which I label accumulation, is a Fisher index of the
potential change in labor productivity resulting from a shift in the capital-labor ratio.
This component represents the average productivity gains or losses as a result of the
movement along both frontiers.
Extensions to the basic model
For my analysis, I have made a number of additions to the basic framework described
by Kumar and Russell. First, I adopt an ‘intertemporal’ approach, in line with the
empirical analysis of Los and Timmer.33 Instead of estimating the frontier at time t
based solely on observations from this period, I also include all observations prior to
period t in the production set. Los and Timmer argue that there are two important
reasons to adopt the intertemporal approach:
“First, because the production frontier is constructed sequentially, it can
never shift inward and hence ‘technological regress’ cannot occur. The pos-
sibility of ‘technological regress’ seems awkward and hard to defend from
a knowledge perspective on technology, as it would involve ‘forgetting’.
Second, a crucial element in the [Basu and Weil] model is the possibility
for countries to use knowledge that was generated by technology leaders
33. Los and Timmer, “The ’Appropriate Technology’ Explanation of Productivity Growth Diﬀerentials”;
for a discussion of the time component in data envelopment analysis see, H. Tulkens and P. Vanden Eeck-
aut, “Non-parametric Eﬃciency, Progress and Regress Measures for Panel Data: Methodological Aspects,”
European Journal of Operational Research 80 (1995): 474–499.
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in the past. Labor-productivity levels of past technology leaders should be
attainable for latecomers.”34
A potential problem is that frontier techniques observed for the first year in my sam-
ple, 1907, could be dominated by unobserved combinations in the past. In that case,
part of what would be interpreted as frontier movements would in fact be assimilation
of knowledge associated with these unobserved appropriate techniques. To accommo-
date this problem, I extended the data set backwards by 8 years and included two
additional periods for the US, 1899 and 1904 respectively.
Secondly, I address the issue of aggregation. So far, the level of aggregation in the
frontier analysis literature has been highly macroeconomic. Kumar and Russell for the
post-WWII period and Allen for the nineteenth and early twentieth century, for in-
stance, rely on a global production frontier for the total economy.35 Bernard and Jones
show that sectoral measures of productivity growth and convergence can look very
diﬀerent from aggregate results.36 Convergence in terms of labor productivity driven
by technology diﬀusion typically occurs at the level of products or industries, rather
than at the total economy level. As pointed out by Timmer and Los, “Convergence
at the industry level might not be reflected in macroeconomic statistics when coun-
tries diﬀer in their industrial composition or experience diﬀerent patterns of structural
change.”37 Broadberry indeed observes substantial diﬀerences in the sectoral compo-
sition between Great Britain and the US for the early twentieth century.38 Hence, I
focus solely on manufacturing, which has the biggest scope for technology spillovers.
In addition, I break up the manufacturing sector into twenty-seven industry-groups
and estimate a separate global production frontier for each.
Data
For the analysis of transatlantic labor-productivity diﬀerentials between 1907 and
1930, I have constructed a new data set of industry-specific real value added, em-
ployment and capital statistics. My panel observes ten benchmark years for the US
(spanning the period 1899 to 1939) and two years for Great Britain (1907 and 1930).
In addition, I also included two benchmark years for Germany (1907 and 1936).39 The
set thus includes data for the three greatest industrial nations of the early twentieth
34. Los and Timmer, “The ’Appropriate Technology’ Explanation of Productivity Growth Diﬀerentials,”
522–3.
35. Kumar and Russell, “Technological Change, Technological Catch-up, and Capital Deepening”; Allen,
“Technology and the Great Divergence.”
36. Bernard and Jones, “Technology and Convergence,” 1043.
37. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 48.
38. Broadberry, The Productivity Race, 63–73.
39. The results for Germany are discussed in a separate working paper; see, Veenstra and Woltjer, “The
Yanks of Europe?”
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century, covers approximately 105 separate industries and overall consists of nearly
1,500 observed input-output combinations.
The capital data is based on horsepower statistics, a proxy of the stock of machin-
ery and equipment. I focus on machinery rather than the total capital stock for two
reasons: (1) the horsepower statistics are available at a highly disaggregate level al-
lowing me to study productivity at the individual industry level and (2) De Long and
Summers show that there is a much stronger association between investment in equip-
ment and machinery and economic growth than any other other component of invest-
ment.40 Innovations are embodied in machinery to a far greater degree than is the case
for buildings and intermediate inputs.
The basic source for US industries is the Census of Manufactures, while the primary
British data is taken from the First and Fourth Census of Production.41 German data is
drawn from multiple industrial surveys, statistical yearbooks, employment censuses
as well as the archival records of the 1936 Industrial Census.42 This section will, very
briefly, describe the basic methods behind the construction of the data set. A full de-
scription of sources and methods can be found in appendices 4.A and 4.B.
As a first step in the construction of my data set, I reclassified the industrial data
for all three countries and all years to the 1945 US Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion (SIC).43 Generally, an industrial classification groups establishments primarily
engaged in the same line, or similar lines, of economic activities. In the case of man-
ufacturing this is either defined in terms of the products made (demand side) or the
processes of manufacture used (supply side).44 The SIC scheme places primary em-
40. B. DeLong and R. Summers, “Equipment Investment and Economic Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 106 (1991): 445–502.
41. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures”; United States De-
partment of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” in Fourteenth Census of the United States
Taken in the Year 1920, vol. VIII (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1923); United
States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures: General Report,” in Fifteenth Decen-
nial Census of the United States (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1933); United
States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures: Statistics by Subjects”; Board of
Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK; Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fourth
Census of Production of the United Kingdom (1930) (London: H.M. Stationery Oﬃce, 1933–5).
42. Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amte, “Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutschen Reich,” chap. Gewerbe
in (Berlin, 1912), 52–133; Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amte, “Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen
Reichs: Ergänzungsheft,” chap. Ergebnisse der Deutschen Produktionserhebungen in, vol. 22, 3 (Berlin,
1913); Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amte, “Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reichs,” chap. Ergeb-
nisse der deutschen Produktionserhebungen in, vol. 23, 2 (Berlin, 1914); Statistischen Reichsamt,
Gewerbliche Betriebsählung (Berlin: Verlag fur Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1933); Reichsamt
fur Wehrwirtschaftliche Planung, Die Deutsche Industrie. Gesamtergebnisse der amtlichen Productionsstatis-
tik. Schriftenreiche des Reichsamt fur wehwritschaftliche Planung, Heft 1 (Berlin: Verlag fur Sozialpoli-
tik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1939); Statistischen Reichsamt, Wirtschaft und Statistik (Berlin: Verlag fur
Sozialpolitik, Wirtschaft und Statistik, 1938).
43. For an overview of the SIC, see United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Statis-
tics by Industry,” in Census of Manufactures 1947 (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing
Oﬃce, 1949), 862–914.
44. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 405–6.
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phasis on the latter, whereas the original, pre-war, British, German and American
classifications rely heavily on the former. The supply-side grouping of businesses –
i.e. the categorization according to the way in which inputs are transformed into out-
puts, mainly depending on the technology used – fits neatly into the DEA framework.
To make the British output data directly comparable to the US, I relied on the price
conversion factors introduced in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation.45 The industry
level conversion factors, or Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), were calculated on the
basis of producer prices, using the procedures first set out by Paige and Bombach and
extensively delineated in the work of van Ark.46 Tomake the German data comparable
to the US, I turned to two new, as yet unpublished, benchmark studies for 1907/09 and
1935/36 based on the same methodology.47 These PPPs enabled me to convert British
and German value added into nominal dollar values, both prior to and following the
First World War.
Nominal value added in dollars for all three countries was then converted to con-
stant prices (with a 1929 base) by applying US price deflators at the industry level. I
calculated deflators on the basis of Fabricant’s indices of physical- and nominal-output
series.48 Subsequently, I reclassified these deflators to fit the SIC, and incorporated the
modifications and extensions to the indices of production proposed by Kendrick.49
Lastly, I expressed the employment measure in terms of hours worked and adjusted
my capital measure to exclude the power of electric motors run by current generated
in the same establishment. The adjustment to the measure of the capacity of horse-
power was made in order to prevent the duplications of motors eﬀectively driving the
same machinery. The necessity of the hours adjustment has been stressed in chapter
3. There I recount the substantial drop in the average hours of work for the interwar
period, particularly for the US.
45. Note that the interwar Anglo-American benchmark refers to the year 1935, whereas the British pro-
duction figures for this study are based on the 1930 census returns. To convert British value added to 1935
dollars I have taken the output-price changes between 1930 and 1935 for Great Britain into account. For
Britain, I extrapolated the 1935 PPPs to a 1930 base using price deflators taken from the work of Fein-
stein. See appendix 4.B for further details; Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United
Kingdom.
46. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity; Ark, International Comparisons
of Output and Productivity, 25–52.
47. The price data for the German interwar benchmark was collected from the American 1935 Census
of Manufactures as well as the German Industrial Census of 1936. The sources and methods used were
identical to those described in the recent 1935/36 British-German benchmark by Fremdling et al. and the
1935 British-American benchmark by de Jong and Woltjer reproduced in chapter 3. For the pre-war bench-
mark, US price data was again taken from the 1909 Census of Manufactures. German, manufacturing-wide
production censuses did not become available until after the First World War. For the early benchmark,
data is obtained from industrial surveys, which reported output and prices for a sample of industries be-
tween 1907–1912. See, Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity
Compared”; Jong and Woltjer, “Depression Dynamics”; Veenstra and Woltjer, “The Yanks of Europe?”
48. Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 123–321, 605–39.
49. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 416–21, 467–75. See appendix 4.A for further details.
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My data set thus includes a single measure of output (value added in constant 1929
dollars) and two inputs (hours worked and horsepower capacity), similar to the exam-
ple discussed above. I also assume constant returns-to-scale throughout this chapter.50
As previously noted, I estimate a separate frontier for twenty-seven industry groups.
These industry groups are referred to as two-digit industries; a denotation which indi-
cates their level of aggregation as being one step above the three-digit level, the level
of detail of my data set. In the estimation of the frontiers I pool all the three-digit
observations belonging to the same two-digit industry, implicitly assuming that these
observations share a common production function.51
4.3 Results
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized in three points. First, for the
first half of the twentieth century technological change at the frontier was decidedly
non-neutral and biased toward capital-intensive production techniques. Because of
this bias labor productivity grew fastest for capital-intensive techniques. If frontier
technology was freely available to follower countries, the latter had a clear incentive to
adopt capital-intensive production techniques. Secondly, in terms of capital-intensity
levels, British manufacturing converged on the US between 1907 and 1930, creating a
large growth potential. Thirdly, Great Britain did not take full advantage of the growth
potential it had created. Despite the process of rapid capital deepening, low levels of
eﬃciency stood in the way of Britain catching-up in terms of labor-productivity levels.
These findings are more in line with Basu and Weil’s model of localized technological
change than David’s concept of technical lock-in.
Biased technological change
In his analysis of the diverging Anglo-American labor-productivity gap during the
nineteenth century, David argues that the initial choice of technology – being either
capital-intensive for the US, or labor-intensive for Europe – led to distinctive rates
50. Färe et al. show that the flexible nature of the DEA would allow me to relax the constant-returns-to-
scale assumption, this does come at a cost of greatly increased data requirements, however. A sensitivity
check on the basis of variable returns-to-scale, which can be found in appendix 4.E, demonstrates that this
assumption does not significantly alter my findings. I therefore feel confident using it. See, Färe, Grosskopf,
and Lovell, Production Frontiers, 32–7.
51. Note that the two-digit classification used for the frontier estimation diﬀers moderately from the US
Standard Industrial Classification. At the two-digit level the 1945 SIC only distinguishes between twenty
industries. I separated a number of these two-digit SIC industries as the assumption of a common produc-
tion function appeared to be invalid. In these cases I estimated more than one separate frontier for that
respective group. A notable example is the chemicals and allied products industry. Appendix 4.E provides a
more extensive description of the selection of frontiers, as well as a sensitivity check on the assumption of a
shared production function at the two-digit level.
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of technical progress across the Atlantic, as the eﬀect of technological advances for a
particular input mix was not automatically transferred to other technologies and was
essentially ‘localized’ to a specific capital-labor ratio.52 In similar vein, Basu and Weil
argue that, although technology is freely available to all and instantly transferred, a
country may nonetheless refrain from using a new technology until it reaches a level
of development at which this technology would be ‘appropriate’ to its endowments.53
They emphasize the fact that technological change appears to be strongly biased to-
ward the capital-intensive technologies. Consequently, countries operating on a tech-
nical level far outside the range of the world’s technology leader are likely to fall be-
hind in terms of productivity growth, as they are unable to benefit from the technolog-
ical change at the capital intensive side of the production frontier. This will eventually
induce the follower countries to adopt more capital-intensive production techniques
to take advantage of the technology improvements made by the leader countries in the
past.54
Although both these models rely on the same concept of localized technological
change, David’s analysis is essentially static whereas the Basu and Weil model in-
corporates a dynamic element. The Basu and Weil model allows for the possibility
of countries to escaping the technological lock-in trap which inevitably follows from
David’s model. As pointed out by Bowden and Higgins, the problem with David’s in-
terpretation is that it traces the misfortunes of the interwar years to technical choices
made in the previous century and does not allow for the possibility of either supply-
or demand-side changes.55 Basu and Weil on the other hand show that, regardless of
static diﬀerences in factor and resource endowments or demand patterns, countries
have the potential to rapidly converge in terms of labor-productivity levels if they suc-
cessfully adopt the leaders’ production technologies.56
Several empirical studies have confirmed the existence of factor-biased technical
change – which stands at the heart of the Basu and Weil model – in pre-WWII manu-
facturing industries at the aggregate level.57 In this section I will corroborate the exis-
tence of this bias for the early twentieth century at the disaggregate level, particularly
for those industries closely associated with the Second Industrial Revolution. The bias
in technological change, for the period between 1909 and 1939, is illustrated in fig-
ure 4.3 for two of my twenty-seven industries.58 For both industries I include a plot
52. David, Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth; Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and
Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing,” 295.
53. Basu and Weil, “Appropriate Technology and Growth,” 1027.
54. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 49–50.
55. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 383–4.
56. Basu and Weil, “Appropriate Technology and Growth.”
57. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, 133; Allen, “Technology and the Great Divergence,” 6.
58. Graphs for all industries are shown in appendix 4.D.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 104 — #116 i
i
i
i
i
i
104 The Roaring Thirties
Figure 4.3: Global technological change (1909–1939)
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of the global production frontiers on the left-hand side, in line with the example in
figure 4.2. In addition, on the right-hand side I graph the log change in potential labor
productivity as a result of the shift in the global frontier over time. This technological
change is plotted for varying levels of capital intensity.
The top-most panels of figure 4.3 show that, for the industrial chemicals industries,
technological progress is strongly biased toward capital-intensive forms of production.
Technological change for producers in this industry operating at a capital intensity
level of 4 horsepower per 1,000 hours of work was between 50 and 100 percent higher
than for those producers operating at a capital-intensity level of 2 or less. Below a level
of 0.5, technological change was absent or negligible. The picture that emerges for this
i
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industry corroborates Basu andWeil’s proposition that innovation is primarily carried
out by the technology leader and does not shift the production frontier as a whole.
Instead, only the section of the production frontier in the direct vicinity of the innova-
tors’ combination of production factors shifts upward as a result of the technological
change.
The textiles industries, on the other hand, exhibited factor-neutral technological
change, as evidenced by the stable relation between capital intensity and technological
change in the lower-right panel. For textiles, the increase of labor productivity as a re-
sult of technological advances were only marginally greater at a capital-intensity level
of 3 compared to a level of 1. The discussion in appendix 4.D shows that, for the major-
ity of manufacturing industries, technological change exhibited a strong bias toward
capital-intensive production techniques. Notable exceptions to this rule (i.e. textiles,
leather and the foods sector) stress the importance of a highly disaggregated analysis
when studying technological change and the diﬀusion of technology, however. I will
return to this issue in the sectoral decomposition of the Anglo-American productivity
gap below.
Over time, the bias of technological change shifted further toward the right into the
more capital-intensive range of production techniques. Between 1929 and 1939 pro-
ducers in the industrial chemicals sector operating at a capital-intensity level below 2
did not experience any further gains in labor productivity resulting from technological
progress. This trend can be observed for the majority of manufacturing industries dur-
ing the early twentieth century and continued after the war.59 Generally, I observe the
most rapid rate of technological change between 1919 and 1929, represented in figure
4.3 by the area of the dotted surface. For the US, technological change contributed over
3.4 percentage points to overall manufacturing labor-productivity growth annually be-
tween 1919 and 1929.60 This was considerably higher than the 1.3 points experienced
during the 1910s and the 1.6 points I observe for the 1930s. The technologically pro-
gressive nature of the interwar period is also stressed by authors such as Gordon and
Field.61 The wide range of new technologies and practices, as well as the strong capital
bias in technological development created a clear incentive for British entrepreneurs
to increase the rate of capital deepening and adopt American production techniques.
59. Allen, “Technology and the Great Divergence,” 5.
60. The contribution of technological change for the sub-periods is calculated on the basis of the technolog-
ical change factor in equation (4.1), which represents a Fisher index of the log change in labor productivity
as a result of the shift in the global production frontier.
61. Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?”; Field, “The Most Technologically Pro-
gressive Decade of the Century.”
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Table 4.1: Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, total
manufacturing, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929) 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
Great Britain (1907–1930) 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
Diﬀerence (US-GB) 1.2 -1.0 0.8 1.4
Source: see section 4.2.
Aggregate decomposition
Table 4.1 reports the average annual growth rate of aggregate manufacturing produc-
tivity for the US between 1909 and 1929 and Great Britain between 1907 and 1930.
Labor-productivity growth is broken down into the contribution of capital accumu-
lation, technological change and eﬃciency change, following the Kumar and Russell
procedure illustrated in equation (4.1).62 The last row of table 4.1 lists the diﬀerence
between the average British and American rates of growth, essentially a decomposi-
tion of the gap in Anglo-American labor-productivity growth into the aforementioned
components.
Both American and British performance was relatively strong during this period.63
Nonetheless, labor productivity growth in the US was considerably faster, and overall
the productivity gap increased by approximately 1.2 percent per year. As table 4.1 il-
lustrates, the drivers behind the widening of the productivity gap were relatively slow
technological change and general eﬃciency decline in British manufacturing indus-
tries. However, the process of capital deepening proceeded at a considerably higher
rate in Britain, in turn decelerating the divergence process. Below, I will argue that
the substantial accumulation component represents a general movement of a number
of modern British industries toward American production techniques, thus partially
bridging the technology gap that arose during the nineteenth century. In the short run,
62. For the total manufacturing estimates I weight technological change for all the underlying observations
by their value added shares. In this aggregation I included only the observations from the start- and end-year
for growth decomposition.
63. Note that the annual productivity increases listed in table 4.1 correspond closely to the growth rates
reported by Feinstein for the UK and Kendrick for the US. British manufacturing output rose, on average,
by 1.2 percent per year between 1907 and 1930, while total employment and the average annual hours-of-
work declined by 0.1 and 0.6 percentage points respectively. American manufacturing output grew by 4.2
percent annually between 1909 and 1929, while the number of persons engaged increased by 1.6 percent
and average hours decreased by 0.9 percent during this period. See, Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National
Income, Expenditure and Output of the UK, T111–3, 129, 131; Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States,
465–6. For a discussion on working hours see chapters 2 and 3.
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of capital intensity, US and GB
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the gainful impact of this capital-deepening process on British industrial performance
was weakened by a drop in eﬃciency, most likely resulting from learning-by-doing
eﬀects and other barriers that raised the cost of adopting a higher level of technology.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the bridging of the transatlantic technology gap. It presents
the distribution of manufacturing employment over available production techniques
(proxied by machine intensity) for both the US and Great Britain. During the first
half of the twentieth century, capital-intensity levels were converging and by 1930
Britain had already surpassed the 1909 American level. In 1907, British manufactur-
ing employed, on average, 0.48 horsepower per 1,000 hours of work in manufactur-
ing. This ratio rose to 1.14 by 1930. In 1909, the American capital-intensity level was
0.98, which increased to 1.81 by 1929. The upper-right panel of figure 4.4 illustrates
that, not only were the average levels merging, the interwar British distribution of
employment over capital-intensity levels (i.e. production techniques) mirrored that of
the US in 1909. Whereas the British distribution of production techniques before the
First World War showed a distinct pattern – with a vastly greater percentage of work-
ers engaged in capital-extensive industries and lacking the characteristic American
tail of very capital-intensive production – the shape and range of the distribution of
production techniques for Great Britain resembled that of the US halfway the inter-
war period. Prior to the Second World War, Britain still trailed the US by almost two
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 108 — #120 i
i
i
i
i
i
108 The Roaring Thirties
decades, yet overall dissimilarities between production techniques used in American
and British manufacturing industries disappeared to a large extent. While at the turn
of the century both countries tracked diﬀerent technical paths, such a distinction is no
longer evident for the interwar period. The comparatively high rate of capital deepen-
ing in British manufacturing implies that initial conditions did not stand in the way
of capital-intensive production.
The rapid rate of capital deepening explains nearly all of British labor-productivity
growth between 1907 and 1930, as shown in table 4.1. The accumulation component
for Britain is considerably larger than for its American counterpart, reflecting both a
faster rise in capital intensity and the greater gains from capital deepening at lower
levels of horsepower per hour worked; the latter aﬃrms the standard assumption of
diminishing returns to capital-intensity. The general move of British industries to-
ward American production techniques also led to an increase in the rate of technolog-
ical change, since aggregate technological change generally exhibits a strong bias to-
ward capital-intensive technologies, as discussed above. Nonetheless, the British rate
of technological progress was still substantially slower than I observe for the US during
this period. Lagging technological change in Great Britain remained a major contrib-
utor to the widening of the transatlantic productivity gap.
The final component in the Kumar and Russell decomposition, eﬃciency change,
represents the residual of the observed rise in labor productivity and the potential
labor-productivity growth – the latter resulting from both capital accumulation and
technology change. Timmer and Loss illustrate that the eﬃciency change can be inter-
preted as the result of learning-by-doing and indicates the extent to which a country
has exhausted the potential of a particular technology.64 In addition to these ‘pure’ ef-
ficiency gains or losses, the residual eﬃciency term for aggregate manufacturing also
includes the eﬀects of structural change. Table 4.1 reports a small eﬃciency gain for
the US between 1909 and 1929, which can, for the most part, be attributed to a favor-
able shift in the employment structure of American manufacturing. Over the course
of these two decades, labor was transferred from low-productive textile production
toward chemicals and machinery fabrication. Generally, pure eﬃciency, or the rel-
ative vertical distance of American industries to the world-frontiers, remained un-
changed.65 Britishmanufacturing experienced a similar shift in the employment struc-
64. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 52; see also, Basu andWeil,
“Appropriate Technology and Growth”; Barro and Sala-I-Martin, “Technological Diﬀusion, Convergence,
and Growth.”
65. Note that, even though the US (as technology leader) dominated the world production frontier during
the early twentieth century, I do observe several British and German observations that were located on the
frontier, thus making it a truly ‘global’ frontier.
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ture, boosting aggregate labor-productivity growth.66 Nonetheless, the total eﬃciency
component in table 4.1 for Britain is well below zero, thus suggesting a substantial
decline in pure eﬃciency at the industry level. Between 1907 and 1930, British indus-
tries were thus unable to realize their full potential that came about through the pro-
cess of rapid capital deepening and increases in technological change. Consequently,
even though British manufacturing converged on the US in terms of capital-intensity
levels, the Anglo-American productivity gap failed to narrow and, as is evident from
table 4.1, even widened considerably during the interwar period.
Delayed catch-up
In contrast to the literature I do not view the lack of catch-up growth as a failure
on the part of British entrepreneurs. Previous applications of the DEA-approach led
to findings resembling mine. For a sample of Asian countries, in the period between
1975–1992, Timmer and Los find comparable gaps between potential and realized
labor-productivity growth.67 Timmer and Los’ interpretation of the Asian growth ex-
perience is based on Basu and Weil’s analytical framework and rests on a two-tiered
approach to catch-up. Follower countries go through two sequential phases of devel-
opment in order to close the gap to the frontier, as depicted in figure 4.5.
The initial phase of catch-up, the adoption of new production techniques through
the accumulation of capital, involves an extensive transformation of the production
process. This causes eﬃciency levels to deteriorate in the short run. Only after the
economy has successfully adjusted to the new state and has ‘learned’ to operate the
new technology at its full potential, can the labor-productivity gap to the frontier be
narrowed. This adjustment process was referred to by David as ‘learning-by-doing’.68
The time lag between creating potential and the movement toward the frontier de-
pends both on the scope of capital deepening and on the flexibility of the economy
and its institutional arrangements. For the case of Britain this implies that the imple-
mentation problems that engineers and industrialists encountered in the 1920s and
1930s were not signs of failed industrialization. Instead, they were features of mod-
ernization and inextricably linked to the initial phase of catch-up growth.
66. In Great Britain there was a substantial outflow of labor from the textile, apparel and leather industries,
which in 1907 held a share of 43 percent of manufacturing employment but which declined to 33 percent
in 1930.
67. Particularly for Korea – the country that experienced one of the fastest rates of capital deepening – the
relative distance to the global frontier increased over time. Overall, Korea grew 3.8 percentage point less
than the 9.3 percent annual growth potential it had created. Instead of interpreting the negative eﬃciency
component as a failure, Timmer and Los conclude that these findings suggest a possible sequence in which
countries first create opportunities for growth by rapidly increasing capital intensities and only later start
to benefit from technology spillovers. See, Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth
in Asia,” 58, 60.
68. David, Technical Choice, Innovation and Economic Growth, 1–2.
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Figure 4.5: Catch-up in two sequential
steps
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Sectoral decomposition
Although the above discussion reveals a clear pattern in the widening of the total man-
ufacturing labor-productivity gap, it masks the underlying dynamics in the British-
American convergence process through the aggregation of industries. Table 4.2 cap-
tures the average annual growth rate of British and American labor-productivity at the
industry level.69 British manufactures showed a comparatively strong performance in
the textiles, apparel, leather, building materials and instruments industries.70 These
industries experienced relatively slow rates of technological progress and suﬀered
less eﬃciency decline, which led to a comparatively modest increase of the Anglo-
American labor-productivity gap. In contrast, labor-productivity levels diverged most
in the industries closely associated with the Second Industrial Revolution; namely,
transportation equipment, chemicals, petroleum and rubber. These ‘modern’ indus-
tries experienced exceptionally rapid rates of global technical advances and exhibited
a strong bias toward uneven factor saving. During the early twentieth century, the
acceleration in the (localized) technological change induced British entrepreneurs to
adopt American-style, capital-intensive, production techniques, as evidenced by the
greater accumulation component for most notably the transportation-equipment in-
dustry. As observed for aggregate manufacturing, the Anglo-American technological
convergence (through the rapid British capital deepening) led to a substantial decline
in eﬃciency levels in Great Britain for these modern industries.
69. The estimates in table 4.2 show labor productivity growth and its decomposition for the main industry
groups within manufacturing. Appendix 4.F provides the results for the full breakdown of the manufactur-
ing sector, including all SIC two-digit industries.
70. Note that the instrument-producing industries are part of the miscellaneous category in table 4.2. See
appendix 4.F for a full breakdown of the manufacturing sector.
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Table 4.2:Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, manufac-
turing industries, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929) 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
Food & tobacco 3.1 1.5 1.9 -0.3
Textiles & apparel 2.3 0.5 1.9 -0.1
Paper & printing 3.6 1.1 2.4 0.2
Chemicals & rubber 4.6 0.8 3.2 0.6
Building materials 3.3 0.4 2.4 0.5
Metals 2.5 0.4 2.0 0.2
Machinery 2.2 0.1 1.5 0.6
Transportation equipment 8.2 2.0 5.6 0.6
Miscellaneous 1.9 0.3 1.8 -0.2
Great Britain (1907–1930) 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
Food & tobacco 1.8 2.3 1.2 -1.7
Textiles & apparel 2.5 1.2 1.6 -0.4
Paper & printing 2.5 3.3 1.2 -2.1
Chemicals & rubber 1.3 1.9 2.3 -2.9
Building materials 2.1 1.0 1.5 -0.4
Metals 0.7 1.1 1.3 -1.7
Machinery 0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.5
Transportation equipment 3.6 3.6 3.0 -3.0
Miscellaneous 1.3 3.0 0.5 -2.1
Diﬀerence (US-GB) 1.2 -1.0 0.8 1.4
Food & tobacco 1.3 -0.8 0.7 1.5
Textiles & apparel -0.2 -0.7 0.2 0.3
Paper & printing 1.2 -2.3 1.2 2.3
Chemicals & rubber 3.3 -1.0 0.8 3.5
Building materials 1.2 -0.6 0.9 0.9
Metals 1.8 -0.7 0.7 1.9
Machinery 1.7 -0.4 1.1 1.1
Transportation equipment 4.6 -1.6 2.6 3.6
Miscellaneous 0.6 -2.6 1.3 1.9
Source: see section 4.2; May not sum to total due to rounding.
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A marked example of the adoption of American-style, capital-intensive produc-
tion techniques in Britain at the industry level is the chemicals sector. This sector
encompasses the chemicals, petroleum, coal- and rubber-products industries which,
during the early twentieth century, experienced an unprecedented rate of productivity
growth. Between 1909 and 1929, American labor productivity in the chemicals sector
grew by 4.6 percent annually, over 3 percentage points of which was derived directly
from technological change. This technological change was strongly biased toward
capital-intensive production techniques, as illustrated by the industrial-chemicals sec-
tor in figure 4.3. As British producers in the chemicals sector were initially operating
on a technical level outside the range of the world’s technology leader, the contribu-
tion of technological change to British productivity growth fell well short of that of
the US, widening the Anglo-American productivity gap by 0.8 percent annually. Com-
paratively rapid British capital deepening in the chemicals sector more than oﬀset the
eﬀects of technological change, however. Table 4.2 shows that the potential for growth
in British chemicals – i.e. the sum of the technological change and accumulation com-
ponents – actually surpassed that of its American counterpart. Yet, the shift toward
more capital-intensive methods of production and the rapid technological change led
to a deterioration of eﬃciency in Great Britain, preventing British chemical produc-
ers from realizing their full potential. Overall, the Anglo-American labor-productivity
gap in this sector widened by 3.3 percent per annum. I observe similar dynamics in
the other modern industries, particularly transportation equipment, but also electrical
machinery, paper, printing and to a lesser degree metals. Again, I distinguish stronger
technological change in the US, which was biased toward capital-intensive production
techniques, coupled with considerably faster capital accumulation in Great Britain.
Similarly, for these industries I also observe a severe deterioration in British eﬃciency
levels.
For the textiles, apparel and building materials industries table 4.2 reveals a dif-
ferent pattern. Here, I do not observe the rapid decline in British eﬃciency levels.
Moreover, for these industries the gap in the Anglo-American labor-productivity lev-
els rose less than the manufacturing average. In the case of the textiles and apparel
industries this gap even declined slightly over the course of these two decades. As
a result of relatively slow, unbiased, technological change, British producers lacked
the incentive to diverge from the original, labor-intensive technological path. This de-
terred them from adopting American production techniques as avidly as we saw for
the modern industries. The dichotomy of technology paths is also evident in the foods
sector. Even though the accumulation component for this British industry was rela-
tively large, by 1930 the British capital intensity level in the foods sector was still well
below the American level in 1909 (0.70 versus 1.12 respectively). In the production of
i
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food, as was the case for textiles, British industry was clearly operating on a diﬀerent
part of the technology frontier compared to their American competitors.
The traditional explanation of diﬀerences in factor endowments, which will aﬀect
all industries equally (at least in the case of the availability of labor), is unable to
explain the apparent divide in the rate of adoption of American, capital-intensive pro-
duction techniques across the diﬀerent manufacturing sectors. The industry-specific
rate and bias of technical progress provides a novel explanation why British en-
trepreneurs in the textiles and building materials, but also in the food industries,
continued to track a labor-intensive path of production, whereas, at the same time,
the producers of chemicals, printing and transportation equipment diverged from this
path and actively sought to adopt new, capital-intensive, production techniques. The
disaggregate decomposition above shows that only those British industries that expe-
rienced strongly biased technological change were drawn toward these more capital-
intensive ways of production. Moreover, particularly those industries that diverged
from their original technological path experienced a clear worsening of their relative
technical eﬃciency. As noted in the previous section, the convergence in terms of cap-
ital intensity and production techniques led, in the short-run, to a widening of the
Anglo-American labor-productivity gap. Regardless, the modern industries showed
strong growth potential, the fruits of which could be reaped when the (initial) barri-
ers to the successful adoption of the new production techniques were overcome and
producers learned to operate the new technology at its full potential. In line with this
reasoning, during the first two decades following the Second World War, the British
manufacturing sector experienced significantly stronger trend growth than the US and
the two countries gradually started to converge in terms of labor-productivity levels.71
4.4 Barriers to British productivity convergence
I am certainly not the first to study Europe’s inability to close the transatlantic pro-
ductivity gap during the first half of the twentieth century, and I consider the analysis
applied in this chapter to be complementary to previous work discussing the con-
straints to British labor-productivity growth. The non-parametric growth decomposi-
tion presented in this chapter uncovers the large discrepancy between created growth
potential and realized growth. In turn, the existing literature can provide a better un-
derstanding of the impediments to technological transfer and the causes behind the
pronounced decline in eﬃciency within British manufacturing. Although it is not my
71. N. Crafts and T. Mills, “Europe’s Golden Age: An Econometric Investigation of Changing Trend Rates
of Growth,” chap. 11 in Quantitative Aspects of Post-War European Economic Growth, ed. B. van Ark and N.
Crafts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 421.
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intent to oﬀer an exhaustive overview of the literature, I aim to link the key mecha-
nisms of my model to the realities of interwar Britain.
The argument made by Broadberry is that Britain failed to adapt to the changing
conditions of the interwar years and, in the face of diﬀerent endowments and demand
patterns, continued to pursue a crafts-based production system, losing both productiv-
ity and technological leadership to the American system of mass-production.72 Con-
sequently, Broadberry argues, British manufactures allowed relative productivity lev-
els to fall, under-invested in new machinery (and hence production processes), failed
to modernize its management, under-equipped its labor force with relevant skills and
embodied a myriad of restrictive practices which prevented industry from realizing its
potential.73 Section 4.3 of this chapter presents a rather more dynamic view of British
manufacturing. I show that a sizable part of British manufacturing was drawn toward
the more capital-intensive, American ways of production and exhibited substantial
growth potential. In this section I will illustrate that, in these key industries, British
entrepreneurs did indeed introduce modern, mechanized production techniques, in-
vested in continuous-flow manufacturing and adopted new techniques of managerial
control. By confirming that Britain was successfully adapting to the rapidly changing
environment, I can reject the premise that the entire manufacturing sector was locked
into a separate technology path and prove that technology transfer did occur. I do ar-
gue however that, in the case of Britain, the adoption of modern production techniques
was severely hampered by government intervention in an attempt to correct for mar-
ket failures, the dominance of craft unions and pre-existing work practices that proved
hard to displace. These institutional impediments explain why technological diﬀusion
was not as widespread, and the convergence of technological paths did not occur as
quickly as observed in the case of Germany for instance.74
Below, I discuss the impact of these institutions, both on the reluctance of British
manufactures to move into the new, dynamic industries that emerged during the early
twentieth century, as well as the relatively hesitant adoption of capital-intensive pro-
duction techniques within some of these industries.
British technological change
To illustrate the introduction of mechanized production techniques in British manu-
facturing I once again turn to the transportation equipment industry. This industry
experienced, as I illustrated in the previous section, exceptionally rapid rates of global
72. Broadberry, “Technological Leadership and Productivity Leadership in Manufacturing.”
73. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 384.
74. Ark, International Comparisons of Output and Productivity, 86–7; Crafts and Mills, “TFP Growth in
British andGermanManufacturing, 1950-1996,” 650; Crafts, “British Relative Economic Decline Revisited,”
22–3.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 115 — #127 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 4. The Great Escape 115
technical progress which exhibited a strong bias toward uneven factor saving. I argue
that these technological advances induced British entrepreneurs to adopt American-
style, capital-intensive production techniques in order to bridge the productivity gap
that had arisen during the previous decades. The rapid capital deepening was reflected
in a particularly large accumulation component, which, between 1907 and 1930, ac-
counted for almost all of British labor-productivity growth in this industry. In the age
of growing private motor ownership and ‘Fordism’, it was the motor vehicles industry
that particularly stood out in terms of technological progress.75 Yet it was also this in-
dustry where British engineers have been criticized for their failure to adopt American
mass-production methods.76 As argued by Bowden and Higgins, prior to the Second
World War, Britain lacked a mass-market for automobiles as demand was limited to
the middle and upper classes.77 The British consumers placed a particularly high pre-
mium on the performance and quality of their motor vehicles and were less concerned
with price constraints. Hence mass-production, as espoused by Fordism, was not a
viable option for British producers.
Nonetheless, the interwar years did witness significant investment in the British
motor vehicle industry. The fact that it was not Fordist does not invalidate it. The
annual growth rate of total capital in the vehicle industry – which Matthews et al. esti-
mate to have been 3.1 percent – was among the highest in British industry in the inter-
war years.78 The 1920s and 1930s witnessed large investment programs undertaken
by the major motor vehicle producers with the gradual introduction of mechanized
production techniques, assembly lines and specialized machinery used to produce in-
dividual items on a continuous basis. British producers of motor vehicles were follow-
ing the path set out by the American vehicle industry. In 1923, for example, a major
investment program in continuous flow production began at Longbridge as a result of
which this site became the first motor works in the country with a moving assembly
line for the production of chassis and car bodies.79
These modernizations were not exclusively confined to the motor vehicle industry.
During the First WorldWar, in the industries essential to the war eﬀort, scientific man-
agement techniques such as time-and-motion studies were applied in order to maxi-
mize output and eﬃciency. Machine tools were imported from the United States and
installed in the factories where they were previously unknown. Automatic welding
spread through the shipyards. Eichengreen notes that “the installation of automatic
machinery allowed a growing number of operations to be undertaken by workers with
75. Field, A Great Leap Forward, 70.
76. Lewchuk, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry.
77. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 386–7.
78. Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973, 241.
79. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 386–7.
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minimal training. In this way, British industry took a first tentative step down the road
that led to modern mass-production as in the United States.”80
The move toward capital-intensive production techniques was not apparent in
all industries, however. The textiles industry proved to be highly reluctant to invest
in new production techniques and technological change. In the previous section I
showed that this industry experienced a relatively modest rate of unbiased techno-
logical progress and that both American and British producers were disinclined to
invest in this industry. As a result, the technology gap, that had opened up during the
nineteenth century, remained wide. In accordance with the Broadberry view, the two
countries continued to track a diﬀerent technological path in this industry. This is most
obvious for cotton textiles, which was the focus of a case study by Lazonick.81 Lazon-
ick argued that the cotton textile industry failed to modernize by re-equipping with
ring spinning and automatic looms. Whereas, during the interwar years, ring spinning
capacity was the dominant spinning choice in the world, the British cotton textile in-
dustry still relied heavily onmule spinning. The relative importance of rings in the UK
remained low at just around 23 percent.82 Consequently, by this time a large propor-
tion of British cotton spinning machinery had become technically obsolete. Sandberg
argued that demand and relative factor costs were the main reasons why English spin-
ners persisted with mules, rather than an aversion to new technology.83
The reluctance to adopt new production techniques is apparent formost traditional
industries. My estimates indicate that industries such as building materials, clothing
and textiles showed little or no sign of convergence in terms of capital intensity lev-
els. Whereas newer industries, such as chemicals, petroleum, transportation equip-
ment, and printing did exhibit rapid capital deepening and technological catch-up.
The experience within these industry-groups was not uniform however; the capital
deepening process in the transportation equipment sector, for instance, was primarily
driven by investment in the motor vehicle and aircraft industries, while the more tra-
ditional shipbuilding and railway carriage trades continued to track a labor-intensive
production path. In the case of the engineering sector, it was the electrical engineering
industry that exhibited a high growth rate of its capital stock and witnessed a dramatic
increase in the range of items produced.84 Even though the transformation of British
manufacturing was hesitant and mostly limited to the more dynamic new industries
there was cause for cautious optimism. Eichengreen remarked:
80. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 320–1.
81. W. Lazonick, “Production Relations, Labor Productivity, and Choice of Technique: British and U.S.
cotton spinning,” Journal of Economic History 41 (1981): 491–516.
82. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 386.
83. L. Sandberg, “American Rings and EnglishMules: The Role of Economic Rationality,”Quarterly Journal
of Economics 83 (1969): 25–43.
84. Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973, 241.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 117 — #129 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 4. The Great Escape 117
“By the end of the 1930s some 250 British firms had adopted modern tech-
niques of managerial control (including the multidivisional firm). Modern
cost accounting had been installed, and top management was being profes-
sionalized. Spending on research and development tripled over the course
of the decade. New products and processes proliferated, fueling hopes of
the emergence of a ‘development bloc’ of modern industries.”85
The ‘new’ industries
The role played by the new industries has been emphasized in the literature before.86
Notably, Richardson ties the robust British growth performance experienced during
the interwar period to these modern industries.87 This view was backed by evidence of
a revival of TFP growth during the 1930s, as well as a strong emphasis on the quality
of modern investment and the structuring of British industry toward these growth-
oriented sectors.88 In addition, Richardson stresses the technical developments and
the introduction of new processes, production methods and products in these indus-
tries, whose progress he considered to be largely interdependent. In the more recent
historiography the growth performance of the British economy during the 1920s and
1930s and the role played by the new industries has been viewed more critically, how-
ever. Broadberry shows that structural change within manufacturing was not particu-
larly pronounced during this period, while overall productivity growth was not espe-
cially fast.89 Also, Crafts stresses the fact that productivity and TFP growth in the UK
remainedwell below the standard set by US industries during the first half of the twen-
tieth century.90 As a result, on an hours-worked basis, the labor-productivity gap be-
tween Britain and the US in manufacturing continued to widen up to the 1950s.91 The
direct Anglo-American benchmark for 1935, discussed in chapter 3, also reveals that
particularly themodern British industries (engineering, transportation equipment and
chemicals) performed poorly in comparison to their American counterparts.
The poor productivity performance of particularly the new industries in Britain
does not appear to favor the ‘optimistic’ interpretation by Richardson, nor does it ac-
85. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 341.
86. Richardson, “The New Industries Between the Wars”; Richardson, “The Basis of Economic Recovery in
the Nineteen-Thirties”; N. Buxton, “The Role of the ‘New’ Industries in Britain During the 1930s: A Rein-
terpretation,” Business History Review 2 (1975): 205–222; S. Pollard, The Development of the British Economy,
3rd ed. (Baltimore: Edward Arnold, 1983); H. de Jong, Catching Up Twice: The Nature of Dutch Industrial
Growth During the Twentieth Century in a Comparative Perspective (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), 108–9.
87. Richardson, “The Basis of Economic Recovery in the Nineteen-Thirties,” 360–1.
88. Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973; Pollard, The Development
of the British Economy, 53.
89. S. Broadberry, “Unemployment in Interwar Britain: A Disequilibrium Approach,” Oxford Economic
Papers 35 (1983): 466–8.
90. Crafts, “British Relative Economic Decline Revisited,” 21.
91. For further details see chapter 3.
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Table 4.3: Decomposition of labor-productivity growth, new in-
dustries vs. old staples, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
United States (1909–1929)
New industries 3.6 0.8 2.6 0.2
Old staples 2.5 0.4 2.0 0.1
Great Britain (1907–1930)
New industries 1.8 2.5 1.7 -2.4
Old staples 1.7 1.2 1.3 -0.8
Diﬀerence (US-GB)
New industries 1.8 -1.7 1.0 2.5
Old staples 0.8 -0.8 0.7 0.9
Source: see section 4.2; May not sum to total due to rounding.
cord well with the wave of modernization described above. However, as previously
noted, TFP growth consist of both improvements in technology as well as eﬃciency
with which the factors of productions are used.92 My decomposition allows for the
breakdown of TFP in both these components. In table 4.3 I recast the results from sec-
tion 4.3 in terms of ‘new industries’ and ‘old staples’, in line with the distinction made
by Richardson as well as Crafts.93 This decomposition contrasts the strong growth po-
tential of the new industries against the slower, yet almost fully realized potential in
the old staples.
Table 4.3 confirms the fact that, in British manufacturing between 1907 and 1930,
hourly labor productivity in the new industries grew slightly faster than in the old sta-
ples. In addition, it corroborates Crafts’ claim that productivity growth in the British
industries remained well below the standard set in the US and that, in international
perspective, the old staples performed comparatively better than the new industries;
as the latter lost considerable less ground to the American producers. The decomposi-
tion also reveals, however, that the potential for growth in the new British industries
was substantially greater than was the case for the old staples. Capital accumulation
alone was responsible for over 2.5 percent of annualized growth in the new industries,
92. N. Crafts, “Creating Competitive Advantage: Policy Lessons from History,” chap. 2 in The UK in a
Global World: How Can the UK Focus on Steps in Global Value Chains That Really Add Value?, ed. D. Greenaway
(London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2012), 7.
93. H. Richardson, “Over-Commitment in Britain Before 1930,” Oxford Economic Papers 17 (1965): 250;
Crafts, “Long-run Growth,” 20. The label ’new’ refers to industries generally associated with the Second
Industrial Revolution.
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more than twice as large as the accumulation component observed for the traditional
industries. This reflects the modernization process in British manufacturing that was,
as discussed above, most pronounced in the new industries. The contribution of cap-
ital deepening to American productivity in the new and traditional industries was
substantially smaller, and the gap between the US and Great Britain arguably demon-
strates the technological convergence that took place during this period. As techno-
logical change still progressed at a considerably higher pace in the US compared to
Britain, however, it is clear that technological convergence was far from complete by
1930.94
Institutional constraints
As illustrated above, only those British firms that were part of the new industries that
in the US had benefited most from the advent of electrification, mass-production,
and the introduction of professional management chose to risk the expenditure re-
quired for the successful adoption of these modern, capital-intensive, production tech-
niques.95 Nonetheless, even in those British industries that chose to invest, the trans-
formation to mass production lacked the vigor and dynamism that characterized the
US and which was also apparent in Germany during the early twentieth century.96
Below, I will highlight the role of institutions in the relatively hesitant adoption of
capital-intensive production techniques in the more dynamic British industries.
For the motor vehicle industry, Lewchuk shows that British producers were reluc-
tant to install new technologies as they wanted to limit their vulnerability to slow-
downs, something which they could aﬀord as a result of the protection imparted by
tariﬀs and an oligopoly dominated by Morris Motors.97 Other sectors adopted simi-
lar anti-competitive behavior, which was sanctioned by government policy. As Britain
was rapidly losing its dominant place in the world market, the interwar economy wit-
nessed a major shift in supply-side policy as the British government became more and
more willing to intervene in the market economy. Crafts notes that, “among the inno-
vations of this period were the beginnings of industrial policy in the 1920s, the general
tariﬀ of 1932, the encouragement of cartels and the imposition of controls on foreign
94. One must bear in mind though that the technological change listed in table 4.3 is a geometric average
and represents the vertical shift of the frontier both at the capital-intensity level of 1907 and 1930. In the
British new industries, technological change measured at interwar capital intensity levels was more than
double that of the period prior to the First World War (2.3 versus 1.0 percent). This large shift illustrates
once more the biased nature of technological change during this period, at least for the modern industries.
95. For a detailed discussion of the impact of electrification on productivity change see, Jong, Catching
Up Twice: the Nature of Dutch Industrial Growth During the Twentieth Century in a Comparative Perspective,
154–61.
96. Veenstra and Woltjer, “The Yanks of Europe?”
97. Lewchuk, American Technology and the British Vehicle Industry.
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investment in the 1930s.”98 The latter arrangements allowed firms to adopt conduct
which avoided competition. Consequently, modernization and rationalization where
no longer a prerequisite to survival. Instead, firms opted for a defensive strategy and
engaged in collusive behavior.99
Another institutional constraint to modernization in the interwar years was the
rapid expansion of the craft unions. During the war, workers had been encouraged to
join unions as a matter of public policy. Once freed fromwartime restraints, the British
unions became increasingly assertive.100 “Menaced by the advent of skill-displacing
technologies, which threatened to challenge their dominance of the workplace, craft
unions used their power on the shop floor to enforce traditional practices in the work-
place in terms of the numbers employed, training, routines and piece rates. Such
attempts were more successful in industries like shipbuilding and cotton spinning,
where skilled craft labor could not be easily replaced and was relatively better orga-
nized than its employers.”101 The craft unions had not yet established a solid foothold
in the new industries, such as pharmaceuticals, automobiles and electrical equipment,
which consequently led managers to face less opposition during the process of mod-
ernization. Admittedly, the high rate of unemployment witnessed during the interwar
period eroded the bargaining power of unions, which may have enhanced the ability of
firms to push for organizational and technical change. The rise of cartelization diluted
the incentive for doing so, however.102
The imposition of an elaborate tariﬀ system sheltered British manufacturing from
foreign competition, which further weakened the need to increase eﬃciency and push
for organizational change. Where the tariﬀs and the encouragement of cartels may
havematteredmost, however, was in retarding the transfer of resources to new uses.103
As, in the 1920s and 1930s, demand weakened for the goods from the industries in
which Britain had investedmost in the nineteenth century (i.e. coal, iron and steel, tex-
tiles and shipbuilding) the market economy should have begun to reallocate resources
out of these uses. Instead, the British manufacturing sector was slow to move into the
new industries. Several scholars have interpreted this slow transformation in terms of
the handicap of an early start.104 The experience and skills accumulated by coal min-
98. Crafts, “Long-run Growth,” 18.
99. Bowden and Higgins, “British Industry in the Interwar Years,” 379.
100. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 320–1.
101. Magee, “Manufacturing and Technological Change,” 93.
102. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 341.
103. ibid., 338.
104. Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy; M. Frankel, “Obsolescence and Techno-
logical Change in a Maturing Economy,” American Economic Review 45 (1955): 296–319; C. Kindleberger,
“Obsolescence and Technical Change,” Bulleting of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statis-
tics 23 (1961): 281–297; E. Ames and N. Rosenberg, “Changing Technological Leadership and Industrial
Growth,” Economic Journal 73 (1963): 13–31.
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ers and shipyard workers, for instance, were ill-suited to the more technologically so-
phisticated new industries. In addition, the old and new industries were often located
in diﬀerent places.105 Buttressed by tariﬀs and cartels, British manufacturing contin-
ued to specialize in the old staples. This only stalled the diﬃcult transition process.
Productivity growth in the new industries was in fact faster than in other branches of
manufacturing, a fact that suggests that Britain’s relative overcommitment to the old
staples reduced the manufacturing sector’s overall rate of expansion and slowed down
the modernization process.106
The slower growth of demand in Britain did have additional consequences for the
rate of technological change as well, by aﬀecting the rate at which machinery was re-
placed. As noted by Salter, gross investment was the vehicle of technological change
– since technological change was largely embodied in new capital equipment – and
the rate of investment largely determined how rapidly new techniques were brought
into general use and were eﬀective in raising productivity.107 Slower demand therefore
accounted for the frequently reported reluctance of British manufacturers to discard
their old machinery at the same rate as their American competitors.108 Salter showed
that the best-practice plants in Britain reported similar capital intensities, applied
identical production methods and had comparable levels of productivity compared to
the best plants in the US. “The diﬀerence,” he claimed, “lies in a much higher propor-
tion of plants employing outmoded methods in the United Kingdom.”109 The dispar-
ity in the ‘standards of obsolescence’ was one of the driving forces behind the Anglo-
American productivity gap during the first half of the twentieth century. Nonethe-
less, the dichotomy of production techniques in British manufacturing, as observed by
Salter, emphasizes once more that British producers did not eschew modern, capital-
intensive, production techniques, but that its capital stock was simply slow to adjust
to the rapid technological evolution of the time.
Another, often cited, factor that inhibited investment was the prevalence of fam-
ily firms in the British manufacturing sector.110 It is argued that the relatively small
British firms failed to capture economies of scale and scope inherent in new technolo-
gies. Opportunities which German and American manufactures seized both domes-
tically and internationally.111 Yet, by international standards British firms were not
exceptionally small. When comparing employment data, we see that the average man-
105. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 327–8.
106. See table 4.3, or Magee, “Manufacturing and Technological Change,” 78.
107. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, 64–5.
108. Magee, “Manufacturing and Technological Change,” 82.
109. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, 72–3.
110. A. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1990).
111. T. Nicholas, “Enterprise and Management,” chap. 9 in Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic
History of Modern Britain, 2:243.
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ufacturing establishment in Britain employed 64 people, compared to 67 in the US, 14
in Germany and 26 in France. As emphasized by Magee, “The largest British chemical
firm in 1903, United Alkali, employed over a thousand more workers than BASF, Ger-
many’s biggest manufacturer of the time. It was only in the heavy industries, such as
iron and steel, that British plants were comparatively small.”112
More generally, Elbaum and Lazonick claim that the institutional legacy associ-
ated with atomistic, nineteenth century economic organization impeded the adoption
of modern technological and organizational innovations. “Entrenched institutional
structures – in industrial relations, enterprise and market organization, education,
finance, international trade, and state-enterprise relations – constrained the transfor-
mation of Britain’s productive system.”113 Nonetheless, these ‘institutional rigidities’,
did not prevent British firms in the new industries from adopting modern mechanized
production techniques, investing in continuous-flow manufacturing and introducing
modern techniques of managerial control. The supply-side policies of the interwar
period merely served to slow the modernization process and retarded the transfer of
resources to these new industries.
The lock-in hypothesis of British technical choice also presumes a static relation
between the cost of capital and labor. During the interwar years, these relative factor
costs were far from stable, however. Broadberry shows that the average weekly hours
fell by approximately 13 percent at a time when the real wage for a ‘normal’ work-
ing week was rising steadily.114 The raise in hourly labor costs was not matched by
an immediate increase in the hourly labor productivity, making eﬀective labor rela-
tively more expensive in Britain.115 At the same time, technical progress itself exerted
continuous downward pressure on the cost of capital goods.116 The cheapening of
capital goods relative to wages gave further impetus to the modernization and ratio-
nalization movement in British manufacturing, particularly in those industries where
capital could be easily substituted for skilled labor.
British growth after the Second World War
Crafts shows that, during the period 1950 to 1973, “Britain experienced its fastest-
ever economic growth but at the same time relative economic decline proceeded at a
rapid rate vis-a-vis its European peer group such that by the end of the period Britain
had been overtaken by [...] nine other [countries] in terms of labour productivity.”117
112. Magee, “Manufacturing and Technological Change,” 79–80.
113. B. Elbaum and W. Lazonick, The Decline of the British Economy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 2.
114. S. Broadberry, “Aggregate Supply in Interwar Britain,” Economic Journal 96 (1986): 469.
115. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 324.
116. Salter, Productivity and Technical Change, 35–6.
117. Crafts, “British Relative Economic Decline Revisited,” 22.
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Following the Second World War, the interwar policies that reduced competitive pres-
sures on British business change proved hard to displace and turned out to have long-
lasting eﬀects on output growth and productivity convergence. Even though a sizable
portion of British manufacturing had successfully taken the first step in the Basu and
Weil model and had created considerable potential for growth during the 1920s and
1930s, the implementation of the crucial second stage, ’learning-by-doing’, proved to
be more problematic. The process of learning-by-doing was, in the case of Britain, de-
celerated by an inflexible labor market and strong unions, as well as the cartelization
and collusive practices previously described. The industries that had implemented
capital-intensive production techniques felt reduced pressure to optimize their eﬃ-
ciency levels, as tariﬀs and cartels created a “cozy environment sheltered from the chill
winds of competition.”118 Furthermore, British commitment to education and human
capital formation lagged behind its major international rivals.119 Traditionally, Britain
provided less basic education to its general labor force and directed educational reform
toward clerical skills. This left the country relatively poorly placed to take full ad-
vantage of the new technologies introduced in the early twentieth century. “This was
a legacy that was to cause twentieth-century diﬃculties,” as emphasized by Harley,
“it was an eﬃcient response to Britain’s position as the first industrialized country,
perhaps, but a restraint on future growth.”120 As a result, Britain was less success-
ful than other European nations in exploiting the opportunities for catch-up growth,
gradually losing ground against her European rivals.121 Nonetheless, as illustrated by
Crafts and Mills, labor-productivity growth between 1951 and 1973 was considerably
faster in the UK than in the US, resulting in the gradual decline of the Anglo-American
productivity gap.122 The post-war productivity convergence supports the premise of
a two-tiered process of catch-up growth that, for Great Britain, had its origins in the
interwar era.
4.5 Conclusion
As noted by Tomlinson, the economic history literature on early-twentieth century
British manufacturing has taken a rather despondent, or ‘declinist’, view. “Every in-
dustry or even company’s failure to match performance in another country has been
118. Eichengreen, “The British Economy Between the Wars,” 338.
119. See chapter 5 for a discussion.
120. K. Harley, “Trade, 1870–1939: From Globalization to Fragmentation,” chap. 7 in Floud and Johnson,
The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 2:175.
121. C. Bean and N. Crafts, “British Economic Growth Since 1945: Relative Economic Decline and Re-
naissance?,” chap. 6 in Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945, ed. N. Crafts and G. Toniolo (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133.
122. Crafts and Mills, “Europe’s Golden Age,” 421.
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commonly treated not as part of the rough and tumble life of global capitalism, or
even as the result of contingent error and miscalculation, but rather as a symptom of
profound economic, but also political, social and cultural malaise.”123 In part, Broad-
berry’s thesis that the divergence of Anglo-American labor productivity reflected the
persistence of distinct industrial technologies in Europe and the United States, fol-
lows this tradition. He argues that, in the face of diﬀerent endowments and demand
patterns British producers continued to pursue a crafts-based production system, in-
evitably losing both productivity and technological leadership to the American system
of mass-production.
This chapter presents a rather more positive view of interwar British manufactur-
ing, as I reassess the productivity dynamics on the basis of Basu and Weil’s model
of appropriate technology, which predicts convergence in light of capital deepening.
I show that a substantial part of British manufacturing, particularly the ‘new’ indus-
tries of the Second Industrial Revolution, was drawn toward the Americanmechanized
production techniques and exhibited substantial growth potential. These new indus-
tries – i.e. chemicals, transportation equipment, electrical engineering and printing –
exhibited strong rates of technological progress that was decidedly biased. Because of
this bias in technological progress, labor productivity grew fastest for capital-intensive
techniques during the first half of the twentieth century, which prompted British man-
ufactures to rapidly increase their rate of capital deepening. These findings are con-
firmed by examples of the introduction of modernmechanized production techniques,
investment in continuous-flow manufacturing and the adoption of new techniques of
managerial control. By confirming that parts of British manufacturing was success-
fully adapting to the rapidly changing environment, I can reject the premise that the
entire manufacturing sector was locked-in a separate technology path, as argued by
Broadberry.
However, in spite of these clear examples of British mechanization, the moderniza-
tion process was severely hampered by government intervention in an attempt to cor-
rect market failures, the dominance of craft unions and pre-existing production prac-
tices. Supply-side policies of the interwar period slowed the modernization process
and retarded the transfer of resources to new industries. The reluctance to adopt mod-
ern production techniques is particularly apparent for the traditional industries. My
figures indicate that the old staples such as building materials, clothing, and textiles
showed little signs of convergence in terms of capital intensity levels. Consequently,
in contrast to Broadberry, in my estimates I do not observe a single development path
for all manufacturing industries, but instead I find large heterogeneity in the modern-
123. J. Tomlinson, “Thrice Denied: ‘Declinism’ as a Recurrent Theme in British History of the Long Twenti-
eth Century,” Twentieth Century British History 20 (2009): 228.
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ization process within British manufacturing.
Even though British manufacturing converged on the US in terms of capital-
intensity levels, the Anglo-American productivity gap failed to narrow and even
widened during the interwar period. I show that, particularly for the modern indus-
tries, the capital-deepening process was accompanied by a large productivity growth
potential which, however, did not materialize as low levels of technical eﬃciency stood
in the way of convergence. Following Basu and Weil’s appropriate-technology model,
I interpret the decrease of relative eﬃciency as a feature of modernization inextri-
cably linked to the first phase of catch-up growth, i.e. creating potential. Only after
an economy has adjusted to the new situation and has exhausted the full potential
of the new technology the labor-productivity gap to the frontier can be narrowed. In
the case of postwar Britain this process of learning-by-doing was decelerated by an
inflexible labor market and strong unions, as well as cartelization and widespread col-
lusive practices. This ‘institutional legacy’ caused Britain to be less successful than
other European nations in exploiting the opportunities for catch-up growth following
the Second World War, thus causing her to gradually lose ground against her major
European rivals. Nonetheless, the UK experienced significantly stronger trend growth
than the US between 1951 and 1973 and the two economies converged in terms of
labor-productivity levels.
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4.A Note on American data
The basic source of output, employment and capital data for US industries is the Cen-
sus of Manufactures. Data on total employment, value added and total horsepower em-
ployed is available in the quinquennial censuses between 1899 and 1919 and the bi-
ennial censuses of 1923 to 1929 and 1939.124 In this appendix I will define the basic
variables, discuss the comparability of the figures between diﬀerent census years and
clarify the industry classification.
Basic sources
Nominal value added is derived directly from the census figures as the net of the ex-
factory value of products (the selling value at the factory or plants) minus the cost
of materials, purchased fuel and electric energy and contract work. No attempt was
made to adjust for inventory revaluations or fully account for maintenance work and
repairs, but evidence presented by Fabricant suggests that these adjustments would
only marginally aﬀect gross value added for the years in my sample.125 I calculated de-
flators at the industry level on the basis of the Fabricant indices of physical output and
nominal output series.126 Subsequently, I incorporated the modifications and exten-
sions to the indices of production proposed by Kendrick.127 Lastly, I reclassified these
deflators to fit the 1945 Standard Industry Classification (SIC), which constitutes the
basis for both the Kendrick series and my own.128 Throughout, nominal value added
was converted to constant prices (with a 1929 base) by applying the price deflators at
the two-digit SIC level.
I define employment as the sum of wage earners, salaried oﬃcers and employ-
ees.129 I exclude all proprietors and firm members as I wish to limit my analysis to
manufacturing personnel whose activity directly contributes to the value added re-
ported in the census. In censuses prior to 1935, manufactures were instructed to re-
port all personnel employed in both production activities and in auxiliary activities
such as maintenance, shipping, warehousing, etc. at the same location. My employ-
ment figures thus invariably include a number of employees engaged in these kinds
124. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures”; United States De-
partment of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures”; United States Department of Commerce:
Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures: General Report”; United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of
the Census, “Manufactures: Statistics by Subjects.”
125. Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 340–50.
126. ibid., 123–321, 605–39; 1939 physical output was derived from United States Department of Com-
merce: Bureau of the Census, “Indexes of Production,” in Census of Manufactures 1947, 1.
127. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 416–21, 467–75.
128. For the computation of the aggregate price indices I maintained the Marshall-Edgeworth formula with
1909, 1919 and 1929 as base-years.
129. The category ’salaried oﬃcers and employees’ includes all superintendents, managers and clerical
workers.
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of non-manufacturing activities. This distinction is complicated further by the 1939
schedule that asked employers to report separate figures for their manufacturing and
non-manufacturing personnel, based either on- or oﬀ-site. Although it is diﬃcult to
establish to what extent this change in definition aﬀects the comparability of the em-
ployment figures between the censuses, Fabricant concludes that ”the implicit cen-
sus definition of factory employment has given rise to no serious ambiguities in the
data.”130 For 1939 I included all non-manufacturing personnel in my employment to-
tals while still excluding proprietors and firm members, which is compatible with the
definition applied by Kendrick for this year.131
The census employment figures were converted to total hours worked on the basis
of industry-specific average annual hours of work obtained from various sources. For
the inter-war period I relied on data by Inklaar et al., who provide detailed estimates
of average hours of work for wage earners.132 I extended their dataset to include the
census years prior to World War I. The censuses of 1909 and 1914 provide industry
specific data on prevailing hours of labor per week; no data is available for the years
1899 and 1904, I used the 1909 average hours instead.133 I normalized the industry-
specific weekly hours over the total manufacturing figures provided by Jones, using
census wage earners as weights.134 Lastly, I converted the prewar estimates to annual
average hours worked, based on the 1900 estimate of American vacation and holidays
by Huberman and Minns.135
Capital intensity is defined as the sum of the horsepower capacity of prime movers
and the horsepower rating of motors driven by purchased electric energy, divided by
my measure of employment. This definition coincides with the census measure of pri-
mary power, which also excludes the power of electric motors run by current generated
in the same establishment to prevent duplication. The census years 1921 and 1931 to
1937 were entirely excluded from my sample as data on power equipment was either
not collected or incomplete for these years. Although it is likely that rates of capacity
utilization have changed during my period of study, partly as a result of the shift from
the use of prime movers toward electric motors, I was unable to adjust for these.
130. S. Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing, 1899–1939 (New York: National Bureau Economic Analy-
sis, 1942), 173.
131. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 434.
132. Inklaar, Jong, and Gouma, “Did Technology Shocks Drive the Great Depression?,” 852–4. These figures
relate exclusively to wage earners, however this group comprises the bulk of my employment measure, and
any deviations in hours worked between wage earners and salaried oﬃcers and employees are bound to be
small compared to the annual fluctuations observed during this period.
133. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” 316–9; United States
Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the Census of Manufactures 1914 (Washington
D.C.: United States Government Printing Oﬃce, 1917), 482–9.
134. Jones, “New Estimates of Hours of Work per Week,” 375.
135. Huberman and Minns, “Days and Hours of Work in Old and New Worlds,” 546.
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Scope and comparability
During the 1899–1939 period the scope of the activities covered by the census has
changed somewhat. Prior to 1919, the American industrial census exempted all estab-
lishments with an annual production valued at less than $500; for the years since 1919
this limit was raised to $5,000. In the 1921 census report this resulted in a 21.6 percent
reduction in the number of establishments covered. However, the comparability of the
figures since 1919 were not appreciably aﬀected as, according to the United States Bu-
reau of the Census, ”99.4 percent of the total wage earners and 99.7 of the total value of
products reported at that census [1919, red.] were contributed by the establishments
reporting products to the value of $5,000 or more.”136 In addition, from 1904 onwards,
the Census of Manufactures was confined to establishments conducting work under
the factory system, thus excluding neighborhood industries and hand trades. For 1899
I relied on reclassified figures provided in the 1909 census. The adjusted figures omit
all non-factory establishments for 1899 and are thus fully comparable to the statistics
for subsequent census years.137
Over the course of my period of study several major industries, engaged in ac-
tivities no longer considered as manufacturing, were excluded from the census.138 I
followed this convention and withdrew these industries from my sample. Over the
various censuses numerous changes were made to the classification of industries and
products, inevitably resulting in discontinuities and breaks in the series. Fabricant dis-
cusses the continuity of the census value added and employment data over the period
1899 to 1939 at length.139 Overall, predominantly smaller industries were aﬀected by
the changes across the various census years, thus limiting the overall impact on the
coherence of the data set. Where necessary, I have combined related industries into
aggregate groupings to ensure continuity.140
Standard industrial classification
In my analysis I rely on the industrial classification laid out in the 1947 Census of
Manufactures.141 The census classification was derived from the 1945 Standard Indus-
136. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures: Statistics by Subjects,”
2.
137. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures,” 507–17; both the 1899
and 1904 data were taken from the 1909 census report.
138. Important industries that were dropped are motion picture production, manufactured gas, automobile
repairing, and railroad repair shops. See e.g. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 404.
139. Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 605–39; Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing,
179–230.
140. E.g. Cigarettes (211) and Cigars (212) were combined into an aggregate industry group as well as Flat
Glass (321) and Pressed and Blown Glassware (322).
141. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Statistics by Industry,” 862–914.
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trial Classification (SIC), which was the first attempt to standardize the collection and
reporting of data across diﬀerent agencies while maintaining consistency over a longer
time-frame.142 The industrial classification groups establishments primarily engaged
in the same line or similar lines of economic activity which, in the case of manufactur-
ing, is generally defined in terms of the products made (demand side) or the processes
of manufacture used (supply side).143 The SIC scheme places primary emphasis on
the latter, whereas the original, prewar, census classifications relies heavily on the for-
mer.144 The supply-side grouping of businesses – i.e. the categorization according to
the way in which inputs are transformed into outputs, mainly depending on the tech-
nology used – fits neatly into my productivity study. Although the SIC has undergone
several revisions (the latest in 1987), I explicitly chose to use the 1945 vintage as the
introduction of new products and production techniques over time make the more
recent classifications less applicable to the period preceding the Second World War.
Following the standard industrial classification, the manufacturing division com-
prises approximately 450 industries in 1939, which are included in 127 industry
groups and 20 major groups.145 These major groups are commonly referred to as two-
digit industries and are broken down into three-digit industries (i.e. industry groups),
which in turn are separated into four-digit industries.146 I restrict my analysis to the
three-digit level, moderately modified to ensure continuity, leavingme with 105 obser-
vations for each of the 10 census years. I generally estimate a frontier at the two-digit
level, implicitly assuming that industries share a production function at this level of
aggregation. As previously noted, the SIC groups industries according to a similar-
ity in their inputs, outputs or use of production techniques, giving credence to the
assumption of a joint production function. For a number of two-digit industries this
assumption was violated, in which case I estimate two or more frontiers for that re-
spective group.147
142. The diﬀerences between the 1947 census and the 1945 SIC are minor; for a detailed discussion see
ibid., 931–3.
143. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 405–6.
144. Although in many respects the SIC resembles the prewar census classifications, there have been a
number of important changes that highlight the shift from a demand-side to a supply-side oriented classifi-
cation. Notably in metals, the prewar censuses grouped establishments according to whether they produced
ferrous or nonferrous products. The 1945 SIC reclassified these industry groups according to whether the
production process was mainly associated with primary production (e.g. refining, smelting, rolling, etc.) or
the production of finished metal products (e.g. nails, wire, hardware, etc.), regardless of the type of metal
from which the end-product consisted.
145. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Statistics by Industry,” 915.
146. Carter et al., Historical Statistics of the United States, 4:4.
147. The most notable example is chemicals and allied products (28) for which five separate technology fron-
tiers were estimated. See table 4.4 for further details.
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4.B Note on British data
The primary British data is taken from the First and Fourth Census of Production.148 In
this appendix I will provide an in-depth discussion of the basic variables and methods
of construction behind this data set. I explore the amendments required for changes in
geographical coverage and discuss the exclusion of small firms. In addition, I analyze
the comparability of the British and American data and review the steps required to
make them analogous.
Basic sources
As was the case for the US, British output, labor and capital data is derived from the
oﬃcial production censuses. I selected the years 1907 and 1930, as both these surveys
contain detailed information on gross output, intermediate inputs, employment and
installed horsepower. Even though the terminology in the British and American cen-
suses diﬀer slightly, the concepts of value added, employment and horsepower capac-
ity are equivalent for both countries. Gross output is again defined as the ex-factory
value of products, whereas intermediate input represents the cost of materials, fuel
and contract work. Value added, or net output, is the net of gross output and interme-
diate input and constitutes the sum of wages, salaries, rent, royalties, rates and taxes,
depreciation of plant and machinery, advertisement and selling expenses and all other
similar charges as well as profits.
As a first step in the construction of my data set, I reclassified the British industrial
classification to fit the 1945 US Standard Industrial Classification (see appendix 4.A).
As was the case for the American data, I restrict the classification to the three-digit
level. The level of detail in the British classification necessitated a number of modifi-
cations to the level of aggregation in order to maintain comparability and continuity
over time.149 The resulting data set consists of 64 observations for both 1907 and 1930
and cover the British factory trades in their entirety.
Subsequently, I converted British output to nominal dollar values on the basis of
the price conversion factors introduced in chapters 2 and 3. In both these industry-
of-origin studies the industry level conversion factors were calculated on the basis of
producer prices, using the procedures first set out by Paige and Bombach and clearly
exposited in the work of van Ark.150 Note that the interwar PPPs rely on price data
148. Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK; Board of Trade, Final Report on
the Fourth Census of Production of the UK.
149. Particularly the British engineering trades lacked the detail specified in the US SIC. In this case I opted
for the lowest feasible aggregation level based on the detail provided in the census.
150. Paige and Bombach, A Comparison of National Output and Productivity; Ark, International Comparisons
of Output and Productivity.
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taken the Fifth Census of Production, which refers to the year 1935.151 I extrapo-
lated the interwar conversion factors to a 1930 base using price deflators taken from
the work of Feinstein.152 The nominal dollar values were then converted to constant
prices (with a 1929 base) by applying the American price deflators, discussed in ap-
pendix 4.A above. Both the Anglo-American PPPs and the American price deflators
were implemented at the two-digit SIC level.
For Britain I define employment as the sum of operatives (wage earners) and ad-
ministrative, technical and clerical staﬀ. In line with the definition used for the US, I
include only those personnel whose activity directly contributes to the firm’s produc-
tion (thus excluding owners and firm members). I converted the 1907 employment
figures to annual hours of work on the basis of Matthews et al. estimate of the average
number of weeks worked per year as well as weekly hours of work listed in the British
Labour Statistics.153 For the interwar period I again rely on Matthews et al., but base
my estimate of the average length of the working week on a study by the International
Labour Oﬃce.154
For the British capital-intensity data I utilize the American formula of adding up
horsepower of prime movers and of electric motors using purchased electricity. The
1930 census directly reports both the power available from prime movers and the
horsepower of electric motors driven by purchased electricity. Unfortunately, no data
is available for the horsepower capacity of electric motors in 1907 and I rely on figures
of electricity purchased to estimate the horsepower of electric motors.155 The pre-
war census does provide detailed figures on the total capacity of (non-electric) prime
movers, however.
Scope and comparability
The 1930 census deals exclusively with industrial production in England, Wales and
Scotland, whereas the 1907 Census of Production relates to United Kingdom as a
whole. Fortunately, the 1907 census does provide separate figures for England and
151. Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fifth Census of Production.
152. Feinstein, Statistical Tables of National Income, Expenditure and Output of the UK, 61–9.
153. Note that the figures for the average length of the working week are industry specific and refer to the
year 1906. Great Britain Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics: Historical
Abstract, 95; Matthews, Feinstein, and Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856–1973, 566.
154. ibid.; International Labour Oﬃce, Year Book of Labour Statistics 1939, 82–3.
155. Althoughmy estimate of electric motors driven by purchased energy is fairly rough, its possible impact
on the British capital intensity figures is limited as electric motors were still fairly uncommon at this time.
Comparable figures for the US and Germany reveal that, prior to the First WorldWar, less than 20 percent of
the installed horsepower consisted of electric motors, while only a fraction of these were run by purchased
electricity.
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Wales, Scotland and Ireland.156 To make the prewar census directly comparable to
the interwar census, I excluded Ireland from the 1907 sample and rely exclusively on
the production figures for Great Britain. This adjustment does not materially aﬀect
the productivity estimates, however, as only a fraction of industrial production in the
United Kingdom took place in Ireland at this time.157
Comparability between both census years is aﬀected by the exemption of small
firms from the interwar schedule. At the 1930 census, firms employing ten persons
or less were exempted from making detailed returns. Full returns were required from
all businesses, irrespective of their size, at the 1907 census. Although the extent of
the bias is diﬃcult to determine, evidence presented by Rostas suggests that small
plants and firms generally have a lower productivity than their larger counterparts.158
The exclusion of these firms from the 1930 schedule thus results in an overestimate
of eﬃciency and productivity in comparison to the prewar numbers.159 In all, the
proportion of the people working in British manufacturing employed by smaller firms
is estimated in the 1930 census at approximately 10 percent.160 On the basis of this
proportion, Fremdling et al. reckon that an upward bias of approximately 2 percent
is introduced in the British interwar productivity statistics.161 As noted in appendix
4.A, prior to the First World War, the US census exempted only those establishments
with an annual production valued at $500 or less. As the average output per person
engaged in manufacturing amounted to $2,560 in 1909, the scope of the American
census is thus nearly as wide as the 1907 British census.162
156. In some cases the Board of Trade chose to aggregate the production figures to prevent the disclosure
of particulars relating to specific firms. The latter measure is taken primarily for small Irish firms that have
no, or only a few, direct competitors within the confines of the country. Consequently, although my data for
1907 does, invariably, include some residual production figures for Ireland, the overall impact is limited on
account of the small size of the firms in question.
157. The production in Ireland focused mainly on the textiles and food sectors and, overall, accounted for
just 3.2 percent of net output and 4.2 percent of employment in the manufacturing sector of the United
Kingdom. Board of Trade, Final Report on the First Census of Production of the UK, 18–9.
158. L. Rostas, Productivity, Prices and Distribution in Selected British Industries (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1948), 28–32.
159. Rostas, Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, 25.
160. Board of Trade, Final Report on the Fourth Census of Production of the UK, V:9–11,
161. Fremdling, Jong, and Timmer, “British and German Manufacturing Productivity Compared,” 372–3.
162. United States Department of Commerce: Bureau of the Census, “Manufactures.”
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4.C Distance functions
In this chapter I emphasize the role of technological change as a driver behind the
wave of modernization that marked the interwar period and stress the importance
of eﬃciency behind the British productivity dynamics of the 1920s and 1930s, par-
ticularly in relation to the US. Studies on technological change in the Anglo-American
convergence debate have so far primarily been based on traditional growth accounting
exercises. These studies assume that an economy is operating on its production func-
tion, and consequently, treat total-factor productivity (TFP) analogous to technologi-
cal change. Such an interpretation is prone to serious limitations, however, as it usu-
ally requires several restrictive assumptions such as allocative and technical eﬃciency,
factor-neutral technological change and constant returns-to-scale.163 By adopting a
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which applies non-parametric linear programming
techniques, I can decompose TFP into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive compo-
nents: (1) changes in technological eﬃciency and (2) shifts in technology over time. In
addition, as the DEA does not require the imposition of a particular functional form
on the production frontier, it allows for any type of technological change, be it biased
or factor-neutral.164
In this appendix I will summarize the basic framework behind the DEA, based
primarily on the work of Färe, Grosskopf and Lovell.165 They illustrate that a distance
function can be used to determine the Farrell eﬃciency indices of a production set for
any number of inputs or outputs. In appendix 4.D I will show that, on the basis of
the eﬃciency scores, a (global) production frontier can be constructed, which in turn
allows me to determine the change in technology over time.166 In this basic example
I assume that all inputs and output quantities are non-negative and that, for each
time period t = 1; : : : ;T , the production technology St models the transformation of N
inputs, xt 2 RN+ , intoM outputs, yt 2 RM+
St =
n
(xt ; yt) : xt can produce yt
o
(4.2)
163. The number of restrictive assumptions within a growth accounting framework is primarily dependent
on the choice of production function. A translog production function, for instance, is much more flexible
than a Cobb Douglas specification and does not assume rigid premises such as perfect substitution between
production factors or perfect competition. Nonetheless, the vast majority of growth accounting studies in
economic history still rely on the restrictive Cobb Douglass production function.
164. The main advantage of the DEA technique is its flexibility and adaptability. A DEA allows for multiple
inputs and outputs, does not require input- or output-prices and does not require behavioral assumptions
such as cost minimization or profit maximization.
165. Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, Production Frontiers.
166. Färe et al., “Productivity Growth, Technical Progress, and Eﬃciency Change,” 68–9.
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The input distance function Dti (x
t ; yt) at time t is defined as
Dti (x
t ; yt) = min
n
 : (xt ; yt) 2 St
o
(4.3)
For the constant returns-to-scale case and a technology set St , the input distance func-
tion for production (xj;t ; yj;t) can be specified as
min  subject to
;1 ;:::;k
yjt 
X
k
kykt (4.4)
xjt 
X
k
kxkt
k  0 8 k:
The solution to the linear program for the intensity vector  and eﬃciency index
 can be interpreted as follows. There is a (hypothetical) composite producer formed
as a non-negative linear combination of all k observations using the components of
. This composite producer consumes no more than  times observation j’s inputs,
while still producing j’s output. The composite producer thus represents a fully ef-
ficient producer who is located on the global production frontier at j’s output level,
while  represents the ratio between both the inputs of the composite producer and
xt
j
respectively. Note that if (xt ; yt) 2 St , the Farrell eﬃciency index  will take on a
value between 0 and 1, where a value of 1 implies full eﬃciency.
The observations for which the input distance function returns a  equal to 1 to-
gether determine the position and shape of the production frontier. The frontier is
formed by tightly enveloping the fully eﬃcient observations, or ‘best practice’ activi-
ties, with linear segments; as illustrated in figure 4.1 in the main text. The frontier is
thus a subset of all feasible techniques that attain the highest labor productivity for
the capital intensity levels they correspond to.167
Although, so far I base my results on the assumption of constant returns-to-scale,
Färe et al. show that the flexible nature of the DEA allows me to relax this assump-
tion.168 The constraint k  0 implies constant returns-to-scale. By controlling the
intensity factor with additional constraints, i.e.
P
k 
k  1 or Pk k = 1, I can impose
non-increasing and variable returns-to-scale respectively. The imposition of these ad-
ditional constraints does come at a cost of greatly increased data requirements how-
ever. A sensitivity check on the basis of variable returns-to-scale, which can be found
167. Timmer and Los, “Localized Innovation and Productivity Growth in Asia,” 52.
168. Färe, Grosskopf, and Lovell, Production Frontiers, 32–7.
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in appendix 4.E, demonstrates that the constant returns assumption does not signifi-
cantly alter the findings presented throughout this chapter; I therefore feel confident
using it.
i
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4.D Technological change
So far I have limited the discussion of the bias in technological progress to a graph-
ical representation of the change for a small sample of manufacturing industries. In
this section I will illustrate the graphical representation of the change in technology
over time and subsequently discuss the observed bias in technological change for the
remaining industries in my sample. This will allow me to determine whether, during
the interwar years, technological progress was biased toward capital-intensive produc-
tion techniques. Overall, I confirm the existence of a substantial bias in technological
change. For a select number of manufacturing industries, however, I find evidence
that suggests technological change was factor-neutral. For the latter industries, the
pull toward American-style production techniques appears to be absent, whereas for
industries that experienced strongly biased technological change British firms were
drawn toward more capital-intensive ways of production.
Figure 4.6 presents a graphical representation of technological change. In this fig-
ure I return to the basic constant returns-to-scale case for two inputs (K and L) and
one output (Y ). In the left pane, observed production  and two frontier-technology
sets are represented in


k;y

space, where y is labor productivity (Y =L) and k is capital
intensity (K=L). The observation  is interior to the boundary of technology at time
0 and 1, and is thus technically ineﬃcient. To find the fully eﬃcient input mix for
this observation – i.e. the intersect with the frontier – I utilize the input-based dis-
tance function introduced in equation (4.4). The distance function seeks the greatest
proportional decrease in inputs, given the target output. In this example, the distance
function yields  which, for , represents the ratio between the minimum amount of
labor required and actual labor employed while still producing at least Y ().169 The
maximum feasible productivity, at the technology level of period 0, is thus represented
by
y
0
() =
Y ()

0
L()
= y()=
0
(4.5)
Technological change over time for  is represented in the left panel of figure 4.6 by the
vertical shift of the frontier; i.e. the ratio between the maximum feasible productivity
at time 1 and 0, or alternatively, the relative eﬃciency of  in period 0 divided by ’s
169. Note that  represents this ratio for all inputs. The optimal capital intensity level for  is thus identical
to its actual level, as k() = K()=L() = K()=L().
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Figure 4.6: Frontiers and technological change
τ0
τ1
y∗
0
(α)
y∗
1
(α)
k(α)
αy(α)
Y/L
0 K/L
(a) technology frontier
k(α)
ln
(
y
∗
1
(α)
y∗
0
(α)
)
dτ
0 K/L
(b) technological change
eﬃciency with respect to the frontier in period 1.
technological change =
y
1
()
y
0
()
=
y()=
1
y()=
0
=

0

1
(4.6)
The right panel of figure 4.6 depicts the log change of technology between the two
periods (i.e. ln

y1()
y0()

or similarly ln(y)) for both k() and any other feasible capital-
intensity level that falls within the technology set. The diagram thus depicts the re-
lation between capital intensity and potential labor productivity change. As noted in
section 4.3, the bias in technological progress can be gauged by the skewness of the
diagram.
Figure 4.7 holds the graphs of technological change for all twenty-seven industry-
groups in my sample; table 4.4 provides a brief description for each industry.170 For
the majority of manufacturing industries technological change exhibited a strong bias
toward capital-intensive production techniques. For a select number of manufacturing
industries, however, I observe no apparent capital-intensity bias in the rate of techno-
logical change, as discussed in the main text.
170. Note that for the SIC labels I followed the following convention. The first two digits refer to the major
industry group, the third digit specifies the exact industries part of that group. A ’t’ is used to join all in-
dustries between the digits prior to and following the marker, ’n’ joins only those digits actually listed (thus
excluding those in-between), and the ’x’ is used as a wild-card, referring to all three-digit industries that
are not mentioned elsewhere; i.e. 20 refers to the entire two-digit SIC group ‘Food and kindred products’,
227 refers to the ‘Carpets and rugs’ industries which is part of the two-digit group 22, ‘Textiles’, whereas
22x refers to all remaining industries in this group. 357t9 concerns the industries 357, 358 and 359, while
371n25 refers solely to 371, 372 and 375.
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Figure 4.7: Technological change
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Figure 4.7: Technological change (continued)
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4.E Robustness checks
In this section I consider several robustness checks that address three of the more vital
assumptions that could lead my estimates to under- or overstate the eﬀects of techno-
logical progress and eﬃciency change on productivity growth. First, I investigate the
impact of alternative returns-to-scale models. Second, I consider the eﬀects of estimat-
ing the production frontiers at the 3-digit SIC level. Lastly, I re-run my analysis on
the basis of total employment instead of hours worked. I conclude that the constraints
imposed throughout this chapter do not appear to bias the main results.
Returns to scale
Throughout this chapter I have based my decomposition results on the assumption of
constant returns-to-scale (CRS). This assumption is only appropriate, however, when
all industries are operating at an optimal scale, which can be frustrated by imperfect
competition, constraints on finance, etc. In this case, the eﬃciency measures based
on the CRS model are biased downwards by the occurrence of scale eﬃciencies. A
variable returns-to-scale (VRS) specification excludes these scale eﬃciencies and en-
velopes the production points more tightly. Consequently, the latter yields technical
eﬃciency scores greater than or equal to those obtained from the CRS model.
As noted in appendix 4.C, the flexibility of the DEA permits me to relax the CRS
constraint and assume VRS instead. The VRS specification does increase the require-
ments on the data set, however. A graphical representation of the frontier illustrates
this problem. The two-input, one-output case would require the addition of a third
dimension, as labor productivity is now not only dependent on the level of capital
intensity but on the scale of production as well. Given the added dimension and the
increased surface area of the frontier, a greater portion of the observations will form
part of the (VRS) frontier and will thus be classified as fully eﬃcient. The problem of
unobserved production – either of represented countries in the past or of otherwise
unrepresented peers – is thus confounded. What would now be interpreted as frontier
movements could in fact be assimilation of knowledge associated with unobserved
appropriate techniques. The VRS specification increases the degrees of freedom of the
model, which could present identification problems for those frontiers for which I
only have a limited number of observations. Nonetheless, if both models yield compa-
rable results, wemay conclude that the CRS assumption is appropriate for the interwar
Euro-American productivity comparison. If, however, large discrepancies are observed
in the decomposition results, this may signal that either my restrictive returns-to-scale
assumption is not valid or that the VRS model suﬀers from insuﬃcient observations.
The decomposition results for total manufacturing, based on both the CRS and VRS
i
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Table 4.5: Robustness checks, total manufacturing, US and GB
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 3.1 0.7 2.2 0.2
VRS 3.1 0.6 2.4 0.1
3DIGIT 3.1 1.0 1.9 0.2
EMP 2.5 0.5 1.7 0.3
(a) US Manufacturing, 1909–1929
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 3.0 0.8 2.0 0.3
VRS 3.0 0.9 2.0 0.1
3DIGIT 3.0 1.0 1.8 0.2
EMP 1.7 0.4 1.2 0.0
(b) US Manufacturing, 1909–1939
annual average growth rate, in ln%
accumu- tech. eﬃ-
total lation change ciency
CRS 1.9 1.7 1.4 -1.2
VRS 1.9 1.9 1.6 -1.6
3DIGIT 1.9 2.5 0.9 -1.5
EMP 1.2 1.5 1.1 -1.3
(c) GB Manufacturing, 1907–1930
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method, are provided in table 4.5. The table lists the aggregate results for the US and
Great Britain separately. For the American decomposition, both the sub-period 1909–
1929 as well as the entire 1909–1939 period are given. Note that, while the annual
log growth of labor productivity remains unaltered by the choice of a returns-to-scale
model, the components of the Kumar and Russell decomposition can still be aﬀected.
Overall, the diﬀerences between both models, at the highest level of aggregation,
appear to be limited. Typically, the VRS model reports a mild increase of the accumu-
lation and technology components, at the expense of eﬃciency. Yet, the general conclu-
sions remain unchanged. American labor productivity is driven by rapid technologi-
cal change and, to a lesser degree, capital accumulation. American eﬃciency change,
for both periods, is small and can primarily be attributed to a gainful shift in the
employment structure. For British manufacturing, the greatest contribution to labor-
productivity growth results from capital deepening. Technological change in Britain,
for the VRS model, still falls short of the progress experienced in the US, but is sub-
stantive nonetheless. Under the VRS specification, eﬃciency decreases considerably
over time for Britain. As noted above, this may be caused by scale (in)eﬃciencies or al-
ternatively an insuﬃcient number of observations. In either case, the CRS assumption
does not fundamentally alter my findings, I thus feel confident using it.
Frontier selection
In my analysis I have so far estimated a frontier for 27 industry groups. In the esti-
mation of the frontiers I pool all the three-digit observations that belong to the same
two-digit industry group, thus assuming that these observations share a production
function at this level of aggregation. As an implicit check I observe whether the three-
digit industries in a common group will, at any point in time, be part of, or closely
approach, the frontier. Only a small number of industries failed to pass this simple
test, in which case I estimated an additional frontier for these observations. Only the
chemicals sector, whose industries proved particularly hard to group, required more
than two distinct frontiers. Table 4.4 in appendix 4.D provides an overview of the
two-digit frontiers in this study.
Alternatively, I can estimate a separate frontier for each of the 105 three-digit in-
dustries in my sample. However, the increase in the number of frontiers does lower the
average number of observations per frontier, which could present similar data prob-
lems as those previously discussed in the returns-to-scale section. Table 4.5 lists the
decomposition results for total manufacturing based on this alternative frontier se-
lection (3DIGIT), which can be directly compared to the basic, two-digit CRS decom-
position. These two decompositions present a similar picture. For both countries, the
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technology component is lower than is the case for the standard CRS model, while
the accumulation component is elevated. Particularly for Great Britain, the eﬀect of
capital deepening is more pronounced, accompanied by a more substantial decrease
in eﬃciency. Nonetheless, the results based on the extended selection of frontiers are
in broad agreement with the findings presented in the main text. As the impact of
the alternative frontier selection is very similar for both Britain and the US and I am
particularly interested in the diﬀerence in the development of capital deepening, eﬃ-
ciency and technological change between both countries, I conclude that the grouping
of industries into two-digit frontiers is a valid approach for this study.
Employment
As a final robustness check I turn to the definition of employment. Throughout this
chapter I relied on total hours worked as a measure of labor input, primarily because
this measure captures the substantial drop in the average length of the working week
that occurred during the interwar years. In contrast, previous productivity studies
have often relied on basic employment measures – looking exclusively at the total
number of active wage earners and employees in an industry – which thus makes
comparison between these studies and my own analysis more diﬃcult.171 To facilitate
this comparison and to determine whether a decomposition based on employment
numbers (EMP) provides comparable results to my basic, hours-based decomposition
(CRS), I have re-run the analysis on a per-worker basis and presented the results in
table 4.5.
The reduction in the average length of the working week, which was evident in
both countries, clearly shows in table 4.5. The total labor-productivity change for EMP
is distinctly lower than my productivity measure based on hours worked (CRS), par-
ticularly when I include the 1930s in the analysis. The decomposition results reflect
this reduction, but otherwise remain unaﬀected. For the US, technological change is
still the driving force behind the change in productivity, while growth in Britain orig-
inates primarily from capital accumulation. In addition, for Great Britain I also ob-
serve a clear positive impact of technology accompanied by a worsening of eﬃciency.
Nonetheless, I feel the EMP specification severely undervalues the impact of tech-
nological progress, particularly for the 1930s, which Field has shown to be one of
the most progressive decades of the twentieth century.172 I therefore prefer the hours
worked measure of employment.
171. Broadberry, The Productivity Race.
172. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century.”
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Chapter 5
The American Human Capital
Revolution
Labor Quality in the United States, 1900–1950
5.1 Introduction
In The Race between Education and Technology, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz
provide an in-depth and persuasive account of the twentieth century as the ‘human
capital century’.1 They reserve a special role for the United States, which showed ex-
ceptional leadership in investing in the skill of its workforce. They characterize the
exceptional American attitude toward human capital as follows:
“For most Americans in the early twentieth century access to schooling, at
least through high school, was largely unlimited by personal station and
residence. Education was publicly provided and was free of direct charge,
except at the highest levels. [. . . ] Americans had a strong tradition of ed-
ucating their youth at public charge and the expansion of education be-
yond the common school and elementary grades continued a commitment
rooted in basic democratic and egalitarian principles.”2
The American approach to schooling in the early twentieth century stood in stark con-
trast to the European education system, which was still largely reserved for the rel-
atively rich. The diﬀerences in school attendance rates between the United Kingdom
1. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 11.
2. ibid., 12.
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and the United States exemplify the fundamental diﬀerences in the commitment to
publicly provide education. Goldin shows that by 1930, compared to Britain, the US
was already three to four decades ahead in post-elementary education, a lead which
remained large well into the second half of the twentieth century.3 The advances in
schooling during the early twentieth century transformed the American workforce.
The formal, school based education provided general training which prepared the
American youth for a wide array of potential tasks and occupations and allowed them
to adequately respond to the considerable technological change that marked this pe-
riod.4 America’s approach to schooling was thus one of the driving forces behind its
technological dynamism and paved the way for rapid economic growth.5 The hesi-
tance of European nations to follow the American example inevitably led to the US
forging ahead of its main industrial rivals, as we have seen in the previous chapters.
Given its importance, surprisingly little is known about the exact contribution of
the advances in educational attainment and the resulting changes in labor quality on
America’s productivity potential for the early twentieth century. As I will show in sec-
tion 5.2, several attempts were made to quantify the role that education played in
labor-quality growth. Nearly all of these studies retain a highly macro-economic fo-
cus, however, exclusively studying the eﬀects of labor-quality change at the total econ-
omy level.6 By confining their study to the aggregate workforce, the previous analyses
overlook the marked diﬀerences in levels and growth rates of labor quality for indi-
vidual sectors and appear to underestimate the eﬀects of shifts of (skilled) workers
between the major economic branches. Goldin and Katz show that, in 1940, certain
manufacturing industries disproportionately hired more educated workers and that
these industries “produced newer products and used more advanced technologies.”7
This complementarity between skill and technology highlights the role of labor quality
in explaining the patterns of technological progress at the sectoral level.8
The aim of this study is to produce new, sectoral measures of labor-quality change
for the 1900–1950 period. In order to fully assess the impact of the substantial invest-
ments in schooling on the American economy in general and sectoral labor input in
particular, I turn to an approach developed by Dale Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches.9 The
3. Goldin, “The Human-Capital Century and American Leadership,” 267.
4. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 29.
5. ibid., 12.
6. The seminal contribution to the measurement of American labor input and quality for the early twen-
tieth century is the work by Denison, see Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States; E.
Denison, Accounting for United States Economic Growth, 1929–1969 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1974); E. Denison, Trends in American Economic Growth, 1929–1982 (Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 1985).
7. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 108.
8. ibid., 89–91.
9. Griliches, “The Sources of Measured Productivity Growth,” 340; Jorgenson and Griliches, “The Expla-
nation of Productivity Change.”
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Chapter 5. The American Human Capital Revolution 149
key innovations in their work was to adjust the traditional measure of labor input –
i.e. total hours of work or employment – for improvements in quality. The main prin-
ciple behind the labor quality adjustment is the distinction among several diﬀerent
types of labor inputs characterized by one or more quantifiable factors that aﬀect the
productivity potential of the worker (e.g. educational attainment, experience, etc.). By
then assigning weights to these categories, they measure the change in the productiv-
ity ‘potential’ of the workforce. The rationale for this procedure is that diﬀerences in
average earnings between the labor categories can be thought of as reflecting diﬀer-
ences in their marginal productivity. When this new measure of labor input is used in
a growth accounting framework – instead of a basic measure of the number of employ-
ees or hours worked – output growth as a result of better educated and trained workers
are ascribed to input growth, rather than productivity or technology growth.10 Previ-
ous studies have shown that this quality adjusted measure can account for a substan-
tial part of the residual or Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth within traditional
growth accounting studies.11 For the 1929–1957 period, Edward Denison attributes
1.08 percentage points (or approximately one-third) of annual productivity growth
to changes in educational attainment, experience and the gender composition of the
American workforce. Overall, the labor quality adjustment allows for a purer measure
of both labor input as well as technical change within a growth accounting framework.
The results presented in this chapter will allow for such a quality adjustment for the
American economy during the first half of the twentieth century.
I utilize the microdata from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).12
This source contains detailed employment records from the decennial population cen-
suses for nearly 10 million individuals between 1900 and 1950, allowing me to con-
struct my labor input measure. Unfortunately, however, the 1900–1930 population
censuses did not inquire into either the educational attainment of the general popu-
lation or the compensation of workers and employees. To overcome these data issues,
I follow a two-tiered approach to the labor quality estimation. First, I estimate educa-
tional attainment at the micro level for the pre-1940 census samples on the basis of
the 1940 returns. Second, I construct an employment matrix for the entire period that
groups workers according to their (predicted) educational attainment, gender, experi-
ence and industry. These groups are then aggregated to the sector and total economy
10. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence.”
11. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States; Griliches, “The Sources of Measured Pro-
ductivity Growth”; Denison and Poullier,Why Growth Rates Diﬀer; Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, “A Retrospec-
tive Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence”; R. Gordon, “Revisiting U.S. Productivity Growth
Over the Past Century With A View of the Future,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
15834 (2010): 1–30.
12. S. Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 5.0 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota,
2010).
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150 The Roaring Thirties
level using 1940 labor-compensation weights. The resulting indices are the first ever
attempt to provide a detailed breakdown of labor-quality change for all the major sec-
tors of the US economy for the period prior to the Second World War.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I discuss the previous attempts to quan-
tify the contribution of the advances in educational attainment for the early twentieth
century. Next, in section 5.3, I provide a brief overview of the basic methods behind
the estimation of educational attainment and labor quality and discuss the primary
sources used for this study. The main results are discussed in section 5.4, followed by
a discussion of their relevance to the ongoing human-capital debate in section 5.5. In
the last section I conclude.
5.2 Previous labor quality estimates
One of the earliest attempts to quantify the role of labor-quality change was under-
taken by John Kendrick.13 Incidentally, his study was also the only one to date to
measure American labor quality at the total economy as well as the sectoral level for
the early twentieth century. However, as I will illustrate below, the measure employed
by Kendrick only partially captures the change in the skill of the labor force and seri-
ously underestimates the growth of labor quality at the sectoral level. Later estimates
by, notably, Denison are able to capture the full extent of education’s contribution to
labor-quality growth as well as assess the eﬀects of changes in the female participation
rates and overall experience of the labor force. Overall, Denison finds a considerably
more rapid skill increase of the total US workforce during the 1909–1957 period than
suggested by Kendrick. Unfortunately, Denison’s study is restricted to the total econ-
omy level and does not provide independent figures for the main economic sectors.
This study presents new measures of labor-quality change broadly in line with the fig-
ures presented by Denison, but complemented by detailed sectoral estimates. These
estimate not only provide a new understanding of skill change for the individual eco-
nomic sectors, but will also allow me to fully capture the eﬀects of the reallocation of
labor between these sectors. The latter turns out to have had a significant impact on
overall labor-quality growth between 1900 and 1950.
Kendrick assessed the eﬀect of skill changes on the composition of the labor force
between 1869 and 1957. Instead of measuring changes in education attainment, gen-
der and experience directly, however, he measured the changes in the occupational
structure. He adjusted labor input by weighting the man-hours of work in separate
occupations and industries by their average hourly earnings for a given base year.
Kendrick’s measure of labor quality thus captures two eﬀects: (1) the relative shifts
13. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 31–4.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 151 — #163 i
i
i
i
i
i
Chapter 5. The American Human Capital Revolution 151
of workers between occupations, and (2) the relocation of employment between in-
dustries. The first eﬀect, the shift of workers from low-paying positions (e.g. laborers)
to better-paying jobs (e.g. operatives or clerical staﬀ), reflects a change in the potential
output per worker. The higher earnings (measured in terms of base-period compen-
sation) imply a rise in the marginal productivity of that worker and thus a rise in the
quality of the labor force – in line with the Jorgenson approach.14 Likewise, the shift
of workers to better-paying industries also show up as an increase in labor quality.
Kendrick assumes under (1) that labor quality will only change over time if a
worker transfers from one occupation to another or if an individual joins (or leaves)
the labor force in an occupation that is better (worse) paid than the national average.
He surmises that “the inherent average physical andmental capacity of the person em-
ployed in each occupation is constant over time.”15 The rapid increase in educational
attainment, as illustrated in the previous section, casts serious doubt on this assump-
tion, however. The average years of schooling for cohorts born between 1880 and 1950
nearly doubled, increasing from approximately 8 to 14 years.16 Part of this increase in
skill translated in a shift of employees between occupations and industries, but part
also translated in a rise of the labor quality within occupations. For instance, the like-
lihood for a blue collar worker born around 1885 to have attended high school was
substantially greater than it was for its counterpart born only 10 years prior, around
1875.17 The high-school education gave the blue-collar worker basic knowledge of
chemistry, electricity and algebra, allowed him to read manuals and blueprints and
made it much easier for him to eﬀectively converse with managers and other profes-
sionals, raising his marginal productivity in the process.18 In addition to undervaluing
the impact of the rapid increases in education attainment during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, Kendrick’s method ignores other demographic changes
as well. Changes in the average age, or experience of the workforce and shifts in the
gender composition are generally considered to be determining factors in the quality
of labor, as I will illustrate below.
Figure 5.1 plots Kendrick’s implicit labor quality figures. The index is derived
by subtracting the change in man-hours for the national economy from the change
in Kendrick’s estimate of labor input.19 Kendrick predicts a constant increase in la-
bor quality of roughly 0.5 percent before 1920, little to no growth between 1920
and 1940 and a very rapid increase during the war years. This development clashes
14. R. Raimon and V. Stoikov, “The Quality of the Labor Force,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 20
(1967): 391–413.
15. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 33.
16. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 20.
17. ibid., 170.
18. ibid., 113.
19. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 328–9.
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Figure 5.1: Labor quality estimates, Kendrick vs. Denison (1890–1960)
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Source: J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton: National Bureau
Economic Research, 1961), 328–9; E. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United
States and the Alternatives Before Us (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962),
85.
with Goldin and Katz’ observation that the average years of schooling continuously
increased throughout the first three quarters of the twentieth century.20 Particularly
the stagnation of labor quality during the 1920s and 1930s is not reflected in the de-
velopment of human capital and would suggest a structural divide between the edu-
cational attainment of the workforce and the population as a whole. This divide could
result from sudden shifts in labor-force participation rates, either following from the
inflow of lesser skilled or the outflow of more skilled workers. There is no evidence for
such a bias, however. At the height of the Great Depression we can actually observe
a movement in the opposite direction. During the depression years, unskilled work-
ers suﬀered the highest rates of unemployment as they were being replaced by skilled
workers willing to perform unskilled labor.21 This would have actually raised labor
quality during the 1930s not lowered it, as suggested by Kendrick.
At the sectoral level the downward bias in Kendrick’s figures is even more ap-
parent. The limited scope for shifts between occupations and industries restricts the
method adopted by Kendrick to fully capture changes in labor quality at this lower
level of aggregation. Consequently, Kendrick records very limited growth between
20. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 20.
21. R. Jensen, “The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression,” Journal of Interdisci-
plinary History 19 (1989): 567–8.
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1899 and 1948 for most of the non-service sectors. He cites growth rates of 1.3 per-
cent in mining and 7.9 percent in manufacturing respectively, while failing to report
estimates for agriculture, construction and trade altogether.22 These estimates are well
below the economy’s overall growth of 20.3 percent during the same period and sug-
gest only a minor role for labor-quality change in industrial output growth – quite
contrary to the claims by Goldin and Katz.23 Notwithstanding the downward bias in
Kendrick’s methodology and limited sectoral coverage, his figures for labor quality in
the service sector show much greater dynamism. For communications and public util-
ities he estimates an overall growth of labor quality between 1899 and 1948 of 14.5
percent; 29.9 percent in finance and (personal and professional) services; but a decline
of 4.3 percent in transportation.24 The considerable rise in labor quality in the per-
sonal and professional services represents the shift of primarily women from jobs as
service workers (e.g. housekeepers) to clerical occupations (e.g. stenographers, typists,
and secretaries). The clerical work required far greater skill and education than that
demanded of service workers, confirming that the transition captured by Kendrick’s
figures indeed represents a rise in labor quality for this sector.25
Following Kendrick’s work, several authors contributed to the debate by quanti-
fying the role of education in economic growth by either measuring the change in
the number of years of schooling for the labor force in connection with the earnings
diﬀerentials directly, or estimating the amount of capital invested in education in con-
junction with a rate of return on that capital.26 The previously mentioned study by
Denison, in particular, overturned the conventional wisdom regarding the impact of
labor-quality change on output growth. On the basis of a framework similar but not
identical to the one later used by Griliches and Jorgenson, he adjusted total economy
man-hours for the increased levels of education, rise in experience and changes in the
age-sex composition of the labor force. On the basis of these adjustments Denison esti-
mates an overall change in labor quality of 0.67 percent per annum between 1909 and
1929 and 1.08 percent between 1929 and 1957.27
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the labor quality series by Denison grows considerably
faster than the Kendrick series. The rapidly improving educational attainment of the
22. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 365–6, 397–8.
23. ibid., 328–9.
24. ibid., 541–2, 581–2, 610.
25. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 172–5.
26. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States; Griliches, “The Sources of Measured
Productivity Growth”; T. Schultz, “Investment in Human Capital,” American Economic Review 51 (1961): 1–
17; G. Psacharopoulos, “Measuring the Marginal Contribution of Education to Economic Growth,” Economic
Development and Cultural Change 20 (1972): 641–658; Denison, Trends in American Economic Growth.
27. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, 265; R. Gordon, “Interpreting the One
Big Wave in US Long-Term Productivity Growth,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7752
(2000): 13–7.
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154 The Roaring Thirties
workforce contributed most to labor-quality growth – Denison estimated education to
have added about 0.56 percentage points of growth to labor input between 1909–1929
and 0.93 during the period 1929–1957.28 Changes in the composition of the work-
force were responsible for the remaining growth of labor quality. Denison argues that
the downward bias on labor quality resulting from the sharp rise in the labor-force
participation rates for women – which generally earned less than their ‘male equiv-
alents’, implying a lower marginal productivity – was entirely oﬀset by a rise in the
average experience of the workforce. Particularly women themselves started to work
for longer and thus became much more experienced which “materially improved the
average quality of female labor.”29 In addition, Denison shows that the relaxation of
institutional barriers to the hiring and promotion of women in the better paying jobs
contributed to the improvement of labor quality during this period.
Denison’s approach aroused considerable criticism, however, centered primarily
on his adjustments for shorter hours of work and increased education.30 As noted
by Robert Gordon, Denison’s adjustments for education diverges from the standard
Jorgenson approach in two important respects: (1) he arbitrarily assumed that ability
rather than educational attainment alone explained 40 percent of the observed diﬀer-
ences in earnings across educational attainment categories, and (2) he raised his edu-
cation estimate by assuming that an increase in the length of the school year had the
same eﬀect on production as a similar increase in the number of school years attended
by an individual.31 Although, the second assumption may be relevant to the period
under study – as the average number of days of school attended per year rose rapidly
during the first half of the twentieth century – overall, Denison’s two assumptions ap-
pear to cancel each other out. Consequently, in this study I chose to drop Denison’s
adjustment for ability, disregard the change in the length of the school year and focus
solely on the change in the average years of schooling instead. The figures for the con-
tribution of education to American labor-quality growth, presented below, could thus
be regarded as a conservative estimate.
As previously noted, Denison does not provide sectoral measures of labor-quality
growth. Kendrick’s figures demonstrate, however, that labor quality can develop quite
distinctly between sectors. In addition, improvements in the utilization of the work-
force – in the form of labor relocating from low-productive to high-productive indus-
tries – can have a notable impact on overall labor quality. Denison, well aware of the
latter issue, made adjustments for the 1929–1957 period to account for the shift of la-
28. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, 73.
29. ibid., 80.
30. G. Fromm, “The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States and the Alternatives Before Us:
Book Review,” American Statistical Association Journal 58 (1963): 1168–1171.
31. Gordon, “Interpreting the One Big Wave in US Long-Term Productivity Growth,” 15.
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bor from the agricultural sector to industry and services.32 On the basis of this rough
adjustment, he found a very small contribution to overall labor-quality growth of less
than 0.02 percentage points annually. As I will show below, this greatly underesti-
mates the actual impact of the relocation of labor. Mainly the expansion of the service
sector and ‘high-tech’ manufacturing industries, not explicitly covered by Denison’s
adjustment, contributed to labor-quality growth.
For the post-war US economy the standard labor-quality series are based on the
seminal work by Jorgenson and Griliches.33 These authors combined hours worked for
various labor types into a constant quality index of labor input, using labor compen-
sation per hour as weights.34 Initially, the authors looked solely at the male workforce
broken down by the number of school years completed.35 Later work by Jorgenson et
al. extended this to include female workers and distinguish labor service categories
classified by age, sex, occupation, industry and educational attainment.36 They find
that labor quality rose quickly between 1948 and 1970 followed by a slowdown dur-
ing the 1970s and 1980s. This reflected the influx of younger workers and a tapering
oﬀ of the growth rate of educational attainment during the latter period.37
5.3 Methodology and data
As noted in section 5.1, I follow the approach advocated by Jorgenson et al. and mea-
sure labor quality as changes in the composition of the workforce.38 To construct an
index of labor input for each individual sector, I assume that labor input for sector
i (Li) can be expressed as a translog function of its individual components.39 I form
sectoral indices of labor input from data on employment by industry, cross-classified
by sex, age and education (Nil). Below I use the subscript l to represent all labor char-
acteristics listed in table 5.1, except for industry. Changes in the employment for each
component are weighted by average shares in sectoral labor compensation (vil).
32. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, 209–10.
33. Jorgenson and Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity Change.”
34. D. Jorgenson, “Accounting for Growth in the Information Age,” chap. 10 in Handbook of Economic
Growth, ed. P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, vol. 1A (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 782.
35. Jorgenson and Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity Change,” 269.
36. D. Jorgenson and B. Fraumeni, “The Accumulation of Human and Nonhuman Capital, 1948–1984,”
chap. 5 in The Measurement of Saving, Investment, and Wealth, ed. R. Lipsey and H. Tice, vol. 52, Studies in
Income and Wealth (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 227–282; D. Jorgenson, F. Gollop, and B.
Fraumeni, Productivity and US Economic Growth, 2nd ed. (New York: toExcel, 1999).
37. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence,” 12.
38. Jorgenson and Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity Change”; Jorgenson and Fraumeni, “The
Accumulation of Human and Nonhuman Capital”; Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni, Productivity and US
Economic Growth; Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resur-
gence.”
39. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni, Productivity and US Economic Growth, 92–3.
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Table 5.1: Characteristics of labor quality
Sex (s) Industry (continued)
(1) male (23) Apparel and related products
(2) female (24) Lumber and woods products
(25) Furniture and fixtures
Age (a) (26) Paper and allied products
(1) 16–17 years (27) Printing and publishing
(2) 18–24 years (28) Chemicals and allied products
(3) 25–34 years (29) Petroleum and coal products
(4) 35–44 years (30) Rubber products
(5) 45 years and over (31) Leather and leather products
(32) Stone, clay, and glass products
Education (e) (33) Primary metal products
(1) 1–4 years grade school (34) Fabricated metal products
(2) 5–8 years grade school (35) Machinery (except electrical)
(3) 1–4 years high school (36) Electrical machinery
(4) 1 or more years college (37) Transportation equipment
(38) Instruments and related products
Industry (i) (39) Miscellaneous manufactures
(A) Agriculture, forestry and fishing (E) Transportation, communication and utilities
(B) Mining (F) Wholesale trade
(C) Construction (G) Retail trade
(20) Food and kindred products (H) Finance, insurance and real estate
(21) Tobacco manufactures (I) Personal and professional services
(22) Textile mill products (J) Public administration
i
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The index of sectoral labor input for industry i is a translog quantity index of sec-
toral employment cross-classified by the components of l
lnLti   lnLt 1i =
X
l
vil

lnN til   lnN t 1il

(5.1)
In equation (5.1) weights are given by the average share of each component in the
value of sectoral labor compensation. These value shares are calculated on the basis
of sectoral employment and compensation per worker (pil), both classified by sex, age
and education
vil =
1
2

vtil + v
t 1
il

; (5.2)
and
vil =
pil NilP
l pil Nil
(5.3)
The sectoral index of labor input can also be expressed as the product of sectoral
employment (Ni) and an index of sectoral labor quality (Qi)
Lti =Q
t
i N ti (5.4)
where total sectoral employment is defined as the unweighted sum of its components
N ti =
X
l
N til (5.5)
Rearranging terms in equation (5.4), taking logs and substituting the index for
labor input by (5.1) provides a direct measure of the change in sectoral labor quality
between period t   1 and t
lnQti   lnQt 1i =
X
l
vil

lnN til   lnN t 1il

 

lnN ti   lnN t 1i

(5.6)
The index of labor quality thus reflects the diﬀerence between the growth rates of the
compensation-weighted index of labor input and sectoral employment.
The derivation of the total economy, or multi-sectoral (e.g. total manufacturing)
index of labor input is very similar to the method described above. The principle is
identical, but labor input is now cross-classified across industry as well as the original
i
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gender, age and education characteristics
lnLt   lnLt 1 =
X
i
X
l
vil

lnN til   lnN t 1il

(5.7)
The total economy labor quality index is then given by
lnQt   lnQt 1 =
X
i
X
l
vil

lnN til   lnN t 1il

 

lnN t   lnN t 1

(5.8)
The drawback of this approach is that it requires highly disaggregate data on em-
ployment and compensation, generally not available in the published census reports
or secondary sources for the early twentieth century. Fortunately, the Integrated Pub-
lic Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) has made samples from the decennial population
censuses publicly available, providing detailed records for nearly 10 million individu-
als between 1900 and 1950.40 I utilize the microdata from this source to construct my
measure of labor quality. As previously noted, the 1900–1930 censuses did not inquire
into either the educational attainment of the general population or the compensation
of workers and employees.41 The 1940 census was the first census of its kind to ask
about schooling, labor compensation and working hours to all citizens surveyed. In
the wake of the depression the 1940 population census dedicated a substantial part of
its inquiry into the issue of employment and productivity, making it an ideal starting
point for this study.
To overcome these data issues I follow a two-tiered approach to the labor quality
estimation. First, educational attainment is estimated at the micro level for the 1900,
1910, 1920 and 1930 census samples on the basis of the 1940 returns. I utilize a logistic
regression to categorize the individuals included in the early censuses into the four
educational categories shown in table 5.1. Second, I construct an employment matrix
that groups workers according to their (predicted) educational attainment, gender, age
and industry. In addition, I assemble a labor-compensation matrix on the basis of the
1940 census sample; again cross-classified by the characteristics listed in table 5.1. On
the basis of the translog quantity indices (5.6) and (5.8), I estimate labor quality at the
sectoral and total economy level. Before discussing themain results, a brief overview of
the basic methods behind the estimation of educational attainment and a description
of the main variables is given below.
40. Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
41. This lack of data on the average years of schooling prior to 1940 is also likely to have been the rea-
son why Kendrick chose to derive his labor quality on the basis of occupational characteristics instead of
educational attainment.
i
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Logistic regression
For the first stage of this study, I estimate the educational attainment for an individual
on the basis of his or her occupation, gender, age and place of residence. On the basis
of this approach I take both the long-run changes in the average years of schooling as
well as the eﬀects of changes in the occupational structure and the gender/age com-
position of the workforce into account. Using this procedure I estimated educational
attainment at the micro level, allowingme to subsequently use the Jorgenson approach
to study labor-quality change not just at the total economy level – as was the case for
the previous studies – but also for individual industries and sectors.
For the estimation of educational attainment I opted for a logistic regression. The
main advantage of this method is that it can cope with the limited number of responses
educational attainment assumes in my model, while its results are still relatively easy
to interpret.42 Running a basic OLS on a categorical response variable would surely
violate the standard assumptions of normality and homoscedasticity. In addition, pre-
dictions based on an OLS model are very likely to fall outside the feasible range of
responses for the educational attainment variable. A predicted value of say -1 or 5.5
when there are only four categories of education does not make any economic sense
and would be highly impractical in the second stage of the labor quality assessment.
For the logistic regression I predict the likelihood that an individual belongs to
a specific educational category. If just two categories were allowed (e.g. [1] primary
education only and [2] high school and above) I could estimate the probability that
an individual i belongs to the first category, i.e. P (Yi = 1). This probability should be
bounded by 0 and 1, continuous and nonlinear; conditions which are all met by a lo-
gistic, or logit transformation. In the logistic transformation, I first calculate the odds
ratio and then take natural logs. The odds ratio is expressed as the likelihood of an
occurrence (the individual belonging to a specific group) relative to the likelihood of
a nonoccurrence (the individual not belonging to this group). Following this transfor-
mation I then assume a linear relationship between the logit dependent variable and
the independent variables
logit[P (Yi = 1)] = ln
"
P (Yi = 1)
P (Yi , 1)
#
=  + Xi (5.9)
As illustrated above, I actually include four educational categories in mymodel. Given
the ordered nature of my response variable, I can use a similar principle to estimate
the cumulative probability instead. The cumulative probability for the first category
42. P. McCullagh and J. Nelder, Generalized Linear Models, 2nd ed., Monographs on Statistics and Applied
Probability 37 (London: Chapman / Hall, 1989).
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would simply be P (Yi = 1), while the cumulative probability for the second response
category is P (Y  2) which is equal to the sum of P (Yi = 1) and P (Yi = 2). The cumu-
lative probability for the third category is P (Y  3), but the fourth and last response
category is 1 by definition. Since all individuals that are not part of either the first,
second or third category will be part of the fourth category, I can thus exclude this last
category from the model.43 In the final model, the cumulative probabilities require
both a category-specific j as well as a separate intercept j ; see equation (5.10).
logit[P (Yi  j)] = ln
"
P (Yi  j)
P (Yi > j)
#
= j + jXi ; j = 1;2;3 (5.10)
Census samples and variables
For the estimation of the logistic regression model I rely exclusively on the 1940 1-
percent sample included in the IPUMS data-set. This sample is limited to include only
those citizens aged 16 years and above, leaving approximately 975,000 observations
for the regression. The data set includes a measure of the highest year of schooling
or degree completed. As illustrated in table 5.1, I reclassify this variable to encompass
four distinct educational attainment classes: [1] 1–4 years of grade school, [2] 5–8 years
of grade school, [3] 1–4 years of high school (grades 9–12) and [4] 1 or more years of
college/university.44 This categorizations means an individual included in the third
educational class has thus completed at least one year of high school while not having
completed a full year in college or university. I opted for this condensed classification,
as it still allows me to specifically study Goldin and Katz’ ‘high school revolution’ and
its impact on US productivity growth while, at the same time, limiting the number of
response categories for the regression.
Following the literature on US labor quality, I mark four variables as important
predictors of educational attainment, namely: occupation, birth cohort, gender and
region. The relation of occupation to educational attainment is illustrated in table 5.2.
Here the eleven main occupational groups and their distribution among the three ed-
ucational classes are depicted.45 Table 5.2 shows that the probability of a professional
(e.g. engineers, economists) having attended high school was substantially greater
than was the case for the average laborer.46 Similarly, the percentage of operatives
43. Below I generally report the probability an individual belongs to a specific response category instead
of the cumulative probability. The category specific probability for j can easily be derived as the diﬀerence
between the cumulative probability for category j and j   1: P (Yi = j) = P (Yi  j)  P (Yi  j   1).
44. Note that if the individual only attended nursery school or did not attend school at all he/she is in-
cluded in the first group: 1–4 years of grade school. See IPUMS variable EDUC for further details; Ruggles
et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
45. See IPUMS variable OCC1950 for further details; ibid.
46. Goldin and Katz show similar figures for the Iowa state census in 1915, confirming the findings in
table 5.2 for an earlier year; see, Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 170.
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Table 5.2: Educational attainment and occupation (1940)a
% that attended high school
aged aged aged aged aged
id occupation 16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
1 professional, technical 95 90 86 82 82
2 farmers (owners and managers) 32 22 17 13 12
3 managers, oﬃcials, and proprietors 79 64 50 43 39
4 clerical staﬀ 83 69 60 51 48
5 sales workers 82 68 59 48 45
6 craftsmen 56 36 26 22 18
7 operatives 43 29 22 19 16
8 service workers (household) 46 25 16 14 13
9 service workers (other) 30 19 16 17 7
10 laborers 52 32 22 18 16
11 unemployed/retired 27 14 10 8 8
a The results above are taken from the 1940 US Census of Population and are for men only. See
main text for further details.
(e.g. spinners, apprentices) that have either attended or finished high school is over
twice as low compared to the average for clerical staﬀ (e.g. cashiers, telephone oper-
ators). Table 5.2 also shows that educational attainment decreases with age, or more
specifically birth cohort. Nonetheless, the ranking of high school attendance between
the occupations remains fairly stable; particularly the professional, managing, clerical
and sales positions prove to be high-skill occupations, regardless of the age of the in-
dividual. Although the data in table 5.2 relates exclusively to men, the rank order of
the diﬀerent occupations is robust against both changes in gender as well as the state
of residence.
The importance of gender and year of birth is illustrated by Goldin and Katz.47
As discussed in the introduction, they observe a rapid increase in the average years of
schooling throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Each successive
cohort spent a substantially greater number of years in school compared to the pre-
vious generation; between 1876 and 1951 the average years of schooling rose by 0.82
years per decade. As noted above, this trend is also reflected in table 5.2, which shows
a clear upward trend in high-school attendance for individuals in occupations born in
the later cohorts.
In addition, Goldin and Katz show that women generally attended school for longer
than men did throughout most of the early twentieth century. This was, they claim, “in
large part because they attended and graduated from high school to a greater degree
47. ibid., 18–22.
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[while] attending college at about the same rate as did men.”48 The gender variable
was taken directly from the IPUMS data-set while the year of birth was rounded oﬀ
to the nearest decade. The relative distance in decades to 1930 was then taken as the
birth cohort measure.49
Lastly, Goldin and Katz note the regional diﬀerences in educational attainment.
They point to widespread diﬀerences in state support and show that the rise in both
high school graduation rates as well as college enrollment rates for states in the North
and West of the country were considerably more impressive than for the rest of the
nation.50 I incorporate a variable in my model that diﬀerentiates between the four
main regions of the country: (1) the South, (2) the Midwest, (3) the West, and (4) the
Northeast.51
In the second stage of this study I again rely on the 1940 sample to estimate rel-
ative compensation per labor category. Here I limit the sample to include only those
citizens between the ages of 16 and 84 having worked at least 48 weeks in the pre-
vious year and earning an income greater than 0.52 Overall, I am left with well over
210,000 individual observations for the labor-compensation matrix. These individuals
are allocated to the cells of the matrix cross-classified by gender, age, education and
industry as summarized in table 5.1. Compensation is reported in the census as the
respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary income for the previous year, expressed
in current dollars.53 To obtain total personal income, which also includes non-wage
income, I multiplied the 1940 compensation figures by the ratio between wage and
salary income and total personal income taken from the 1950 census returns.54 Non-
wage income generally represented only a small part of total personal income in my
sample, with the notable exception of the agricultural sector.
For the construction of the employment matrix I use the IPUMS 1-percent census
samples for the decades between 1900 and 1950. To estimate educational attainment
I include the occupation, birth cohort, gender and region variables discussed earlier,
supplemented by data on the age of the individual and industry in which he/she is
engaged.55 The employment sample is limited to include only those citizens between
the ages of 16 and 84, who are engaged in one of the sectors listed in table 5.1. For the
48. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 19.
49. An individual born in 1901 would thus be assigned a value of 3 as birth cohort, regardless whether I
observe this individual in the 1920 or 1950 census. For details on gender and age see the IPUMS variables
SEX and AGE respectively; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
50. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 201–8, 271–7.
51. See IPUMS variable REGION for further details; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series.
52. C. Goldin and L. Katz, “The Returns to Skill in the United States Across the Twentieth Century,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 7126 (1999): 1–49.
53. See IPUMS variable INCWAGE for further details; Ruggles et al., Integrated Public UseMicrodata Series.
54. See IPUMS variable INCTOT for further details; ibid.
55. See IPUMS variable IND1950 for further details; ibid.
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employment-matrix my data-set includes 3,135,000 individual observations. The sam-
ples for the logistic regression, the compensation matrix and the employment matrix
are all weighted by the IPUMS ‘person weight’ variable.56
5.4 Results
In this section I discuss the main results from the labor quality estimation. As a first
step I estimate educational attainment on the basis of a logistic regression. The re-
sults from this regression and a detailed discussion of various specifications of the
model are left to appendix 5.A. On the basis of the logistic regression, I confirm the
findings by Goldin and Katz that great leaps were made during the early twentieth
century toward mass secondary schooling. I also establish that the greatest gains for
college attendance occurred only later in the century. In addition, I observe significant
regional diﬀerences in educational attainment. After correcting for occupation, region
and birth cohort the regression reveals a slightly increased probability for women to
have attended high school. Reversely, the probability for them to have also attended
college was lower.
On the basis of the model described in appendix 5.A and the microdata from the
IPUMS database I can predict the educational attainment for all individuals in the US
workforce for the census years between 1900 and 1930. In addition, the census figures
allow me to map the changes in gender composition and experience over the first half
of the twentieth century. Below, I present the labor composition figures for the entire
US workforce, which will form the basis for my labor quality index presented at the
end of this section.
Labor composition
Figure 5.2 depicts the predicted results for the pre-1940 census years, as well as the
observed values of educational attainment for 1940 and 1950. The figures are pre-
sented at the total economy level, separately for both men and women. The results
reveal a remarkable increase in the share of employees and workers that attended ei-
ther secondary or tertiary education. My estimates show that in 1900 approximately
80 percent of the male workforce had not received an education beyond grade school,
whereas only a little over 6 percent had attended college. By 1950 the primary edu-
cation group had almost halved to just over 40 percent, while the tertiary education
group had expanded to 16 percent. The high school category experienced the most
dramatic expansion, however. For men it rose from approximately 12 percent in 1900
56. See IPUMS variable P ERWT for further details; ibid.
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Figure 5.2: Educational attainment of the workforce (1900–1950)a
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a The figures for 1900–1930 are estimated on the basis of the logistic regression discussed
in appendix 5.A.
to 40 percent in 1950. For women this category had already expanded to 45 percent
by 1940, up from 16 percent in 1900.
The right panel of figure 5.2 shows that throughout this period woman workers
not only experienced an equally impressive rise in educational attainment, they were,
on average, also slightly better educated than their male counterparts. Besides the
fact that women attended school for longer than most men did, those that chose to
participate on the labor market were also better educated than the women that stayed
at home.57 Women were primarily employed as household service workers and, from
1920 onwards, in clerical occupations (typists, secretaries, etc.). Generally, the clerical
professions attracted women with an above average level of educational attainment.
The majority of men, on the other hand, were still engaged as either laborer, operator
or farmer prior to the Second World War.
Figure 5.3 reports the age of the total labor force, again for men and women sepa-
rately. Although the evolution of the average age of the US workforce – which serves
as a proxy for the overall experience – was naturally not as dramatic as was the case
for educational attainment, figure 5.3 still demonstrates a steady increase during the
period 1900–1950. For male workers, the outermost category (45 years and over) ex-
57. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 19.
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Figure 5.3: Age of the workforce (1900–1950)
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panded from approximately 30 percent of the labor force during the start of the period
to 40 percent in 1950. The trend for female workers was more pronounced as, partic-
ularly following the Second World War, they continued to work at higher ages. This
is most evident from the change in the innermost experience category (16–24 years)
which contracted from approximately 45 percent in 1900 to 20 percent in 1950.
The increased willingness of women to continue to work, even after marriage, and
the growing demand for female employees particularly in the clerical occupations ul-
timately resulted in a steadily rising share of women in the workforce. In 1900 ap-
proximately 18 percent of workers was female, which rose to 24 percent in 1940 and
increased even further after the war to roughly 30 percent. Even though the rising
share of women accelerated the growth of the educational attainment level of the la-
bor force, overall it tended to depress the growth of labor quality, as I will show in
section 5.5 below.
1940 labor compensation
The various labor categories, as distinguished by gender, educational attainment and
experience, described in the previous section, can be combined into a constant quality
index of labor. As illustrated in section 5.3, I aggregate these groups using 1940 labor-
compensation weights. The full labor-compensation matrix – which distinguishes be-
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Table 5.3: Labor compensation, total economy ($, 1940)a
age
sex education 16–17 18–24 25–34 35–44 45+
male 1–4 years grade school 203 381 647 911 991
male 5–8 years grade school 341 661 1,138 1,458 1,482
male 1–4 years high school 472 891 1,423 1,843 1,952
male 1 or more years college . . . 1,333 2,115 2,733 2,825
female 1–4 years grade school 157 247 371 469 505
female 5–8 years grade school 236 435 641 751 761
female 1–4 years high school 328 591 847 1,015 1,024
female 1 or more years college . . . 816 1,172 1,431 1,503
a Labor compensation is based on the 1940 IPUMS ‘wage and salary income’
(INCWAGE) adjusted to ‘total personal income’ (INCTOT) on the basis of figures on
non-wage income from the 1950 census returns. For the full industry decomposition
of labor compensation see appendix 5.B.
Source: S. Ruggles et al., Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, 5.0 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota, 2010).
tween gender, age, education and industry – is shown in appendix 5.B, but table 5.3
presents an excerpt of the labor compensation figures for the total economy.
The wage structures in 1940 was characterized by large inequality.58 The figures
in table 5.9 demonstrate that men earned consistently more than women for all labor
categories, ranging from about 30 percent for the youngest workers to 100 percent for
the older and more skilled workers. The wage gap between the secondary and upper-
primary education class ranged from about 25 to 40 percent, while the college/high-
school gap lay between 45 and 65 percent. Overall an experienced, college educated,
male employee could earn up to 11 times the wage of a 18–24 year old women with 4
or less years of grade school.
Ideally, I would like to allow the weights for my labor quality index to vary over
time, reflecting potential changes in relative compensation between the labor cate-
gories. Unfortunately, the censuses prior to 1940 did not inquire into either wages nor
earnings, impeding the accurate measurement of labor compensation for these earlier
decades. However, Goldin and Katz demonstrate that the wage structure observed in
1940 was fairly typical for the prewar period.59 Although, on the basis of scattered ev-
idence on wages from various sources they observe a gradual compression of the wage
distribution for production workers between 1890 and 1940, Goldin and Katz con-
clude that the gap in the skilled/unskilled wage level for 1920 was virtually identical
58. See also, Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 44–88.
59. ibid., 53–7.
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Table 5.4: Labor quality index, main sectors (1900=100)
sector 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 ln%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 100 101 110 113 119 130 25.9
Mining 100 101 105 111 116 125 22.0
Construction 100 98 104 105 105 114 13.0
Manufacturing 100 102 110 115 119 129 25.8
Transportation, comm. and utilities 100 99 103 109 118 118 16.9
Wholesale trade 100 96 97 99 100 102 2.0
Retail trade 100 98 101 103 103 104 4.2
Finance, insurance and real estate 100 92 89 90 95 92 -8.0
Personal and professional services 100 100 111 115 120 130 26.2
Public administration 100 99 93 103 102 95 -5.1
Total economy 100 107 118 125 131 143 35.8
Source: see text.
in comparison to 1940.60 On the basis of this evidence I feel confident using solely the
1940 compensation figures as weights for the construction of my labor quality index.
Labor quality
Joining the labor composition data with the labor-compensation figures presented in
the previous paragraph yields my final labor-quality indices. As discussed in section
5.3, labor quality is defined as labor input per worker and represents changes in the
composition of the workforce.61 Table 5.4 displays the figures for the entire American
labor force between 1900 and 1950, in addition to more detailed statistics for the main
economic sectors. At the total economy level, labor quality exhibited a steady increase
for the entire period. The average growth between 1900 and 1950 was approximately
0.72 percent per annum, primarily reflecting the rapid rise in the share of the work-
force that attended either high school or college.
Table 5.4 also illustrates that there were substantial diﬀerences in the growth rates
of labor quality between the major economic sectors. Primarily within the service sec-
tor I observe notable variations in the development of labor quality. The transporta-
tion, communication and utilities as well as the personal and professional services
exhibited strong growth. The finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) and public ad-
ministration sectors on the other hand exhibited a decline in labor quality, albeit a slow
one. Employment in the government branch increased rapidly during the first half of
the twentieth century; a small, generally highly educated labor force in 1900 expanded
60. ibid., 55, 59–63.
61. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh, “A Retrospective Look at the U.S. Productivity Growth Resurgence,” 8.
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quickly and, following the wars, was supplemented with a younger, less experienced
cohort. In addition, the share of women in this sector grew rapidly, particularly dur-
ing the 1930s and 1940s. Section 5.5 below will discuss the contribution of experience,
gender and educational attainment to labor-quality change in further detail.
To illustrate the level diﬀerences in labor quality between the sectors of the econ-
omy, I can utilize an approach very similar to the one described in section 5.3. Instead
of measuring the structural change of employment in each of the labor categories over
time, I analyze the diﬀerence in the employment structure between sector i and a base,
or reference sector b. The subscript l is again used to represent all labor characteris-
tics listed in table 5.1, except for industry. The log diﬀerence in employment for each
component is now weighted by the average shares in sectoral labor compensation for
both sectors i and b
lnQti   lnQtb =
X
l
vtl

lnN til   lnN tbl

 

lnN ti   lnN tb

(5.11)
where
vtl =
1
2

vtil + v
t
bl

(5.12)
In table 5.5 I show the labor quality levels for the first and last years in my sample,
with the total economy as the reference sector. Levels for the intermediary decades are
shown separately in appendix 5.D. The comparison confirms the high level of labor
quality in public administration around 1900 and the subsequent decline (relative to
the total economy) during the first half of the twentieth century. This relative decline is
also evident for most of the other sectors with high initial levels of labor quality. Over-
all, for the period between 1900 and 1950, the US experienced a gradual contraction
of the skill-gap between its major economic sectors.
The agricultural, mining and manufacturing sectors benefited most from the nar-
rowing of the gap in sectoral labor quality. The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector
– traditionally a low-skill sector, as shown in table 5.5 – witnessed a steady improve-
ment in the composition of its labor force. Although this was the only major sector
to experience an absolute decline in labor numbers, the outflow of workers consisted
primarily of young, lesser educated laborers. This ultimately led to a modest improve-
ment of the agricultural sector’s labor quality level. As shown in table 5.4, growth in
labor quality for the mining and manufacturing sectors was also quite fast compared
to the sectoral average. This primarily reflected the ability of these sectors to attract
more experienced and skilled labor than any of the other sectors, as I will show next.
i
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Table 5.5: Labor quality levels, main sectors (total econ-
omy=100)
sector 1900 1950
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 90 93
Mining 98 103
Construction 110 101
Manufacturing 96 99
Transportation, comm. and utilities 105 105
Wholesale trade 130 109
Retail trade 113 96
Finance, insurance and real estate 132 104
Personal and professional services 93 96
Public administration 125 102
Total economy 100 100
Source: see text.
5.5 Decomposition and long-run trends
In this section I will elaborate on the results of the previous section and discuss their
relevance in relation to the ongoing human capital debate. First, I will compare my
new estimates to the figures by Kendrick and Denison. Here I conclude that Kendrick’s
index of labor quality is incompatible with evidence on the increase in the average
years of schooling (as outlined by Goldin and Katz) and that my own figures appear
to provide a much better fit in this respect. Next, I decompose the labor quality in-
dex to assess the direct impact of education, the change in gender composition, age
and shifts in the industrial structure. I conclude that the educational reforms of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century as well as structural shifts were the main
source of the continuous quality growth of the American workforce. All sectors shared
in the improvements resulting from the educational reforms, even though the impact
of this and the other labor characteristics on labor input diﬀered widely between them.
Lastly, I link my estimates to the post-war figures by Jorgenson et al. and discuss the
long-run development of labor quality. Again, education plays a pivotal role, both in
the development of labor input as well as aggregate production.
Labor quality in perspective
When comparing the new figures to the original labor quality index by Kendrick we
can observe substantial diﬀerences in the estimated trend over the course of the early
i
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Figure 5.4: Labor quality, new estimates (1890–1960)
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Source: J. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in the United States (Princeton: National Bureau
Economic Research, 1961), 328–9; This study, see table 5.4.
twentieth century.62 Figure 5.4 plots Kendrick’s national economy numbers against my
total economy figures listed in table 5.4. Kendrick’s figures report a markedly diﬀerent
rate of advance for particularly the interwar and the SecondWorldWar years. My labor
quality index suggest a steady rate of growth of approximately 0.7 percent per year
between 1900 to 1950. Kendrick estimated a constant increase of roughly 0.5 percent
before 1920, little to no growth between 1920 and 1940 and a very rapid increase
during the war years.
As previously noted, Kendrick’s labor quality index does not accord well with the
observed continuous increase in the average years of schooling.63 Particularly the stag-
nation of labor quality during the 1920s and 1930s is not reflected in the development
of the rate of school attendance over course of the early twentieth century and would
suggest a structural divide between the educational attainment of the workforce and
the population as a whole. The new estimates provide no evidence for such a division.
Instead, I observe an almost uninterrupted increase in labor quality throughout the
entire interwar period for the agricultural, industrial and some service sectors. Pro-
ductivity studies relying on Kendrick’s labor input figures – Field’s work on American
inter-war productivity and technological change for instance – are thus bound to over-
62. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States, 265–8, 328–30.
63. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 20.
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state the growth unaccounted for by factor inputs (i.e. TFP) by quite a margin.64
The pre-war labor quality estimates by Denison compare more favorably to my
own.65 Following Gordon, I amended Denison’s estimates to exclude the arbitrary ad-
justment for ability and only took the increasing school years per person into account
(thus ignoring the impact of increasing school days per year).66 The resulting figures
project a growth of labor quality of 0.6 percent per year for the 1913–1928 period and
0.5 percent annually between 1928 and 1950.67
Education, gender and experience
To fully assess the role played by education – both for the development of labor in-
put as well as aggregate production – I can decompose the labor quality index into
its underlying constituents. Ho and Jorgenson suggest a breakdown of the index on
the basis of its distinctive characteristics.68 They propose the construction of partial
indices of labor input in which only a subset of the characteristics is incorporated. To
construct such a partial index, I sum the number of workers and the corresponding
value shares over some of the characteristics and construct a translog index over the
remaining characteristics.69
Previously, I used a single subscript (l) to represent the categories of labor input
cross-classified by all characteristics except for industry. Below I use a separate sub-
script for each of the individual characteristics: two sexes, represented by the subscript
s; five age-groups, represented by a; four educational classes, represented by e; and
twenty-nine industries, still represented by i. The partial labor input index for gender
is then given by
lnLts   lnLt 1s =
X
s
vs
0BBBBB@lnX
a
X
e
X
i
N tisae   ln
X
a
X
e
X
i
N t 1isae
1CCCCCA (5.13)
Equation (5.13) is based on equation (5.7), the basic labor input equation intro-
duced in section 5.3. However, now the compensation shares vs solely distinguish be-
tween the two gender categories and is multiplied by the log change of male and fe-
male workers respectively. The resulting partial labor input index only reflects changes
in the relative share of men and women in the workforce and ignores the eﬀects of the
64. Field, “The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century”; Field, “Technological Change
and US Productivity Growth.”
65. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States; Denison, Trends in American Economic
Growth.
66. Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One Big Wave?,” 124.
67. Gordon, “Interpreting the One Big Wave in US Long-Term Productivity Growth.”
68. M. Ho and D. Jorgenson, “The Quality of the U.S. Work Force, 1948–95,” Harvard University Unpub-
lished Working Paper 1 (1999): 12.
69. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni, Productivity and US Economic Growth, 269.
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Table 5.6: Labor-quality growth decomposition, main sectors (ln%, 1900–
1950)a
characteristics
sector total e a s i resid.
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 25.9 17.0 8.4 -0.6 . . . 1.2
Mining 22.0 11.5 7.7 -0.9 . . . 3.7
Construction 13.0 8.6 2.5 -0.7 . . . 2.5
Manufacturing 25.8 10.9 12.4 -5.9 7.8 0.6
Transportation, comm. and utilities 16.9 7.3 8.9 -6.0 . . . 6.6
Wholesale trade 2.0 5.4 0.6 -9.3 . . . 5.3
Retail trade 4.2 4.4 7.7 -12.5 . . . 4.6
Finance, insurance and real estate -8.0 6.0 -5.4 -17.5 . . . 8.9
Personal and professional services 26.2 15.5 13.7 3.9 . . . -6.9
Public administration -5.1 6.1 -10.5 -4.2 . . . 3.4
Total economy 35.8 17.6 7.7 -6.4 20.4 -3.4
a May not sum to total due to rounding. The full growth decomposition, including the
second, third and fourth order eﬀects, is listed in appendix 5.C.
Source: see text.
other characteristics. As before, labor-quality growth can still be derived as the diﬀer-
ence between the growth rates of the compensation-weighted, partial index of labor
input and employment.
Partial indices for all four characteristics can be computed, which are referred to
as first-order indices. In addition to these first-order indices, second-order indices of
labor input can also be defined. These depend on any two characteristics of labor in-
put, by adding employment and the corresponding value shares over other charac-
teristics and again constructing a translog index.70 Similarly, I can define third- and
fourth-order indices. There are six second-order indices, four third-order indices and
one fourth-order index. The fourth-order index reflects compositional shifts among all
characteristics, as in equation (5.7).
The last row in table 5.6 reports the results from the decomposition of labor-quality
growth for the entire American labor force. The first column in this table displays
the log growth over the entire period, while the next columns report the partial, first
order indices for education (e), age (a), sex (s) and industry (i) respectively. The final
column reports the sum of the residual, second-, third- and fourth-order eﬀects. The
full decomposition, including the higher-order indices, is given in appendix 5.C.
Table 5.6 shows that the growth of labor quality, at the total economy level, ap-
peared to be driven primarily by the change in educational attainment and shifts in
70. Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni, Productivity and US Economic Growth, 270.
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the industrial structure. The contribution of education was positive for all decades and
showed a clear rising trend over time, reflecting the findings by Goldin and Katz.71 The
relocation of labor from low-skill/low-productive sectors (e.g. agriculture) to high-
skill sectors (e.g. trade and FIRE), reflected an improvement in the utilization of the
workforce, greatly raising the potential output per worker. To a lesser extent, the grad-
ual rise in the experience level of the Americanworkforce, as illustrated by the increase
in the average age shown in figure 5.3, also positively contributed to labor-quality
growth.
The shift in employment between main economic sectors was quite pronounced.72
In 1900 the agricultural sector employed approximately 40 percent of the total work-
force; the industrial and service sector accounted for 23 and 37 percent of employment
respectively. By 1950 the share of agriculture in total employment had decreased to
just over 10 percent. The service sector, on the other hand, had expanded its share
to 58 percent, while the industrial sector engaged 31 percent of the workforce. As
shown in appendix 5.B, labor compensation in the agricultural sector was well below
average when compensated for diﬀerences in gender, education and age. In contrast,
the average earnings in the service sectors were considerably higher, which suggests a
greater marginal productivity of a service-employee with the same characteristics as
a farm-worker. The shift of employment out of agriculture thus greatly added to the
productivity potential of the total American workforce – contrary to the claim in this
respect by Denison.73
In contrast, the rising share of women in the labor force tended to depress the
growth of labor quality. Particularly the period between 1940 and 1950 – as a result of
the war eﬀort – observed a marked increased in the number of female workers. This,
according to my estimates, reduced labor-quality growth by almost 3.3 percent in the
course of the 1940s. It should be noted, however, that the negative contribution of
the change in the gender composition follows from my assumption that the relative
wage for a particular labor category reflects its relative contribution to labor input. As
shown in appendix 5.B, women earned consistently less than men, which I thus as-
sume indicates that their marginal productivity also fell short of that of male workers.
The wage gap may overstate the actual diﬀerences, however, as social factors are likely
to have played a role during wage negotiations, detrimentally aﬀecting female work-
ers’ wages. Still, data from the second half of the twentieth century reveals that, even
though women did gain on men, the wage diﬀerential always favored male employees.
the observed wage gap may thus reflect genuine diﬀerences between men and women
71. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology.
72. Broadberry, “How Did the United States and Germany Overtake Britain?,” 385.
73. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, 209–10.
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in physical characteristics, shorter hours worked by women and reduced experience
for female employees (e.g. resulting from time taken oﬀ for child-rearing). Arguably,
the numbers presented in table 5.6 thus provide a lower bound for the contribution of
changes in the gender composition. The resulting labor quality index should therefore
also be interpreted as a conservative estimate.74 As illustrated in section 5.4, the rising
share of women in the workforce did accelerate the growth of the overall educational
attainment level however, which may explain the relatively high contribution of the
education characteristic for the last decade in my sample.
In addition to the total economy figures, table 5.6 also presents the decomposition
for the main sectors of the American economy between 1900 and 1950. Note that for
all sectors except manufacturing the contribution of the industry characteristic is zero,
as these sectors represent the lowest level of aggregation in my data-set, preventing
any role for structural change. Again I observe that (1) educational attainment was the
greatest contributor to labor-quality growth for almost all sectors, (2) the growth in the
partial index for age was nearly always positive (except for public administration and
FIRE), and (3) the change in gender composition always reduced labor-quality growth
(except for personal and professional services). Nonetheless, particularly for the gen-
der and age characteristics there were large inter-sectoral diﬀerences. Especially the
service sectors attracted a substantial amount of female labor, while the manufactur-
ing sector experienced themost rapid rise in the combined experience level of its work-
force.
Overall, the decomposition exercise discussed above provides a useful assessment
of the sources behind the labor-quality growth. I confirm Denison’s finding for the to-
tal economy that the educational reforms of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century were a major source for the continuous quality improvements of the Amer-
ican workforce.75 More in line with Kendrick, I also uncover a significant eﬀect of
structural change on the growth in total-economy labor quality.76 Whereas Denison
attributed a mere 0.02 percentage point annually to the reallocation of labor between
sectors between 1909 and 1957, I estimate an annual contribution of 0.27 percent be-
tween 1900 and 1950.77 All sectors shared in the improvements in educational attain-
ment, although the impact of this and the other labor characteristics on labor input
diﬀered substantially between them. These findings all strengthen the recent narrative
by Goldin and Katz who typify the twentieth century as the ‘human capital century.’78
74. For further details on wage inequality in the US see, Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and
Technology, 50 and Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States.
75. ibid., 265.
76. Kendrick, Productivity trends in the United States.
77. Denison, The Sources of Economic Growth in the United States, 209–10.
78. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology.
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Figure 5.5: Labor quality, long-run estimates (1900–1990)a
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a My figures for 1900–1950 were linked to the 1948–1990 figures by Jorgenson et al.
Source:M. Ho and D. Jorgenson, “The Quality of the U.S. Work Force, 1948–95,” Harvard
University Unpublished Working Paper 1 (1999): 26; D. Jorgenson and B. Fraumeni, “Investment
in Education and U.S. Economic Growth,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94 (1992):
S51–S70; This study, see table 5.4.
Long-run trends
Figure 5.5 displays the long-run development of American labor quality for the period
between 1900 and 1990. I link my estimates to the post-war figures by Jorgenson et al.,
who apply a method compatible with the one used throughout this study.79
Following the Second World War, we can observe an acceleration in the growth of
labor quality. For this period, Jorgenson and Fraumeni again stress the role of educa-
tion, both for the development of labor input as well as aggregate production.80 Be-
tween 1948 and 1969, labor quality contributed approximately 0.9 percentage points
to overall productivity growth. However, the role played by labor quality lessened
substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. Growth of the quality index decreased to just
0.3 percent per year, well below the trend observed in the pre- and post-war period.81
The decline in labor-quality growth mirrored the slowdown of educational attainment
observed primarily for Americans born between 1950 and 1975.82 The latter again
underscores the importance of labor quality and human capital accumulation in the
79. Ho and Jorgenson, “The Quality of the U.S. Work Force,” 26; D. Jorgenson and B. Fraumeni, “Invest-
ment in Education and U.S. Economic Growth,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 94 (1992): S51–S70.
80. Jorgenson and Fraumeni, “Investment in Education and U.S. Economic Growth,” S61.
81. ibid., S63.
82. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 22.
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Table 5.7: Labor-quality growth decomposition, manufacturing industries
(ln%, 1900–1950)a
characteristics
sic sector total e a s i resid.
23 Apparel and related products 11.7 5.7 22.3 -15.9 . . . -0.4
31 Leather and leather products 0.1 4.9 4.2 -15.8 . . . 6.9
25 Furniture and fixtures 9.6 7.6 2.7 -5.5 . . . 4.8
26 Paper and allied products 29.8 9.9 17.0 3.2 . . . -0.2
28 Chemicals and allied products 23.3 14.5 9.1 -4.7 . . . 4.3
29 Petroleum and coal products 26.4 14.6 9.5 -4.3 . . . 6.6
36 Electrical machinery 24.9 8.4 22.7 -9.3 . . . 3.1
37 Transportation equipment 12.0 8.8 2.9 -4.9 . . . 5.2
D Manufacturing 25.8 10.9 12.4 -5.9 7.8 0.6
a May not sum to total due to rounding. The full growth decomposition, including the
second, third and fourth order eﬀects, is listed in appendix 5.C.
Source: see text.
American productivity debate. The figures presented in this study are the first attempt
I know of to provide a consistent measure of labor quality all the way back to the start
of the century. This will allow researchers to further study the contribution of educa-
tional reform and overall changes in labor composition from a long-run perspective.
Manufacturing
As illustrated in table 5.4, manufacturing was one of the sectors with the fastest rate
of labor-quality growth throughout the early twentieth century. The detailed industry
data in the IPUMS data-set allowed me to further disaggregate labor quality for the
manufacturing sector, the results of which are shown in table 5.7. This table contains
only a selection of the manufacturing industries, the full list of industries is provided
in appendix 5.C.
The detailed figures for manufacturing in the first column reveal similarly large
inter-industry diﬀerences of labor-quality growth as those observed for the major sec-
tors in table 5.4. Whereas, for example, labor quality in the furniture and fixture and
leather industries progressed only slowly, the paper, petroleum and electrical machin-
ery industries exhibited very rapid growth. The decomposition of labor-quality growth
on the basis of gender, education and experience in table 5.7 sheds further light on the
sources behind these diverging trends.
On the basis of this decomposition, I again conclude that the change in educational
attainment was the main driver behind the growth of labor quality for most manu-
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facturing industries. In contrast to the sectoral decomposition, however, I do observe
substantially greater deviations in the relative contributions of gender, experience and
even education across industries. In some cases the changes in the share of women
engaged or shifts in the average age of the employees even eclipsed growth of labor
quality as a result of educational change.
The slow growth of labor quality for the leather and apparel trades, and also the
tobacco industry, was primarily the result of the rapidly rising share of women work-
ing in these industries. This development is clearly illustrated by the large negative
contributions of gender in the decomposition for these industries. The ratio of female
to male workers in the apparel industries, for instance, grew from approximately 1:1
in 1900 to 3:1 in 1950. The leather industries showed an equally impressive transfor-
mation; in 1900 just 14 percent of the workers were women, which expanded to over
40 percent in 1950. Even though other industries initially employed similar shares of
female workers (e.g. textile mill products), I do not observe a comparable increase in
the share of female workers over time. The apparel, leather and tobacco industries
thus stand out as the above results appear to suggest that the production in these in-
dustries – by way of their use of capital or technology – has changed significantly over
the course of the early twentieth century, making it more suitable to female labor.
This development can be illustrated on the basis of the decomposition introduced
in section 5.4. Appendix 5.D list the results from the level decomposition for the man-
ufacturing industries, with total manufacturing as the reference sector. To directly
measure the contribution of, for instance, gender to inter-sectoral level diﬀerences, I
can extend the level decomposition in equation (5.11) to include partial labor input
indices that only reflect changes in the relative share of men and women in the work-
force and ignore the eﬀects of the other characteristics; in line with equation (5.13).
Appendix 5.D also lists the resulting first-order indices for education, age and sex for
all manufacturing industries.
The greatest gains from education were achieved within the chemicals and
petroleum industries. Compared to the leather products industries, the diﬀerence in
the rate of change in educational attainment for the petroleum industries alone is re-
sponsible for a gain in labor-quality growth of almost 10 percentage points. Together
with printing and publishing, the petroleum industries engaged the greatest share of
college educated employees at both the start of the century and in 1950 (approximately
25 percent in 1950). In contrast, for the same year, the share of tertiary educated em-
ployees was only 5 percent for the textile, apparel and leather industries. Generally, I
observe that industries that employed a relatively large share of secondary and tertiary
educated workers in 1900 maintained this advantage throughout the entire period of
study. This is also reflected in the level decomposition shown in appendix 5.D. The
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partial index for education for the petroleum industry yields a level of 108 in 1950,
whereas this index for textiles, apparel and leather lies between 94 and 95 for this year.
The importance of the last component, age, is particularly evident for the trans-
portation equipment industry. This industry stood out at the start of the twentieth
century as a result of its older and highly experienced labor force. In conjunction with
a low share of female laborers and about average educational attainment, the trans-
portation equipment sector had the highest level of labor quality compared to the
other manufacturing industries in 1900 (see appendix 5.D). Given this high initial
level of labor quality, the scope for improvements by way of attracting more expe-
rienced labor was limited, as illustrated by the low contribution of the experience
characteristic for this industry in table 5.7. Since the contribution of the other two
characteristics to labor-quality growth (education and gender) was comparable to the
manufacturing average, the other industries began to slowly converge on the trans-
portation equipment sector in terms of labor quality levels. Eventually, around 1930,
it definitively lost its lead to the petroleum and machinery producing industries.
The development of labor composition, or lack thereof, for the transportation
equipment industry as a whole is nicely summarized by the experience of the automo-
bile industry. Prior to the introduction of Ford’s assembly line in 1913, the fabrication
of automobiles was a highly skilled job which was generally performed by a num-
ber of all-round mechanics. As noted by Goldin and Katz however, over the course
of the early twentieth century “technological advances then led to standardized and
completely interchangeable parts that were assembled in factories [. . . ] by scores of
less-skilled workers.”83 This illustrates both the initial high level of labor quality for
the transportation sector, as well as the slow development of human capital over time.
As noted by Goldin and Katz it is very likely that new technologies alter the relative
demand for diﬀerent types of labor.84 This technology-skill complementarity has also
been associated with the electricity revolution of the early twentieth century.85 When
I compare the growth in labor quality to my sectoral estimates of technological change
discussed in the previous chapter, I observe a mildly positive correlation between both
measures.86 For the period 1909–1939 the lumber, furniture and leather industries
experienced an annual technological change of just over 1.0 percent – well below the
average for manufacturing of 1.9 percent – while technology in the petroleum and
83. C. Goldin and L. Katz, “The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity,” Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 113 (1998): 696.
84. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 91.
85. Goldin and Katz, “The Origins of Technology-Skill Complementarity”; L. Katz and R. Margo, “Techni-
cal Change and the Relative Demand for Skilled Labor: The United States in Historical Perspective,”National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 18752 (2013): 1.
86. Excluding the transportation equipment sector, I find a correlation of 0.43 between the growth in labor
quality and technological change in the period 1910–1940.
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rubber industries increased by 2.7 and 4.7 percent per year respectively. The figures in
appendix 5.C confirm that the growth of labor quality mirrored that of technological
change for these particular industries. However, rapid technological change and la-
bor quality increases do not always coincide. Transportation equipment, for instance,
exhibited the fastest rate of technological change at 3.9 percent annually but expe-
rienced a below average rate of labor-quality growth. Technology and skill may thus
not always be complements, as we have seen for the automobiles example above. In
addition, the measure of technological change in the previous chapter was not cor-
rected for the change in labor quality. Consequently, labor quality is actually a part of
technological change making a direct comparison between both measures hazardous.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I compiled new measures of labor-quality change in the United States
for the 1900–1950 period. In contrast to previous studies, my estimates include a de-
tailed sectoral breakdown, allowingme to study both the development of labor quality
for the entire US labor force as well as the change across diﬀerent sectors and indus-
tries. For my time-series estimation, I follow the approach advocated by Jorgenson et
al.; a method also currently in use by the American Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The measurement of labor quality, or labor services, is of particular importance
to the study of productivity and technological change. Within a growth accounting
framework, the rate of growth of total factor productivity is defined as the diﬀerence
between the rate of growth of real product and the rate of growth of real factor in-
puts.87 The labor quality adjustment, presented in this chapter, provides a more ex-
tensive measure of labor input which will in turn allow for a purer measure of tech-
nical change. The results presented in this chapter allow, for the first time, for such a
quality adjustment of labor in all the major sectors of the American economy during
the first half of the twentieth century.
Overall, I find that labor quality exhibited a steady increase during the first half
of the twentieth century. The average growth rate between 1900 and 1950 was ap-
proximately 0.72 percent per annum, in accordance with the continuous increase in
the average years of schooling as outlined by Goldin and Katz.88 At the sectoral level,
labor-quality change was more pronounced in agriculture and industry than it was
for services. My disaggregate results show that the fastest rate of labor-quality growth
occurred in the mining, manufacturing and personal and professional service sectors,
while wholesale trade, FIRE and public administration exhibited slow progress. The
87. Jorgenson and Griliches, “The Explanation of Productivity Change,” 249.
88. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology.
i
i
“Woltjer_thesis” — 2013/9/5 — 10:59 — page 180 — #192 i
i
i
i
i
i
180 The Roaring Thirties
sectoral decomposition shows annual rates of growth ranging from -0.18 to 0.60 per-
cent.
Given the paucity of data on particularly educational attainment and labor com-
pensation, prior to 1940, I have made a number of assumptions that may bear uponmy
final estimates. The pre-1940 labor quality estimates are based on predicted values of
educational attainment, where I implicitly assume a stable relationship between occu-
pations and education attainment as well as a log-linear relation between birth cohorts
and education. In addition, for the compensation weights I rely exclusively on wage
and income data taken from the 1940 and 1950 census returns, thus assuming that
no notable changes in the relative wage structure occurred during the course of the
early twentieth century. Finally, I made no attempt to compensate for diﬀerences in
hours worked between the labor categories distinguished in this study. It is very likely,
however, that some groups (e.g. women) worked considerably shorter hours, which is
likely to have aﬀected their average wage and thus their implied contribution to labor
input.
In various parts of this chapter I discussed a number of these assumptions, endeav-
oring to establish their validity.89 Still, future work could benefit from particularly the
estimation of pre-1940 labor-compensation and hours figures, cross-classified by the
categories that make-up labor input; i.e. educational attainment, gender, age or expe-
rience and industry. As established by Goldin and Katz, however, this will present a
considerable challenge as this data is lacking entirely from the early twentieth century
population censuses, and only fragmentary data on a select few regions and time-
periods can be found elsewhere. The evidence that is available suggest, however, that
the wage structure observed in 1940 was fairly typical for the prewar period, lending
credence to the estimates presented here.90 Given the broad agreement between my
labor quality estimates for the total economy and the well-established estimates by
Denison, I feel confident that the new sectoral figures provide a valuable addition to
the American productivity debate.91
89. See for instance appendix 5.A for a discussion on the assumptions behind the logistic regression, or
section 5.5 for a discourse on the wages for female workers .
90. Goldin and Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology, 53–7, 59–63.
91. Denison and Poullier, Why Growth Rates Diﬀer, 85; Gordon, “US Economic Growth Since 1870: One
Big Wave?,” 124.
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5.A Estimation of educational attainment
Table 5.8 reports the main results for the logistic regression. For the analysis of labor
quality I start with a basic model where educational attainment is estimated solely on
the basis of occupational characteristics, gender and birth cohorts. Subsequently, I ex-
tend this model to include regional dummies, controls for young workers as well as in-
teraction eﬀects between the educational categories and the predictor variables. Over-
all, with the exception of the controls for young workers, all variables are highly sig-
nificant and show the predicted sign. The inclusion of interaction eﬀects – i.e. separate
beta-coeﬃcient for each of the educational response categories – reveal significantly
diﬀerent coeﬃcients between the educational categories for most of the included pre-
dictor variables. For the estimation of educational attainment I always include a set of
dummy variables for the occupational categories and gender as well as the natural log
of the birth cohort variable.92
By taking the natural log of the birth-cohort variable instead of incorporating a full
set of dummies for the birth cohorts, I assume a log-linear relationship between birth
cohorts and educational attainment. This assumptions allows me to reliably predict
the educational attainment of individuals born as early as 1820. Figure 5.6 illustrates
the validity of this assumption and, in addition, a number of plausible alternatives. All
panels in figure 5.6 present the probability that a male employee, engaged as clerical
staﬀ, has only attended grade school and did not continue on to high school or college.
The upper-left panel (a) shows the predictions from a logistic regression based on
a full set of cohort dummies, which covers the period from 1840 to 1920. For the
labor quality estimation in 1900 I also require data on individuals born prior to 1840,
however. The upper-right panel (b) compares the fit from the predictions based on
the natural log of the birth cohort variable to those in panel (a). This shows that the
fit from the log-linear extrapolation is actually very close to the predictions based on
the cohort dummies. In addition, panel (b) provides the probabilities for the 1820 and
1830 cohorts, which appear to fit in nicely with the trend observed for later cohorts.93
For other combinations of occupations, gender and educational categories I observe a
92. I exclude the tenth occupational category (laborers) from the set of dummies as it represents my ref-
erence category. The eleventh occupational category ‘unemployed/retired’ is included in the logistic regres-
sion, even though this category is subsequently dropped when I predict the educational attainment of the
workforce. Nonetheless, as observations from this category provide valuable data for the estimation of the
parameters of the remaining variables (e.g. birth cohort and gender), I retained the eleventh category.
93. An alternative assumption is presented in panel (c), which shows the probabilities based on a quartic
function of the birth cohort variable. For the cohorts born after 1860, this model again provides a very good
fit compared to that presented in panel (a). Prior to 1860 however, the predictions based on the quartic
for cohorts starts to deviate and the probabilities for the 1820 and 1830 cohorts do not appear to be very
credible. Lastly, in panel (d), I take the results from panel (a) which I extrapolate on the assumption that the
educational attainment between 1820 and 1840 remained unchanged. This prediction naturally results in a
clear break in trend between the pre- and post-1840 periods.
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Table 5.8: Logistic regression results, estimation of educational attainment
Model I Model II Model III
P(Yi=1) P(Yi2) P(Yi3) P(Yi=1) P(Yi2) P(Yi3) P(Yi=1) P(Yi2) P(Yi3)
(Intercept) -2.04 0.48 3.02 -2.26 0.31 2.89 -2.49 0.32 3.86
(0.007)* (0.007)* (0.008)* (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.009)* (0.014)* (0.011)* (0.028)*
occ. 1 -4.62 -4.57 -3.43 -4.00 -4.89
(0.014)* (0.014)* (0.053)* (0.021)* (0.029)*
occ. 2 -0.46 -0.48 -0.68 -0.52 -0.76
(0.011)* (0.011)* (0.015)* (0.014)* (0.036)*
occ. 3 -2.31 -2.25 -1.94 -2.25 -2.73
(0.012)* (0.012)* (0.024)* (0.014)* (0.030)*
occ. 4 -2.42 -2.36 -3.12 -2.79 -2.73
(0.011)* (0.011)* (0.044)* (0.015)* (0.029)*
occ. 5 -2.26 -2.20 -2.33 -2.41 -2.56
(0.013)* (0.013)* (0.035)* (0.016)* (0.031)*
occ. 6 -1.23 -1.14 -1.47 -1.22 -1.13
(0.010)* (0.010)* (0.018)* (0.012)* (0.033)*
occ. 7 -0.81 -0.75 -0.88 -0.79 -0.65
(0.009)* (0.009)* (0.014)* (0.011)* (0.033)*
occ. 8 -0.31 -0.34 -0.22 -0.32 -0.51
(0.015)* (0.015)* (0.022)* (0.018)* (0.053)*
occ. 9 -1.12 -1.05 -1.07 -1.15 -1.25
(0.012)* (0.012)* (0.021)* (0.014)* (0.036)*
occ. 11 -1.13 -1.02 -0.73 -1.17 -1.71
(0.008)* (0.009)* (0.012)* (0.011)* (0.028)*
female -0.07 -0.11 -0.36 -0.15 0.22
(0.005)* (0.005)* (0.009)* (0.006)* (0.009)*
log(cohort) 1.05 1.16 1.24 1.32 0.34
(0.003)* (0.004)* (0.007)* (0.004)* (0.007)*
young 0.32 0.18 0.02 0.79
(0.009)* (0.019)* (0.010) (0.019)*
region south 0.42 0.92 0.30 -0.09
(0.005)* (0.009)* (0.006)* (0.010)*
region midwest -0.20 -0.45 -0.15 -0.21
(0.005)* (0.010)* (0.006)* (0.010)*
region west -0.56 -0.43 -0.64 -0.62
(0.007)* (0.014)* (0.008)* (0.012)*
LogLikelihood: -1,023,374 -1,010,735 -982,163
Pseudo R^2: 0.114 0.125 0.150
Chi^2 v. constant: 263,236 (p < 0:001) 288,496 (p < 0:001) 345,640 (p < 0:001)
N = 975,261. Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p < 0:01
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Figure 5.6: Predicted educational attainment by birth cohorts (1820–1920)a
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(b) log(cohort)
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(c) quartic(cohort)
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(d) cohort linear extrap.
a The figures above estimate the probability, for each birth cohort between 1820 and 1920,
that a male worker, engaged in a clerical occupation (occ. 4), has only attended primary
school (educ. 1 or 2). The probabilities are predicted on the basis of the full model (III)
presented in table 5.8, where the ‘log(cohort)’ variable is exchanged for either a full set of
cohort dummies or a quartic of the cohorts. The fit resulting from the model with a full
set of cohort dummies in panel (a) is compared to alternative models in panels (b) and (c).
The last panel, (d), mirrors the fit of (a) extrapolated to 1820 on the assumption that the
educational attainment between 1820 and 1840 remained unchanged.
similarly good fit between these two alternative specifications, justifying my choice for
the inclusion of the natural log of the birth cohort in the logistic regression.
The first three columns in table 5.8 show the parameter estimates and standard
errors for Model I, the basic specification for the logistic regression. Unfortunately,
the interpretation of the beta-coeﬃcients is not as straightforward as is the case for
a standard linear regression. As noted in the main text, the parameter estimates for
the logistic regression model are linear eﬀects but on the scale of the log of the odds
ratios. The exponents of the parameters therefore show the multiplicative eﬀects on
i
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the odds.94
The parameter estimates for the occupational categories are all significant and in
line with the probabilities shown in table 5.2 in the main text. All the occupational cat-
egories have a reduced odds ratio in comparison to the laborer reference class, but the
categories normally associated with high-skilled labor (i.e. professionals [1], managers
and oﬃcials [3], clerical staﬀ [4] and sales workers [5]) returned the lowest coeﬃcients.
The estimate for the log of the birth cohort is also significant and quite large. For in-
stance, the odds ratio for an individual to have attended only primary or secondary
education is twice as large for the 1910 cohort as it was for the 1920 cohort; in compar-
ison the 1890 cohort’s odds ratio is over 4 times as large. This corresponds to Goldin
and Katz’s findings of a steadily increasing educational attainment for younger gener-
ations. The dummy for female citizens is also significant, but the estimated parameter
is very small. For the basic model there does not appear to be a diﬀerence between
men and women in terms of educational attainment, once I correct for occupational
and age characteristics.
The last three rows of table 5.8 report the model’s log-likelihood ratio and
goodness-of-fit statistics. The chi-square statistic compares the deviance of the full
model against a constant model, which for all three specifications provides strong
evidence against the null-hypothesis of no discernible diﬀerence in fit. The reported
pseudo R-square represents the adjusted-McFadden statistic which again compares
the fit of the full model against the constant model. Consequently, in contrast to the
R-squared statistic for simple linear regressions, the logistic version does not repre-
sent a direct comparison of the observed versus the predicted values of the model and
is therefore intuitively not as appealing. Nonetheless, I chose to report the pseudo R-
square as this statistic proves to be a helpful tool in assessing the relative fit of my
94. To illustrate the interpretation of the parameter estimates, I will first estimate the cumulative proba-
bilities for the reference category and subsequently analyze the eﬀects the variables have on this probability.
The reference category for the basic model is a male laborer (occ. 10) from the first birth cohort (1920). The
log odds for the reference category are represented by the intercept, which is 0.48 for the second educa-
tional class (5–8 years grade school). This value yields an odds ratio of 1.63 which translates to a cumulative
probability of 62 percent that an individual belonging to this reference category has only attended primary
education. The cumulative odds ratio for the third educational class (high school) are much higher; the third
intercept of 3.02 returns a cumulative probability of 95 percent. From these results the probabilities for the
individual educational categories can easily be deduced. The probability an individual has attended college
for example is equal to 1 minus the cumulative probability for the third educational category, i.e. 5 percent
for my reference category. To estimate the cumulative probability for an individual engaged as manager
instead of as a laborer I multiply the reference odds by the exponent of the ‘occ. 3’ parameter value. For the
second educational class this would result in an odds ratio of e0:48  e 2:31, or approximately 0.16, which
translates to a probability of 14 percent. As expected, the probability for a manager to be educated beyond
the primary level is substantially greater that it is for a common laborer. This example shows that a negative
parameter estimate will lower the expected odds ratio, while a positive parameter will raise it. A lower odds
ratio will in turn also produce a smaller cumulative probability value.
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three competing specifications.95
Even though the basic model provides a good fit, there are still a number of con-
cerns that need to be addressed. First of all the model predicts a very high share of
young individuals in the higher educational categories, which is the result of the log-
linear relationship assumed between the birth cohorts and the logit probability. In re-
ality it would have been implausible, however, for someone aged 16 to have attended
college. In Model II I take this constraint into account by adding a dummy for young
workers.96 In addition, I include the region variable described in section 5.3.
The results from the second model, listed in the fourth, fifth and sixth columns of
table 5.8, show that the young workers do indeed have a higher probability of having
only attended primary or secondary education. In addition, the parameter estimates
for the regional dummies confirm the conclusions by Goldin and Katz. The educational
attainment of individuals in the Western states is significantly higher than for individ-
uals in the other States. Overall, the South reports the highest parameter estimate. The
parameters for the variables included in the first model are only marginally aﬀected
by the addition of the new predictors. The only notable exception is the parameter es-
timate for birth cohort which has risen, reflecting the inclusion of the dummy for the
young workers.
The previous two specifications both assume that the eﬀect of the variables on the
odds ratios is identical for all educational categories. For some of the parameters this
may not be the case, however. To test this assumption, I include interactions between
all variables and the educational categories in Model III. The coeﬃcients in the last
three columns in table 5.8 reveal a number of notable disparities between the esti-
mates for the three cumulative educational categories. First, the right-most parameter
for the gender-dummy shows a diﬀerent sign. This demonstrates that for a given occu-
pation, region and birth cohort the probability for women to have spent a year or more
in high school is greater than it is for men. Reversely, the probability for them to have
also attended college is actually lower. Second, turning to birth cohorts, I estimate a
substantially higher parameter estimate for the first two (primary) educational cate-
gories. This suggests that the rise between generations in the number of individuals
having attended some form of secondary education was much faster than it was for
the shift between secondary and college education. This underscores the great leaps
made during the early twentieth century toward mass secondary schooling, but also
confirms that the greatest gains for college attendance occurred only later in the cen-
tury. Third, the ‘young’ coeﬃcients diverge considerably as well. The young-dummies
95. J. Gill, Generalized Linear Models: A Unified Approach, Sage University Papers Series on Quantitative
Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-134 (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000).
96. A young workers in defined as an individual 22 years of age or younger who is part of the labor force,
working either full- or part-time.
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for the lowest educational classes are small or insignificant, while for the third ed-
ucational category the estimate is quite large and significant. This shows that, for
young-workers, only the probability to have attended college is reduced. Lastly, the
new parameters for some occupational categories show a clear bias toward the highest
educational category. This is particularly evident for professional and technical work-
ers (occ. 1) who, in comparison to the reference category, are 50 times less likely to
have only attended primary education but over 125 times more likely to have attended
college or university.97
The discussion above suggests that there is strong evidence that the eﬀect of the
variables on the odds ratios diﬀer between the educational categories. This is also re-
flected in the goodness-of-fit statistics, which show marked improvement between the
second and last model specifications. The pseudo R-square, which oﬀers the most intu-
itive interpretation of the model’s relative fit, increased from 12.5 percent forModel II
to 15.0 percent forModel III. Throughout this chapter I relied on the third model spec-
ification for my estimates of the pre-1940 educational attainment of the workforce.
97. Note that the odds ratio for the fourth educational category is the inverse of the cumulative odds ratio
for the third educational category.
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5.B Labor compensation
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
De jaren dertig van de vorige eeuw worden zelden gezien als een tijd van technologi-
sche en organisatorische vernieuwing, laat staan als een periode van snelle arbeidspro-
ductiviteitsgroei. In plaats daarvan wordt dit decennium vaak geassocieerd met lang-
durige werkloosheid, mislukte oogsten, faillissementen, inkomensteruggang en alge-
hele financiële malaise, zeker als men terugdenkt aan de economische situatie in de
Verenigde Staten. Tijdgenoten dachten daar niet anders over. In de vroege jaren veertig
bestempelde het tijdschrift Life het voorgaande decennium als de “Gloomy Thirties”
(Sombere Jaren Dertig), terwijl Time opteerde voor het al even grimmige “Threadbare
Thirties” (Armzalige Jaren Dertig).
De wetenschappelijke literatuur legt eveneens de nadruk op de negatieve gevolgen
van de crisis die de Amerikaanse aandelenbeurs verlamde in de herfst van 1929, en
de ‘Grote Depressie’ die daarop volgde. Het overgrote deel van deze studies, zowel
in de economie als in de economische geschiedenis, richt zich op de beurskrach, de
run op de spaarbanken en de internationale monetaire crisis. De meeste evalueren de
directe gevolgen op de consumentenbestedingen, de werkgelegenheid, het prijsniveau,
de internationale handel en de reële productie. Daarnaast kijken verschillende studies
terug op het fiscale en monetaire beleid gevoerd onder het presidentschap van zowel
Hoover als Roosevelt en de lessen die daar, in het licht van de recente financiële crisis,
uit zijn op te maken.
Waar de meeste van deze academische bijdragen zich richten op de productiemid-
delen die niet benut werden en de inkomsten die uitbleven, stelt de economisch histo-
ricus Alexander Field dat voor de VS de jaren dertig, paradoxaal genoeg, ook de tech-
nologisch meest vooruitstrevende periode van de vorige eeuw vertegenwoordigen. De
hypothese van Field bouwt voort op eerder werk van Michael Bernstein en Ester Fano
en omvat twee stellingen: (1) gedurende de jaren dertig werd door bedrijven en de
overheid een breed aanbod van nieuwe technologieën en organisatorische veranderin-
gen geïntroduceerd, wat resulteerde in de sterkste trendgroei van totale factorproduc-
tiviteit in de twintigste eeuw, en (2) de depressie bracht een groot aantal innovaties
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voort die de voorraad onbenutte of slechts gedeeltelijk benutte technieken aanvulde
en uitbreidde, welk op hun beurt de basis vormden voor veel van de arbeids- en totale
factorproductiviteitsverbetering van de jaren vijftig en zestig.
Field betoogt dat de periode 1929–1941 weinig tot geen groei liet zien in zowel
het totale aantal gewerkte uren, als in de kapitaalvoorraad. Desalniettemin groeide
de productie in de Amerikaanse private sector (exclusief de agrarische sector), gedu-
rende deze twaalf jaar, met naar schatting ergens tussen de 33 tot 40 procent. De kloof
tussen de groei van productie en productiemiddelen weerspiegelde, zo stelt Field, de
verbetering in de totale factorproductiviteit, welke resulteerde in een reële vergroting
van de productiecapaciteit van de Amerikaanse economie met maar liefst 2,3 tot 2,8
procent per jaar. De technologische winst die werd geboekt gedurende de jaren dertig
was groter dan de stijging van de reële productie per werknemer in de jaren twintig
en oversteeg zelfs de winst geboekt tijdens de ‘Gouden Jaren’, de kwart eeuw tussen
1948 en 1973.
Voor specifieke voorbeelden van de technologische veranderingen in de jaren der-
tig wendt Field zich tot een studie van David Weintraub. Weintraub beschrijft onder
andere de ontwikkeling van het chroomproces en corrosie-bestendige staallegeringen
en verbeteringen in verven, vernissen en lakken. Hij toonde aan dat, door de ontwik-
keling van cellulose-lakken de tijd die nodig was voor de productie van een auto (door
het verminderen van de droogtijd) werd verkort van 26 dagen tot slechts een paar
uur. Verdere verbeteringen in chemische processen resulteerden in hogere opbreng-
sten in de commerciële winning van ertsen en nieuwe toepassingen voor afvalproduc-
ten, voornamelijk in de aardolie- en aardgasindustrie.
Daarnaast lieten de jaren dertig een stijging zien in het gebruik van machines en
apparatuur met een verhoogde capaciteit, wat eveneens de arbeids- en kapitaalpro-
ductiviteit sterk stimuleerde. Dit was zichtbaar voor apparatuur in algemeen gebruik,
zoals industriële locomotieven, shovels en elektrische motoren, maar ook in vaste in-
stallaties, zoals cementovens, moleninstallaties in de mijnbouw, transportbanden in
meelfabrieken en generatoren. Het gebruik van grotere ketels door elektriciteitsbe-
drijven resulteerde in een aanzienlijk hoger thermisch rendement en een bijna on-
onderbroken stijging van de energieproductie gedurende de jaren twintig en dertig.
Gerelateerd aan deze voortdurende trend naar grotere productie-eenheden was het
groeiend belang van industriële meet- en regelapparatuur. Deze verbeteringen verge-
makkelijkten de automatisering van controleprocessen, verminderden de stilstand en
onderhoudskosten van machines en verlengden de levensduur van de productieappa-
ratuur aanzienlijk.
De depressiejaren werden tevens gekenmerkt door de introductie van nieuwe en
verbeterde materialen en onderdelen. Naast de eerder genoemde staallegeringen wer-
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den in toenemende mate houten of metalen onderdelen vervangen door kunststoﬀen,
werden nieuwe materialen voor snijgereedschappen geïntroduceerd (bijv. wolfraam-
carbide) en werden verouderde glijlagers door rollagers vervangen. Ten slotte introdu-
ceerden producenten gedurende de jaren dertig continue verbeteringen in het ontwerp
en de inrichting van fabrieken door middel van onder andere de installatie van trans-
portbanden en de implementatie van massaproductiemethoden. Hoewel de basis voor
veel van deze ontwikkelingen al in de jaren twintig was gelegd, waren er nog steeds
aanzienlijke winsten te behalen in het depressietijdperk.
De claim van Field, dat de periode tussen 1929 en 1941 inderdaad een technisch
zeer vooruitstrevend decennium was, roept nog wel een aantal vragen op. Field specu-
leert dat de productiviteitskloof tussen Europa en de VS verder opliep gedurende de
jaren dertig, maar hij presenteert geen concreet bewijs hiervoor. Zijn relaas richt zich
vrijwel volledig op de Amerikaanse ervaring, wat dientengevolge de vraag oproept of
deze snelle technologische ontwikkelingen uniek waren voor de VS of dat soortgelijke
ontwikkelingen ook zichtbaar waren in Europa. Daarnaast negeert Field de rol van
menselijk kapitaal. Zoals Claudia Goldin en Lawrence Katz illustreerden, onderging
de Amerikaanse beroepsbevolking een ongekende stijging in het opleidingsniveau ge-
durende de late negentiende en vroege twintigste eeuw, een trend die niet werd door-
broken tijdens de depressie. Verrassend genoeg beweert Field echter dat de verbete-
ringen in het onderwijs en de daaruit voortvloeiende groei van de kwaliteit van arbeid
geen eﬀect hadden op de groei van de arbeids- of totale factorproductiviteit. Dit eﬀect
werd, zo stelt hij, gedurende de hele periode 1929–1941 overschaduwd door andere
factoren.
De onderhavige studie werpt een nieuwe blik op de productiviteit in zowel de Vere-
nigde Staten als het Verenigd Koninkrijk – de belangrijkste industriële rivaal van de
VS. In het licht van de dynamische ontwikkeling van de productiviteit, beschreven
door Field, analyseer ik opnieuw de Britse technologische en organisatorische innova-
ties van begin twintigste eeuw en bied ik een geheel nieuwe verklaring voor de snelle
divergentie van de Anglo-Amerikaanse arbeidsproductiviteitsniveaus. Hoofdstukken
2 en 3 presenteren twee nieuwe benchmark vergelijkingen, of ijkpunten van de Anglo-
Amerikaanse comparatieve arbeidsproductiviteit. Hiermee leg ik de relatieve verhou-
dingen tussen de twee belangrijkste industriële naties bloot, zowel tijdens het begin
van de twintigste eeuw (ca. 1910) als het interbellum (1935). Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op
de technologische verandering, kapitaalaccumulatie en eﬃciëntie van de industriële
productie van Groot-Brittannië en de VS tussen de twee wereldoorlogen. Ten slotte, in
hoofdstuk 5, kijk ik terug op de kwaliteit van arbeid in de Amerikaanse economie en
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de ontwikkeling daarvan gedurende de eerste helft van de twintigste eeuw.
Ik kom tot de conclusie dat aan de vooravond van de Eerste Wereldoorlog het gat
tussen het bruto binnenlands product per hoofd van de bevolking en de arbeidspro-
ductiviteit van de VS en het VK groter was dan tot nu toe werd gesteld. In hoofdstuk
2 laat ik zien dat vooral de Amerikaanse landbouw en industriële sectoren relatief
productief waren in vergelijking met hun Britse tegenhangers. Rond 1910 lag de toe-
gevoegde waarde per uur gewerkt, in de Amerikaanse industrie, iets meer dan een
factor twee maal hoger dan in het VK. Ondanks deze ruime voorsprong vergrootte
de Amerikaanse industrie de kloof in arbeidsproductiviteit nog verder gedurende de
jaren twintig en dertig totdat deze, in 1935, was uitgegroeid tot bijna 280 procent. Op-
vallend genoeg vind ik dus geen enkele aanwijzing voor een ‘tijdelijke conjuncturele
convergentie’ voorafgaand aan de Tweede Wereldoorlog, zoals wordt aangevoerd door
de economisch historicus Stephen Broadberry. Integendeel, als arbeid gecorrigeerd
wordt voor de terugval in het gemiddelde aantal gewerkte uren, laat de productivi-
teitskloof tussen beide landen een aanhoudende opwaartse trend zien gedurende de
depressiejaren; zoals ik aantoon in hoofdstuk 3. De gestage divergentie van de Anglo-
Amerikaanse arbeidsproductiviteitsniveaus lijkt Field’s claims, van grote productivi-
teitsverbeteringen in de VS gedurende het tweede kwart van de twintigste eeuw, te
onderschrijven.
De leiderschapsrol van Amerika wordt vaak toegeschreven aan de verschillen in
initiële condities en relatieve factorprijzen tussen de VS en Europa. Waar Amerikaanse
producenten al in de negentiende eeuw kozen voor voornamelijk kapitaalintensieve
productiemethoden, opteerden producenten in Europa (waar arbeid relatief goedkoop
was) juist voor een arbeidsintensief productieproces. Dit patroon in de verschillende
keuzen van industriële technologieën in Groot-Brittannië en de Verenigde Staten werd
volgens Broadberry voortgezet in de twintigste eeuw. Dit zou dan ook het gebrek
aan convergentie in de productiviteitsniveaus tussen beide landen kunnen verklaren;
Britse producenten bleven een arbeidsintensief productiesysteem nastreven wat, tot
de jaren zeventig, minder eﬀectief bleek dan het Amerikaanse systeem van massapro-
ductie.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseer ik opnieuw de productiviteit in de Britse industrie ge-
durende de vroege twintigste eeuw. Ik doe dit aan de hand van een nieuw analy-
tisch kader, ontwikkeld door Susanto Basu en David Weil, dat de rol van leren en
gelokaliseerde technologische verandering benadrukt en dat convergentie in het licht
van snelle kapitaalvorming voorspelt. Met behulp van een Data Envelopment Analy-
sis (DEA) kan ik de eﬀecten van kapitaalaccumulatie, technologische ontwikkelingen
en veranderingen in de eﬃciëntie op de Britse en Amerikaanse arbeidsproductiviteit
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kwantificeren.1 Hier vind ik bewijs voor een aanzienlijke verhoging van de kapitaal-
intensiteitsniveaus binnen de Britse industrie – met name in de ‘nieuwe’ industrieën
die nauw verbonden waren met de Tweede Industriële Revolutie – waaruit ik opmaak
dat deze belangrijke industrieën actief op zoek waren naar moderne technieken van
massaproductie en management. Hoewel rond 1930 de Britse industrie nog steeds on-
geveer twee decennia achter lag op de Verenigde Staten in termen van kapitaalinten-
siteit, waren de grote verschillen tussen de best-practice productietechnieken rond die
tijd al veelal verdwenen. De Britse producenten van auto’s, bijvoorbeeld, volgden het
pad van de Amerikaanse auto-industrie. Het interbellum toonde grote investerings-
programma’s, de geleidelijke invoering van gemechaniseerde productietechnieken, as-
semblagelijnen en gespecialiseerde machines en de opkomst van tal van nieuwe pro-
ducten en processen in de Britse industrie.
Zoals blijkt uit de gestage divergentie van de Anglo-Amerikaanse arbeidsproduc-
tiviteit tijdens de vroeg twintigste eeuw, ging het proces van kapitaalaccumulatie en
modernisering niet gepaard met een onmiddellijke toename van arbeidsproductiviteit
in de Britse industrie. In tegenstelling tot de bestaande literatuur interpreteer ik het
ontbreken van deze zogenaamde catch-up groei tijdens de jaren twintig en dertig ech-
ter niet als een tekortkoming aan de zijde van de Britse ondernemers. In plaats daarvan
stel ik een reeks voor waarbij eerst kansen voor groei worden gecreëerd, gevolgd door
een periode van learning-by-doing en ten slotte de daadwerkelijke convergentie van
productiviteitsniveaus. De eerste fase van catch-up, de invoering van nieuwe produc-
tietechniekenmiddels de accumulatie van kapitaal, omvat een uitgebreide transforma-
tie van het productieproces. Dit resulteert, op de korte termijn, in een daling van de
eﬃciëntieniveaus en een stagnatie van de productiviteit. Pas nadat de economie een
nieuw evenwicht heeft bereikt, en producenten ‘geleerd’ hebben het potentieel van
de nieuwe technologieën volledig te benutten, vindt er convergentie in termen van
arbeidsproductiviteit plaats. Vergelijkbaar met de claim van Field voor de VS, bear-
gumenteer ik dat de technologische vooruitgang geboekt tijdens de depressiejaren de
basis vormde voor de snelle arbeids- en totale factorproductiviteitsgroei van de Britse
industrie tijdens de Gouden Jaren (1948–1973). Ik betoog echter wel dat, in het geval
van Groot-Brittannië, het moderniseringsproces werd beperkt door institutionele be-
lemmeringen, wat verklaart waarom de technologische diﬀusie niet zo wijdverspreid
was en de technologische paden van de VS en het VK na de Tweede Wereldoorlog niet
zo snel convergeerden als het geval was voor bijvoorbeeld West-Duitsland en Frank-
1. Data Envelopment Analysis is een non-parametrische methode die in de economische wetenschappen
wordt gebruikt voor het schatten van zogenaamde ‘productiemogelijkhedencurves’. Met behulp van deze
curves is het mogelijk het maximaal haalbare productieniveau – gegeven een set van productiefactoren –
uit te zetten tegenover de daadwerkelijk gerealiseerde productie. Hiermee kan de eﬃciëntie van productie
worden vastgesteld.
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rijk.
In hoofdstuk 5 richt ik mij op de Amerikaanse investering in onderwijs en het eﬀect
hiervan op de kwaliteit van arbeid en het productiviteitspotentieel van de beroeps-
bevolking. Zoals aangetoond door Goldin en Katz, koos men in de VS al vroeg voor
een onderwijssysteem dat grotendeels werd bekostigd door de staat en dat toegang
bood aan alle lagen van de samenleving. Het Amerikaanse onderwijsmodel stond hier-
bij in schril contrast met het Europese systeem dat begin twintigste eeuw nog steeds
was voorbehouden aan de relatief rijken. De investering in het onderwijs, eind negen-
tiende en begin twintigste eeuw, transformeerde de Amerikaanse beroepsbevolking en
bereidde de Amerikaanse jeugd voor op een breed scala aan mogelijke taken en beroe-
pen. Verscheidene auteurs hebben al aangetoond dat de Amerikaanse benadering van
onderwijs een van de drijvende krachten was achter de technologische dynamiek die
deze periode kenmerkte en de weg vrijmaakte voor snelle economische groei. Dit is in
strijd met de bewering van Field die, zoals al eerder opgemerkt, stelt dat de vooruit-
gang in het onderwijs, of de ‘kwaliteit’ van arbeid in het algemeen, slechts een kleine
rol speelde in de groei van de totale factor productiviteit tussen de jaren 1929 en 1941.
Om het feitelijke eﬀect van de aanzienlijke investeringen in scholing op de Ame-
rikaanse economie vast te stellen, maak ik gebruik van een methode ontwikkeld door
Dale Jorgenson en Zvi Griliches. De belangrijkste vernieuwing in deze methodiek is
dat zij de traditionele maatstaf van arbeid corrigeren voor verbeteringen in kwaliteit.
Ze maken onderscheid tussen verschillende factoren die het productiviteitspotenti-
eel van de gemiddelde werknemer kunnen beïnvloeden (b.v. opleidingsniveau, maar
ook werkervaring en sekse) en wegen deze aan de hand van informatie over de reële
beloningen. In een boekhoudkundig kader, ook wel growth accounting genoemd, kan
de productiegroei als gevolg van beter opgeleide en getrainde werknemers nu wor-
den toegeschreven aan de groei van arbeidsinput in plaats van de onverklaarde totale
factorproductiviteit.
In tegenstelling tot eerdere studies maak ik een schatting van de verandering van
de kwaliteit van arbeid op het industrie-niveau, wat mij in staat stelt om de ontwikke-
ling van menselijk kapitaal in kaart te brengen voor niet alleen de gehele Amerikaanse
beroepsbevolking, maar ook separaat voor afzonderlijke sectoren en industrieën. Ik
kom tot de conclusie dat er sprake was van een gestage toename van arbeidskwaliteit
in de decennia tussen 1900 en 1950, met een gemiddelde groei van iets meer dan 0,7
procent op jaarbasis. In vergelijking met zowel recentere decennia als de ontwikke-
ling van het menselijk kapitaal in andere landen was dit een relatief snelle stijging.
De groei was voornamelijk het gevolg van een algemene verschuiving van werkgele-
genheid van de minder productieve agrarische sector naar hoogproductieve sectoren
(diensten), in combinatie met een algemene stijging van het opleidingsniveau van de
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beroepsbevolking.
Deze nieuwe schatting komt overeen met de door Goldin en Katz geobserveerde
stijging van het gemiddelde Amerikaanse opleidingsniveau. Derhalve concludeer ik
dat de bewering van Field, dat de verandering in de arbeidskwaliteit tijdens de depres-
siejaren slechts een kleine rol speelde in de snelle groei van (arbeids)productiviteit,
geen stand houdt. Hij baseerde zijn berekeningen op het werk van John Kendrick, die
het groeipercentage voor de periode 1900–1950 half zo hoog inschat als mijn meest
conservatieve schatting. Daarnaast stelt Kendrick dat er weinig tot geen groei in ar-
beidskwaliteit plaatsvond tussen 1920 en 1940, terwijl mijn cijfers een continue en
sterke groei laten zien gedurende het gehele interbellum. Mijn nieuwe schattingen il-
lustreren dat de kwaliteit van de Amerikaanse beroepsbevolking ook bleef verbeteren
tijdens de depressiejaren, met tot gevolg de snelle technologische vooruitgang en de
omvangrijke modernisering van de jaren dertig en daarna.
Alhoewel de jaren dertig ontegenzeggelijk zijn gehavend door de hoge werkloos-
heid, massale migratie en diepgaande sociale en culturele veranderingen, was dit de-
cennium verre van somber in termen van technologische vernieuwingen en organisa-
torische veranderingen. De vooruitgang in producten en materialen, verbeteringen in
de opzet van fabrieken, management en menselijk kapitaal en de opkomst van nieuwe
productietechnieken plaatste zowel de Amerikaanse als de Britse economie in een po-
sitie die snelle groei en ontwikkeling mogelijk maakte. In het licht van deze ontwik-
kelingen is de term “Gloomy Thirties” voor dit decennium dan ook te somber. Gelet
op de grote technologische vooruitgang en de uitgebreide modernisering van de pro-
ductieprocessen zou dit tumultueuze decennium met evenveel recht kunnen worden
getypeerd als de “Roaring Thirties”. Dit is dan ook de titel die ik aan mijn proefschrift
gegeven heb.

